THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE GRACE

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
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by
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ABSTRACT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE GRACE

James Patout Burns, Jr.

Yale University, 1974

This study analyzes the development of Augustine's doctrine of the operative graces through which God effects the conversion and perseverance of his elect and thereby achieves his predestining purpose. In interpreting Augustine the established practice has been to acknowledge an increased emphasis on gratuitous divine election which begins in 417 and lasts until the end of his life in 430. The insistence of providential manipulation of the environment of man's free choice which characterizes Augustine's discussion of operative grace in *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, *Confessiones*, and *De spiritu et littera* is then used to temper the deterministic rigorism apparent in his later writings. The fundamental assumption of such interpretations is the stability of Augustine's doctrine of divine operation.

The primary hypothesis of this investigation states that Augustine's doctrine of the grace of conversion changed in *De gratia Christi*, which was written in the spring of 418. Before this time, he explained that God effects the initial act of faith by presenting the motives he knows will actually win an individual's consent; but in 418 and thereafter, he asserts that the Holy Spirit works within a person's heart to overcome his opposition to Christ and to effect his decision to convert. A secondary hypothesis affirms that the subsequent doctrine of the gift of perseverance is modeled on the theory of the Spirit's interior working of
faith rather than on the exposition of providential control given in 397.

Augustine appears to have developed a new explanation of conversion in order to defend the gratuity of charity against Pelagian arguments that this grace is earned by the prior act of faith. The structure of the new theory seems to have been determined by the development of his appreciation of the work of the Holy Spirit during the polemic against the Donatists. The subsequent analysis of the divine working of perseverance grows out of this new explanation of faith and draws on its suppositions.

The usual exposition of Augustine's doctrine of operative grace begins with *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* (written in 397), moves immediately to *De spiritu et littera* (412), and then makes the doctrine of these two works normative for interpreting Augustine's later thought. This study, however, uses a developmental analysis of all of Augustine's writings to specify the variations in both the theological context and the problematic of each of his successive discussions of the efficacy of divine action. Only those sermons and commentaries on the Psalms which cannot be dated near the critical period beginning in 417 are excluded from the investigation. In the process, the growth of Augustine's theories of original sin, sacramental efficacy, divine coercion, and human freedom and servitude are traced. The significance of the Donatist controversy in shaping Augustine's reaction to Pelagius is central to the analysis.

Establishing this difference between Augustine's early and later explanations of the efficacy of divine operation specifies the proper context for understanding his final teaching on predestination and reprobation, and excludes certain mitigating or exaggerating interpretations of his deterministic tendencies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My study of the development of Augustine's theory of operative grace began in a report for a course on divine grace taught by Fr. Frederick Crowe at Regis College in Toronto in 1969. I read a number of the anti-Pelagian writings in chronological sequence and noticed what I took to be a variation in Augustine's explanation of the grace of conversion. Fr. Crowe encouraged me to pursue the hypothesis and suggested further readings in Augustine. When I moved to St. Michael's College, Prof. Joanne Dewart undertook the direction of the further study which was reported in the thesis which I submitted for the degree of Master of Theology in 1971, "The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of the Initial Act of Faith during ten years of the Pelagian Controversy, 412-421: Its Causes and Consequences." In the oral defense of this thesis, Fr. Walter Principe of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies showed me that the hypothesis could be established only by a fuller study of the course of Augustine's development. The project was put on a back burner while I completed the courses and examinations for admission to candidacy at Yale University. With the assistance of Mr. George Lindbeck and Mr. James Reilly, I was able to define with my mentor, Mr. Jaroslav Pelikan, a project which was both adequately comprehensive to test my hypothesis and manageable within the proper limits of a dissertation. The methodology of the investigation was modeled on that of Bernard Lonergan's study of Aquinas' discussions of the same material, which
I had the opportunity to work through under his direction in Toronto.

I owe special thanks to Prof. Dewart and to Mr. Pelikan whose direction always allowed and encouraged the free pursuit of the investigation, and to Fr. Walter Principe for the example of his exacting standards of textual analysis and for his continuing interest in the project. An additional debt of gratitude is owed to my Jesuit brethren of the Orange Street Community and the Dominican Sisters of St. Joseph's Convent for their care and support. Because of this research they have all heard a good deal more of Augustine's theories of grace and free will than any of them ever really wanted to know.

Finally, I shall not let pass the opportunity to pay tribute to the late Fr. Arnold Benedetto, who guided my philosophical studies and directed my research for the degree of Master of Arts at Spring Hill College. His persistence in exposing the inadequacies of partisan interpretations of Thomas Aquinas generated and nurtured such love as I possess for the study of each master's own text. He gave me my first taste of the intricacies of scholastic analysis of the interaction of human freedom and the irresistible divine will. Quiescat cor ejus in te Domine.

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de lib. arb.

de mag.

de mor. ecc. cath.

de mor. Man.

de nat. boni

de nat. et grat.

de nupt. et concup.

de ord.

de patient.

de pecc. mer.

de pecc. orig.

de perf. just.

de praed. sanct.

de sanct. virg.

de serm. Dom.

de spir. et litt.

de Trin.

de unico bapt.

de util. cred.

de vera relig.

de VIII quaest. ex, V.T.

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INTRODUCTION

This investigation centers not on Augustine's theory of predestination but on his elaboration of a doctrine of divine sovereignty, of the dominion of God over the free choice of man. Augustine not only asserts that man's salvation is consequent upon God's predestining purpose; he explains how divine grace accomplishes this design without violating human free choice. The understanding of how God achieves the good of the elect is the subject of this study; its hypothesis is that Augustine's theory changed.

Augustine first affirmed a divine predestination without prior merits in De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, the first written work after his elevation to the episcopacy, between 395 and 397. The assertion grows out of an analysis of the ninth chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and in particular of verse sixteen: [salvation] is not from man's willing and exertion, but from God's mercy. The accompanying explanation provides for a divine control over man's acceptance or rejection of the means of salvation through God's knowledge of an individual's dispositions and preferences and his providential manipulation of the environment of choice. Since God can find some appeal which would win the consent of any given person, his decision to present a motive which he knows will be successful actually determines the conversion and faith
of his elect. The environment in which he must choose lies beyond a person's own control, yet exercises a significant influence on his decision; thus, by asserting divine control over these factors, Augustine can explain divine dominion without violating human freedom. Once a person has believed in Christ as Savior and prayed for assistance to live well, God bestows the gift of the Holy Spirit, which disposes him to love, prefer, and accomplish the good works which merit eternal life. This much Augustine asserts and explains in 397.  

During the next twenty years, Augustine avoids the discussion of predestination and divine dominion over man's free choice. He subsequently explains that he skirted the issue lest the questions it entails complicate other discussions and derail his arguments. Such indications as he gives, however, indicate the stability of his adherence to this explanation of God's dominion. A discussion of the genesis of the act of faith in *De spiritu et littera* in 412 appears fully compatible with both the assertion of sovereignty and the explanation of its exercise which had been put forward in *Ad Simplicianum*.  

As Augustine gained ascendancy over Pelagius in proving the necessity of divine assistance to gain eternal life, he moved to block an appeal to a human initiative which would earn the grace which saves man. The assertion of the gratuity of God's help, of his operation of man's initial act of faith, and of the doctrines of predestination and sovereignty then became the focal point of the debate. To secure the gratuity of grace,

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1 *Ad Simplicianum*, 1.2.

2 *De praed. sanct.*, 9.18.

3 *De spir. et litt.*, 31.53-34.60.
Augustine asserts that man's conversion to Christ is accomplished by God's sovereign operation rather than by the autonomous response of man to an offer of assistance; and he advances a new and significantly different explanation of the way God works man's act of faith. Without relinquishing the divine control over the environment, Augustine affirms that the efficacy of the preacher's ministry derives from the operation of the Trinity within man's heart. Faith is attributed to the interior teaching of the Father and the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus the explanation shifts from the use of exterior means, and assimilates the operation of faith to the Spirit's working of charity and its fruits. At the same time, increased emphasis is placed on the Spirit's efficacy in moving man to good works. The discussion of election itself continues to center, however, on the initial stages of the process of salvation.

When the question of predestination next returns to prominence in the final five years of Augustine's life, the focus has shifted to the fulfillment of the Christian life. The accompanying explanation of divine sovereignty deals not simply with the initial act of faith, but with man's perseverance in good. The operation of faith through the interior working of the Holy Spirit is complemented by a similar activity which accomplishes the predestined person's continued commitment to justice and his avoidance of sin. The original assertion of Rom., 9.16 reaches its full scope in the final doctrine of predestination and perseverance.

The present study does not center on the early affirmation of predestination in the initial act of salvation and the late development of a theory of predestination to eternal life in themselves. Its hypotheses deal, rather, with the explanation of the way in which the divine dominion over the will of man achieves these purposes. The primary assertion is
that Augustine shifted his explanation of the divine operation of faith in 418 from the presentation of motives adapted to a man's dispositions to an immediate divine operation in the willing itself. The secondary hypothesis is that the explanation of God's operation of the predestined's perseverance in good is patterned on and derives from the doctrine of the working of conversion developed in 418.

Establishing these hypotheses would break an impasse in the interpretation of Augustine's doctrine of predestination by describing a shift in his thinking in 418 which divides his earlier from his later thought. A failure to specify the differences in his explanations of the exercise of God's domination over man's free choice has led many commentators to reject his entire teaching wholesale as hopelessly deterministic. Other interpreters have been more concerned to harmonize his assertions with acceptable doctrine; but many of their expositions have been notably unfaithful to the text and suppositions of Augustine. Six different interpretations can be grouped into three categories. Those who view Augustine as a determinist reject his explanation of the Christian mystery. Others attempt to save him as a Christian theologian and interpret his deterministic statements according to earlier explanations which guard man's freedom. A third approach distinguishes the earlier and later emphases, but without specifying the difference in the understanding of divine operation.

Without undertaking an analysis of Augustine's earlier writings, Odilo Rottmanner insisted that a rigorous doctrine of predestination which is accomplished through the irresistible efficacy of the divine will is taught by Augustine after 417. He submits that the later works must be considered definitive of Augustine's thought and concludes that his
doctrine is incompatible with Catholic dogma.\(^4\)

Those who attempt to rescue Augustine from conclusions such as Rottmanner's use different explanations taken from the earlier writings to interpret his later, more determinist statements in a way fundamentally compatible with the affirmation of human freedom. Four different approaches can be distinguished within this second category. These will be expounded by taking one modern representative of each school.

Xavier Leon-Dufour argued in a much-cited article that a statement in *De spiritu et littera*, which Augustine wrote in 412, must serve as the general principle for interpreting all his writings on grace and freedom.\(^5\) God wills to save all men, but man can accept or reject the means God offers, *consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est*. God never determines man's decision or encroaches on his freedom of choice.

Eugène Portalie uses the Molinist principle of *scientia media* to elaborate an Augustinian explanation of God's determination and control of man's choice in a way which does not violate his proper autonomy.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) Odilo Rottmanner, *Der Augustinismus* (Munich, 1892).


\(^6\) Eugène Portalie, "Saint Augustin," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 4 ed. (1931), I, Pt. II, 2388-2392, 2399-2404. This article was written between 1899 and 1902: it was separately published, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*, trans. by Ralph Bastian (Chicago, 1960), see pp. 198-204, 215-223. Among Portalie's predecessors in this tradition are: Otto
In the sixteenth-century controversy de auxiliis, Luis de Molina proposed that three different forms of divine knowledge be distinguished according to their objects: the events which actually occur, the pure possibilities, and the decisions which creatures would freely make in various circumstances. The third knowledge, whose object is midway between actuality and pure possibility was termed scientia media. With such knowledge, God could achieve his predestining purpose through providential manipulation of the environment of the elect's free choice. Such an explanation harmonizes with that which Augustine advanced in Ad Simplicianum in 397, and Portalié makes this theory normative for interpreting the later statements.

A. M. Jacquin takes exception to Portalié's reading of the text of Ad Simplicianum and proposes an interpretation inspired by the principles of Molina's chief opponent, Domingo Bañez. In both the early and later works, Augustine teaches that God wins man's consent not simply by providing motives which are adapted to the dispositions of his elect's will, but by an interior grace which modifies these dispositions as well. In this sense, God not only calls the elect by a vocatio congrua but also


A. M. Jacquin sets out his interpretation of the effective vocation in the second of three articles on predestination, "La question de la prédestination aux Ve et VIe siècles," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, V (1904), 727-746; and in, "La prédervation d'après saint Augustin," in Miscellanea Augustiniiana (Rome, 1931), II, 853-878. He attacks Portalié and Schwane by name.
prepares his will to respond. Jacquin draws his proof from the frequent
use in Augustine's later writings of the Septuagint text of Proverbs 8.35,
"The will is prepared by the Lord." In both these explanations, God ac-
tually determines the consent to his grace; and the elect cannot claim
an autonomous decision. Thus each must ultimately reject Leon-Dufour's
assertion of the elect's freedom to reject God's grace and to frustrate
his will to save.

Eugene TeSelle's interpretation of Augustine is more compatible with
Leon-Dufour's defense of man's freedom. He accepts the text of De spiritu
et littera as granting man a freedom to accept or reject God's grace.
However, he also notes a change in Augustine's explanation of the process
of conversion. In De gratia Christi, written in 418, the operation of
faith and the bestowal of charity are not distinguished and placed in
the normal sequence. Instead, Augustine analyzes the process of conver-
sion as a reorientation of man's will by the interior grace of charity.
TeSelle insists, however, that the explanation does not involve an imme-
diate divine action on the will. God works man's choice by presenting
motives to his understanding, through sensation or interior inspiration.
TeSelle also distinguishes the doctrine of predestination expressed in
the final five years of Augustine's life from his earlier teaching of
election and conversion. The one is concerned with providing the external
conditions for beginning the process of salvation; the later doctrine
involves the prior election of the faithful who are not chosen for etern-
al life.

8 Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York, 1970), pp. 320-322,
334.

9 Ibid., 325-326, 329-330.
Jean Leboullier is the principal modern interpreter to suggest a shift in Augustine's explanation of the efficacy of the grace of faith from the vocatio congrua to an internal operation of man's choice. Leboullier dates the change in 418, and in the later works finds further evidence of Augustine's having abandoned his former explanation. Following Leboullier, Guy de Broglie also notes the assertion of an interior action of man's willing which had not been discussed in De spiritu et littera. Neither Leboullier nor de Broglie, however, attempted to establish or elaborate the hypothesis; and it has been subsequently ignored.

Although the present investigation did not draw its inspiration from the remarks of Leboullier, it undertakes to establish this interpretation. It challenges the assumption that a single explanation of divine operation of man's choice can account for all of Augustine's statements. Rottmanner provides no adequate interpretation of the earlier viewpoint; and Jacquin fails to give an accurate exegesis of the text of Ad Simplicionum. Portalic's interpretation of this text is adequate; but his theory cannot express the more deterministic explanation of the later works. The principle which Leon-Dufour advances to generality is here rejected as incompatible with Augustine's fundamental assertion of divine sovereignty, and his proposal is shown to be the consequence of a misinterpretation of the single passage of Augustine in which it occurs. Finally, TeSelle's observation of the assimilation of the operation of faith to the bestowal of charity is developed in support of a divine


operation of the will which is not limited to the mediation of intellec-
tual motivation. In this way, a genetic link is established between the
two forms of predestination which he distinguishes.

The hypothesis that Augustine developed a new theory of the divine
operation of the initial act of faith is established by an analysis of
the texts of the Pelagian controversy between 418 and 422, by contrast-
ing the problematic of this explanation with that of Ad Simplicianum,
and by specifying the development of his understanding of related issues
in the intervening twenty years. The analysis of the theological context
and problematic of the two discussions demonstrates that a shift in doc-
trine underlies the change in Augustine's language. In Ad Simplicianum,
Augustine seeks an explanation of the first act of faith which will satisfy
the attribution of salvation to God's mercy and exclude any human autonomy
which could frustrate that mercy; but in 418, he must exclude all human
merit from the initial act of faith in order to protect the gratuity of
the grace of charity. A number of significant doctrines were developed
after 397 and provide a new context for the discussion in 418: a doctrine
of original sin which justifies the condemnation of all Adam's children
without subsequent personal sin, the understanding of a sacramental effi-
cacy in baptism which is independent of the consent of the recipient,
an affirmation of the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit which supplies
the efficacy of human ministry, the assertion of a divine election which
works the salvation or condemnation of children by providing or witholding
the sacrament of baptism, a theory of coercion which justifies the
use of persecution to force man to abandon evil and turn to good, and an
appreciation of the servitude of the human will which restricts man's
power to choose good. Through these developments, Augustine had devalued
man's autonomous freedom in preferring good to evil and had become more inclined to assert a divine operation of his choice.

The secondary hypothesis that Augustine's doctrine of the operative grace of perseverance grew out of his new explanation of the operation of faith is established by showing the genetic connection between the two sets of writings and the similarity of his argumentation. Augustine himself shows the relation of this problematic to that of his explanation of conversion in *Ad Simplicianum*; and this makes the influence of the Pelagian controversy on his theological context even more striking.

A procedure adapted to the scope and goals of this investigation has been adopted. The analysis concentrates on the development of Augustine's own thought and the influence of its various elements on the doctrine of grace and divine sovereignty. Thus no attempt is made to discover the origins of certain ideas in Ambrosiaster and Tyconius, or to specify the influence of Ambrose or Cyprian on his assertion of related doctrines. The significance of Caelestius, Pelagius and Julian of Eclanum is limited to Augustine's own perception of their teaching and his attempts to cope with it. Within the range of Augustine's own thought, attention is focused on the controversy with Pelagius. Efforts are made to isolate those elements in the controversies with the Manicheans and the Donatists which structure his subsequent polemic against the Pelagians. Through this narrowing of focus and concentration of attention, the present investigation attempts to establish the meaning of Augustine's statements about the first motions and fulfillment of salvation in the period after 418.

As the limits of the issues investigated have been set by the question to be decided, so the materials examined are specified by the genetic methodology. In a developmental study, writings which cannot be located
in a chronological sequence are of marginal value. Further, their dating must be established by external evidence, or by internal evidence independent of the issues under investigation. Through his Retractationes Augustine has himself provided the proper sequence of his major works, though difficulties remain with the dating of individual parts of works which were composed over longer periods. Only the Enarrationes in Psalms and the Sermones which cannot be dated within the Pelagian period have been excluded from this research. Although all of Augustine's other writings have been surveyed, further problems of dating have restricted the use of some. The Tractatus in Johannis evangelium subsequent to the first sixteen cannot be relied upon to trace a development between 412 and 422. The principles according to which Kunzelmann dates the Sermones of this period also draw heavily on evidence internal to the controversy itself, and particularly on some of the developments integral to the present interpretation of Augustine's doctrine. Such materials can be

12 The chronology of these expositions proposed by S. M. Zarb, Chronologia Tractatum S. Augustini in Evangelium primarum Epistulan Johannis Apostoli (Rome, 1933), and further elaborated by Maurice Le Landais, Deux années de prédication de S. Augustin (Paris, 1953), was challenged by Anne Marie La Bonnardière, Recherches de chronologie augustinienne (Paris, 1965), pp. 19-118. Her dating of the first sixteen expositions of the Gospel and all ten of the First Epistle before 410 may be considered established. The exact dating in 406-407 and the dating of the subsequent expositions has been challenged effectively by Marie-Francois Berrouard, "La date des Tractatus I-LIV in Johannis Evangelium de saint Augustin," Recherches augustinienes, VII (1971), 105-168. The argument for the Tractatus after number sixteen hinges on the interpretation of references to Arianism and Pelagianism; but the anti-Arian material is quite ambiguous, and the question comes down to judging the stage of development to which the anti-Pelagian material belongs. Even if the results of the present investigation could be presumed, the question would not be settled.

used to amplify an exegesis firmly established through other evidence. The uncertainties of the chronology of Ep. 98 ad Bonifatium and the tenth book of De Genesi ad litteram cause difficulties in the exposition of the development of Augustine's doctrine of original sin, which is divided between the final section of the second chapter and the first section of the third chapter. In the absence of clear contrary evidence, the more convenient separation of the material in these works from that in the works proper to the Pelagian controversy has been adopted. Because the chronological sequence of the writings against the Pelagians is so clearly established, these restrictions on the use of other materials do not significantly limit either the investigation or its results.

The exposition proceeds in six chapters, of which the final two deal with the hypotheses themselves. The first chapter expounds Augustine's original position on the responsibility of human free choice and the assistance of God's grace and then charts his progress through the explanation of divine efficacy in Ad Simplicianum. The period of the Donatist controversy is considered in the second chapter, which concentrates on the evolution of Augustine's theology of the Holy Spirit and the doctrine of original sin. The scene is thus set for the outbreak of the controversy with the Pelagians. The third chapter interrupts the historical sequence to attempt synthetic statements of Augustine's teaching on the freedom of man's will and the guilt inherited from Adam which supply the necessary background for tracing the growth of his understanding of the interrelation of grace and free choice during the critical period from 412 to 422. The fourth chapter picks up the thread of the narrative again, explaining the course of the polemic until the Council of Carthage in 418. With the parameters of development thus established,
the fifth chapter undertakes the proof of the primary hypothesis by analyzing Augustine’s statements on the divine operation of faith in the period from 418 through 422. The secondary hypothesis is then established by following the subsequent discussions within the orthodox camp in the last five years of Augustine’s life, 425-430.
CHAPTER ONE

THE DISCOVERY OF DIVINE ELECTION

The present chapter charts the growth of Augustine's understanding of the Christian mystery from his own conversion in 386 through the writing of his *Confessiones* as Bishop of Hippo, about 401. In this period three stages can be discerned: the polemic against the Manicheans, his first attempts to expound St. Paul's Epistles, and the insight into the gratuity of grace at the beginning of his episcopacy. In his original reaction against Manicheism, Augustine was intent on establishing that man's free choice is the source of all evil: physical ills derive from the punishment for Adam's sin; but moral evil results from each man's rejection of the assistance which God offers all. In reading and commenting on Paul's Epistles in a less controversial setting, Augustine comes to realize that the means of attaining salvation in Jesus Christ are not offered to all men. He supposes that God withholds the hearing of the gospel and the gift of charity from those who he foreknows will reject them. Shortly thereafter he focuses on the assertion of divine sovereignty in Romans 9 and realizes that merits are the effect of faith and charity rather than the foreknown cause of their bestowal. Through the recognition that the means of salvation are not universally available and that they are provided without regard to man's merits, Augustine arrives at
a doctrine of divine election. God's elective purpose is accomplished through a providential control over the circumstances of the elect's life and by the gift of the Spirit's charity.

This chapter, which traces Augustine's developing theory of salvation will be prefaced by a brief exposition of his understanding of the proper works of each of the divine persons. The second section of this chapter sets forth the theory of universally available salvation which is assumed in the early polemic against the Manichees. Then the influence of Paul's Epistles in the development of an understanding of the particularism and election of Christianity is detailed. The recognition of the gratuity of grace occupies the fourth section. Finally, the whole theory is confirmed by various examples in the narrative of the Confessiones.

1. The works of the Holy Trinity

Augustine tends to think of the Father as "God" who providentially orders all created beings and events for the correction and advancement of good men and the punishment of evil ones. God works by bestowing or withholding temporal goods and consolation or suffering of body and soul, as well as through the actions of free creatures, with or without their realization, to achieve his just and merciful purposes. The evil will of Satan is his instrument in the tempting of Judas and Peter no less than in the proving of Job and Paul. God's control over what a man sees and

1 De serm. Dom., 2.17.58; C. ep. Fund., 1; C. Faust., 26.3.
2 De lib. arb., 3.23.68; de div. quaest., 27; Ad Simp1., 2.1.4, 11; C. ep. Fund., 38; de acone chr., 7.8; C. Faust., 22.20.
3 De serm. Dom., 2.9.34; de nat. boni, 32.
hears enables him to influence and guide his decisions.⁴

The Divine Wisdom, which Augustine identifies with the Son, works within each man to enlighten, to direct attention to higher truths, and to give access to God.⁵ According to Augustine’s analysis of learning, man knows matters of fact by observation and report; but the truths of reason, which are unchanging and which govern judgments of fact, are acquired by consulting a source above the human mind to which one has interior access.⁶ The Divine Wisdom works within the mind of man, manifesting the eternal truths which are attained by interior reflection.⁷ Christ is characterized as the universal teacher who dwells within the minds of men and dispenses instruction according to the merits of each.⁸ Because of his special relation to the rational soul, the Divine Wisdom can speak immediately within the heart of man, and is not limited to working providentially through creatures. Thus Christ can influence men whom the preaching of the gospel does not reach.⁹

Augustine’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as the bond of love uniting the Father and the Son may be original.¹⁰ As the gift of God

⁴De lib. arb., 3.25.74.

⁵De beata vita, 4.35; de lib. arb., 3.5.12; de mag., 13.46.


⁷De mor. ecc. cath., 16.28; de lib. arb., 2.15.39; de vera relig., 31.57; de fide et symb., 4.5; de serm. Dom., 1.2.9.


⁹De Gen. c. Man., 1.3.6.

¹⁰De mor. ecc. cath., 17.31; de fide et symb., 8.19; de anone chr., 16.18;
to men, the Spirit is the source of love of God, of neighbor, and of
spiritual things. 11 The love of eternal things draws man's attention
and effort to the interior teaching of the Son 12 and to the performance
of good works. 13 The work of the Spirit complements that of the Son,
but it does not share its general scope. The Father controls all crea-
tures; the Son enlightens all rational being; the Spirit works in the
just.

2. Universally available salvation

De libero arbitrio spans the years prior to the Pauline commen-
taries and provides a structure for exposing Augustine's reflections after
his conversion in Italy through the beginning of his priestly service in
Hippo. The works of this period concentrate on what might now be charac-
terized as the philosophical problems associated with the Manichean and
Christian theories of the origin of evil and man's power to overcome it.
Augustine's polemic relies heavily on the Catholic assertion that physical

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11 De mor. ecc. cath., 13.23; de vera relig., 52.113.

12 De mor. ecc. cath., 17.31; de fide et symb., 8.19; Propp. ex ep. ad
Rom., 58; de div. quodct., 64.2.

13 De fide et symb., 8.19; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 54, 60; Exp. ep. ad Gal.,
44; C. Faust., 17.6.
evil and moral weakness are punishments for the sin of Adam. He insists, however, that each man is responsible for subsequent failures. As a consequence of the sin of Adam all his offspring are burdened with a certain impotence of mind and will. They do not attain a clear understanding of what they ought to do, and they experience difficulty in performing the good which they actually perceive. Adam was originally gifted with clarity of intellect and force of will, but these were lost as a consequence of his failure to use them well. As a punishment for sin, Adam became mortal and thereby incurred the ignorance and impotence which characterize this mortal human condition. Though Adam did not lose his power of generating, he could not fittingly transmit a higher form of life than he possessed. Hence all his children are subject at birth to the conditions of mortal existence which were a punishment for sin in their first parents.

Since sin itself is always a free personal choice to which one has an alternative, the punishment for sin in Adam and in his offspring

14 De lib. arb., 3.15.44, 3.18.52, 3.24.72.

15 The primary punishment for sin seems to be death: de duab. anim., 19; de vera relig., 12.23; de lib. arb., 3.10.29,31. Carnal concupiscence arises from the mortal condition of the body, de lib. arb., 3.18.52; and upon it follow ignorance of the true good which is incorporeal and inability to act according to it, de lib. arb., 3.18.51,52; de serm. Dom., 2.6.23. The present interpretation of original sin in Augustine follows the study of Athanasian Sage, "Pêché originel: naissance d'un dogme," Revue des études augustiniennes, XIII (1967), 211-248, hereafter referred to as, "Naissance."


17 De lib. arb., 3.16.46, 3.19.53,54,57, 3.22.64.

18 "ergo peccatum est voluntas retinendi uel consequendi quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere," de duab. anim., 14.15, CSEL, XXV,
is not itself sinful. The children of Adam begin their lives in an imperfect condition. They err unwillingly and must exercise great care to come to understand what they ought to do; then carnal concupiscence hampers their willing and prevents their accomplishing the good. Men retain, however, the good judgment and freedom to prefer wisdom and to seek it, to desire peace and to strive for goodness, and to call on God for assistance. Even prior to such a prayer, God helps men to truth through the interior illumination of the mind and his control over the circumstances of each man's life. Even the bitterness which tinges corporeal pleasures and the spectre of death admonish men to turn to eternal goods. God also inspires a love of truth in men's hearts so that they will attend to it. No man is without divine assistance.

Pt. I, 70.15-17. See also C. Fort., 17; de lib. arb., 2.19.53, 3.16.46, 3.17.49, 3.1.1-3; de vera relig., 14.27. Augustine will later restrict this definition to the sin of Adam, C. Jul. op. imp., 1.44, 2.80, 3.110, 6.21.


20 Ibid., 3.18.51,52, 3.19.53.

21 Ibid., 3.19.53,56, 3.22.65.

22 De mag., 38-46, esp. 45; de vera relig., 10.20, 24.25; de mor. Man., 17.55.

23 De ord., 1.5.14: de lib. arb., 3.25.74; de mor. Man., 17.55; de serm. Dom., 2.9.32.


25 In de mor. ecc. cath., Augustine places great emphasis on the role of charity in man's adhering to God and living a Christian life: 15,25,31, 22.41, 26.49,51, 30.64. The Holy Spirit is the divine charity and unites man to God: 13,23, 16.29. But the love which the Spirit gives seems to lead to the divine wisdom rather than itself producing good willing and works in man: 17.31. See also, de fide et symb., 8.19.
God requires that man do what is in his power: that he seek truth, strive for good, ask for help, and use the assistance which is provided. Faith is the first step in the process of man's salvation. Belief in God's historical acts and teaching precedes and leads to an understanding of spiritual, eternal reality. By living according to the precept which he accepts in faith, man purifies his heart and comes finally to understand the things of God. Good will is manifest in the desire to advance, even when performance falls short of perfection. A man sins only by failing to progress toward that perfection which is originally beyond his abilities. Reward and punishment are distributed according to these efforts. Thus children who have the opportunity to will neither good nor evil before their deaths must enter some neutral state in eternity. Augustine concludes that although the exercise of man's free choice is limited by concupiscence and his environment, sin occurs only when a man does not do what he actually could.

As a consequence of the sin of Adam, however, man is susceptible to a further limitation of freedom for which consequences he is responsible. When one fails to strive for good and consents to the suggestion

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26 De lib. arb., 3.19.58, 3.22.63,64; see also, 3.19.53,56.

27 De lib. arb., 3.24.72; de fide et symb., 10.25. See also de ord., 2.5.15,16, 2.9.26; de vera relig., 24.45, 25.46,47, 28.51; de util. cred., 2. The only "fullness of knowledge" to be found in the present life, however, is more in love of God than in understanding him: de Gen. c. Man., 2.23.35,36; de mor. ecc. cath., 25.47.

28 Good willing as the desire to advance is within man's power, de lib. arb., 1.12.25,26; but Augustine affirms that the accomplishment of this good is not in man's inborn power, ibid., 3.18.51.


30 Ibid., 3.23.66.
of sinful pleasure which arises from concupiscence, he augments the attraction of this delight and gives it some control over his willing. A sequence of such free choices implicates the will in a habit which actually rules further choices. The divine illumination and inspiration can challenge a habit which has gained dominion over man's will. Man always retains, however, the capacity to accept or reject the proffered divine assistance: he either undertakes a program of asceticism to reverse his habit or hardens his heart in a servitude of sin for which he is personally responsible.31

Augustine concludes that the opposition to good which adults experience is actually a consequence of both the sin of Adam and their personal sin.32 Originally, each man was capable of progressing toward full goodness; but his sinful choices have made this increasingly difficult. God's assistance continues to be given to men through means which would make salvation universally available: providential control over the environment, illumination by Divine Wisdom, and the gift of Divine Love. Grace is cooperative, eliciting and assisting the operation of free choice which remains in the discretion of fallen man. Although Augustine has assigned a place to faith in the gospel of Jesus Christ, it does not appear to be integral to salvation.

31 C. Fort., 22; de serm. Dom., 1.12.34-36, 1.18.54; de Gen. e. Man., 1.20.31, 2.14.21; C. Adimantium, 26,27. "Habit" translates Augustine's term, "consuetudo," which denotes a stable orientation of the will to a specific action, but must not be identified with the technical scholastic term, "habitus."

32 De duab. anim., 19.

In 394, Augustine began to comment on the Epistles of St. Paul and to employ them more fully in other writings. He makes a significant change in his theory of man's situation and of the grace necessary to bring him to salvation. Four states of fallen mankind are distinguished: before the law, under the law, under grace, and in glory. Thirty Within this structure, Augustine develops a fuller understanding of the graces of faith and charity.

For Adam each man inherits mortality and carnal concupiscence. The power of cupidity over man's choices begins in Adam's consent to a lower desire; it is increased by the cares of mortal existence; and grows by each sinful choice of an individual. When the evil of the soul's consent to these desires is not made manifest and prohibited, man follows and approves the tendency to temporal goods which originates in his lower nature. Augustine ignores the efficacy of the divine illumination and providential care which he had earlier indicated as instrumental in recalling man to higher values; and he asserts that prior to the giving of the law, all men sin and merit eternal damnation by their

33 These four times are distinguished in both the history of mankind, Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13-18; de div. quaest., 61.7; and the life of the individual, de div. quaest., 66.3.

34 Augustine uses the analysis of the development of custom, de div. quaest., 70.

35 Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 45-46; de div. quaest., 66.5, 68.3.

36 Exp. ep. ad Gal., 48; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 42; de div. quaest., 66.5.

37 Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13-18; de div. quaest., 66.2, 3.
consent to cupidity.\textsuperscript{38}

The law manifests man's plight and begins the process which leads to conversion and salvation. Through the precepts of the law, man recognizes the good which ought to be done; and as he attempts to hold himself back from sinning, he discovers the impotence of his will. Augustine now assigns to the law the functions which were earlier thought to be exercised by man's own intellect and will, even in his fallen state.\textsuperscript{39}

The giving of the law manifests the radical impotence of man and his need for a divine gift whereby he can love the good which is commanded and recognized. Through sinful habit, man has been dominated by a desire for temporal goods; his desire to maintain these goods and to avoid the threatened punishment does not fulfill the requirement of the law that the good be loved.\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, when the practice which the law commands jeopardizes the goods which carnal man hopes to attain as a reward for his obedience, he abandons the performance of the commanded works themselves.\textsuperscript{41} The law actually increases sin in the offspring of Adam

\textsuperscript{38} De div. queest., 68.3. There is no question of guilt inherited from Adam whereby all men are condemned. The mass of sin which all men become results from free choice which operates under the handicap of ignorance and concupiscence. A recognition of the inevitability of personal sin appears earlier in de Gen. ad litt. op. imp., 1; and is echoed in de div. queest., 68.4, when Augustine speaks of the general sin by which sinners form one lump. See Sage, "Naissance," pp. 217-218.

\textsuperscript{39} Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13-18.

\textsuperscript{40} Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 45-46, 47.25; de div. queest., 66.3.

\textsuperscript{41} Exp. ep. ad Gal., 43; de div. queest., 66.1.

\textsuperscript{42} Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46,49; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 48; de div. queest., 66.6.
by heightening desire, adding the evil of disobedience, and giving occasion for pride and self-righteousness when the standard of external performance is achieved.\(^{43}\)

Man requires the assistance of the law to discover the true good, though his judgment is capable of recognizing it once presented.\(^{44}\) The law also serves to break man's pride and appetite for autonomy, and to make him aware of his need for divine assistance.\(^{45}\) In order to pray to God for help, however, fallen man must receive a vocation to believe that Jesus Christ can liberate him from sin and help him keep the law.\(^{46}\) Even in his sinfulness, man has the power to recognize the truth of the law's instruction; so, too, he retains the capacity to accept the call to faith.\(^{47}\) The man who consents to the call to believe in Christ and prays for divine assistance merits the gift of charity whereby he does good works and merits eternal life.\(^{48}\) Thus he must assign his salvation to the divine mercy which provided the conditions necessary for his act

\(^{43}\) De div. quaest., 66.1,5: Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 40, 41; de div. quaest., 66.5.

\(^{44}\) Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 43.

\(^{45}\) The moral law makes man aware of his impotence and the futility of an attempt to justify himself, Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13-18; de div. quaest., 66.1. The ceremonial law of Israel and the subjection of the Gentiles to idols and demons humble them and thus prepare for grace, Exp. ep. ad Gal., 24, 29.

\(^{46}\) Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 62; de div. quaest., 68.5. The content of the act of faith seems to Christ as liberator from sin and the law, Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13-18,44,45,48,64.

\(^{47}\) Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 61,62.

\(^{48}\) Exp. ep. ad Gal., 32,47; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 60,61; de div. quaest., 68.3, 75.1.
of faith. In this sense, God effects the consent of man by calling him.\(^{49}\) The man who refuses to believe is denied the grace to keep the law; and he may be hardened so that he cannot respond to a subsequent vocation.\(^{50}\) Believing ceases to be primarily a cognitive process through which man comes to know higher things so that he may live according to them; the confession of sinfulness and humbling oneself to request divine help now define an act of fiducial faith.\(^{51}\)

Charity is the gift of divine love whereby the believer actually loves God, justice and eternal goods.\(^{52}\) Since each man chooses according to the dispositions of his will, according to what pleases him, the man who has charity chooses and accomplishes the good.\(^{53}\) Temporal and carnal goods lose their power over his will; he withdraws from vain curiosity to seek internal truth; and he desires the future life.\(^{54}\) Carnal desires continue in man during this life, but charity holds the mind back from consent to them.\(^{55}\) Although man's perseverance in good is not without

\(^{49}\) De div. quaest., 68.5.

\(^{50}\) Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 62; de div. quaest., 68.5. The hardening is not a divine action making man worse; but a withholding of divine aid with the consequence that man makes himself worse.

\(^{51}\) Augustine's earlier notion of faith did include a humbling of man's mind before the divine authority, de Gen. c. Man., 2.17.41; de fide et symb., 10.25.

\(^{52}\) Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13-18.

\(^{53}\) Exp. ep. ad Gal., 49; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 13, 41, 44; de div. quaest., 66.1.

\(^{54}\) Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 41, 58, 54.

\(^{55}\) Exp. ep. ad Gal., 49, 46, 48; de div. quaest., 66.6.
his own effort and consent, his good works and salvation should be attributed to God, who gives the charity which works good.\footnote{Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 21, 60, 62.}

Augustine affirms two divine operations in man. By giving the law and the call to faith, God works man's consent of faith; by giving charity, God operates love and its good works. In each case, the divine operation allows and requires man's own willing, which he may refuse. The two actions, however, are significantly different. Like the law, the call to faith is a divine teaching, given internally or externally by word and sign.\footnote{De div. auct. dist., 68.5.} The grace of charity is a modification of the dispositions of man's will. Thus God does not work faith in the same way he causes love and its performance of good.\footnote{Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 60.}

Augustine's understanding of the situation of Adam's offspring seems to have changed. Although man can still recognize the good when it is presented, he does not seek it out and discover it. Although man is capable of believing that God will assist him and of praying for this help, he requires a specific call to faith. The instruments of the initial stages of salvation, the law and vocation, are not so generally available as the endowments of nature or so universally provided as the providential care and divine illumination which were earlier indicated as the means of conversion to God. Augustine does not, however, raise the question of a gratuitous divine election operating in the giving of the law and vocation. The call to believe is indeed given by divine mercy, since none of man's prior works are good and meritorious;\footnote{Exp. ep. ad Gal., 46; Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 21, 60, 62.} but divine
election and rejection are based upon man's response to the vocation. Both Esau and Pharaoh, whose rejections are discussed, have received a vocation.

4. Gratuitous grace in the *Ad Simplicianum*

Shortly after the death of Valerius and Augustine's assuming the office of Bishop of Hippo, he replied to a set of questions put to him by Simplician, the elderly presbyter who had instructed him in Milan and who himself succeeded to Ambrose's see. One of the issues treated was the interpretation of Paul's assertion in Rom., 9.16 that salvation depends not upon man's will or execution, but upon God's mercy. Augustine recognizes that his previous understanding of the necessity of the divine gift of vocation as the means of faith allowed a subordinate but autonomous role for man's consent. Since the dispositions of man's will guide his choice and performance, God effects man's consent in good works by the gift of charity. Charity itself is given, however, only to those who

59 Without charity, none of man's works are truly good; hence there can be no merit prior to the vocation and faith which gives charity, *Exp. ep. ad Gal.*, 43,44; *Propp. ex ep. ad Rom.*, 60. One who has perhaps kept parts of the law in order to avoid punishment merited only this, not the giving of a vocation, *Exp. ep. ad Gal.*, 21. Finally, though a man may have sinned more lightly or even shown greater sorrow for sin than another, still if left to his own devices, he will perish. Hence the divine mercy is the beginning of salvation, *de div. quaeat.*, 68.5.

60 *De div. quaeat.*, 68.4,5; *Propp. ex ep. ad Rom.*, 60,61,62.

61 In one instance Augustine presumesthat Esau and Pharaoh receive vocations which they reject, *Propp. ex ep. ad Rom.*, 60-62. In another he speculates that the vocation of Pharaoh might have been the good done for Egypt through Joseph, *de div. quaeat.*, 68.4,5.

62 *Ad Simp.*, 1.2.12.
ask in faith. Thus if a man can refuse the call to faith, he can abort the entire process of salvation and frustrate the merciful purpose of the divine will. The independence of man's act of faith jeopardizes the divine sovereignty in giving grace and in hardening. Salvation would depend upon man's own consent and performance as well as upon God's mercy.

Augustine now develops a theory of the act of faith which will safeguard both divine sovereignty and human free choice. This theory is based upon three propositions drawn from his earlier teaching. In discussing sinful and meritorious choices, he has indicated that man's willing is actually governed by his dispositions by the patterns of his preferences. He has also affirmed God's knowledge of these dispositions, and thereby of the choice a man will make in any particular situation. Finally, he has taught that divine providence has full control over what a man experiences and knows. Now Augustine explains that through the type of motivation which God presents to a man in the call to believe, he himself actually determines whether an individual will freely consent or refuse the call. Those whom God elects to receive charity are given a vocation which is so adapted to their actual dispositions that it wins their consent. Those who are not chosen are called through means which

63 Ibid., 1.2.21.
64 Ibid., 1.2.12,13.
65 Ibid., 1.2.21,22. See also, Exp. ep. ad Gal., 49.
66 C. Adimantium, 17.
67 Ad Simpl., 1.2.13.
do not attract them, and which they consequently reject. \(^{68}\) God could, of course, devise a form of motivation which would move any particular man to faith. \(^{69}\) The elect accept and follow a divine vocation which effects their compliance; the non-elect refuse a vocation which does not work faith in them.

This operative grace of faith is significantly different from the grace of charity. The vocation is adapted to the prior dispositions of the human will, while charity modifies these dispositions. \(^{70}\) Augustine gives many examples of this congruous vocation, chief among them that of St. Paul. In each case, the effective element is something seen or understood which appeals to the man's desires. \(^{71}\) The difference in the efficacy of the two graces is more significant, although Augustine does not advert to it. The congruous vocation does not necessitate man's choice, but it always wins his consent. Charity, however, does not guarantee man's stability and perseverance in goodness. Only much later will Augustine recognize the grace of perseverance which operates man's continuing in charity and thereby achieves God's predestining purpose.

In this theory of an efficacious grace of faith, Augustine affirms a gratuitous divine election and rejection. The election is only to faith; glory must be earned by the works of charity. \(^{72}\) He immediately begins

\(^{68}\) *Ibid.*, 1.2.13,14.

\(^{69}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{71}\) *Ibid.*, 1.2.14,22.

\(^{72}\) *Ibid.*, 1.2.22.
a defense of the justice of reprobation. Augustine draws attention to two consequences of Adam's sin: all men are carnal and cannot understand divine truth; all men have become sinful and deserve condemnation. In the sin of Adam, men became terrestrial or carnal and lost the ability to understand divine things. Moreover, no sinner has a right to question God's justice and demand the knowledge which is a reward for faith and a pure life. Thus the sons of Adam cannot expect to understand why God saves one man rather than another. Clearly, however, God owes no man salvation and could allow all to go into the eternal death they have earned. The sons of Adam receive a good human nature from God; but because of Adam's sin they participate in mortality and carnal concupiscence. Fortified by personal consent, concupiscence mixes the whole human race into a single lump of sin, with the original guilt in every part. Because the universal human sinfulness which cupidity provokes would justify

73 Ibid., 1.2.17; see also, de div. quast., 68.2.3.

74 Although Augustine speaks repeatedly of the one lump or dough of sin, Ad Simp., 1.2.16,17,19; still he gives no clear indication of an advance beyond Propp. ex ep. ad Rom., 68, in which he laid the blame on each man's own consent to evil. Thus in Ad Simp., 1.2.18, he says, "Idem tamen ipsi et homines et peccatores, sed homines dei conditions, peccatores propria voluntate," CCSL, XLIV, 45.558-560. Later he amplifies this, "In multitudine, inquit, disciplinam dominus separuit eos--unde nisi a beatitudine paradisi?--et inmutavit uias eorum, ut iam tamquam mortales uluerent. Tunc facta est una massa omnium, uenienis de traduce peccati et de poena mortalitatis, quamuis deo formante et creante quae bona sunt." After explaining man's continuing natural goodness, he accounts for the sinfulness. "Sed concupiscientia carnalis de peccati poena iam regnans uniuersum genus humanum tamquam totam et unam comparsionem originali reatu in omnia permanente confederat." Ibid., 51.694-52.707. The reign of concupiscence would seem to achieve its effect through man's own will. No clear evidence of an inherited guilt is offered here. Later explanations of the role of concupiscence in transmitting guilt do not form the proper interpretative context of these early remarks. See Sage, "Naissance," pp. 218-221.
the damnation of all men, God does no injustice in condemning some of them. There is no question, however, of non-personal, inherited guilt; and the situation of infants who die prior to any free choice goes un-examined.

Augustine's understanding of the process of salvation evolves rapidly under the influence of St. Paul. He begins to realize that without special assistance men do not seek for truth and strive to do good; all sin and merit eternal death. Sinful man does not respond to the call of God which comes through natural processes: he requires a special vocation. Because of the divine sovereignty, the free response of man must be determined by God's choice of a specific vocation. Charity is given to him who believes and prays; it moves man's will to desire and do the good. The man who perseveres in charity merits eternal life.

5. Confirmation by example in the Confessiones

In his narration of his life, Augustine indicates many instances of the working of divine providence to bring him to grace and the ministry of the Church. The worldly desires of his parents were the instrument which God used to give him an education; his own desire for glory was used to bring him to Rome.\(^{75}\) God provided for his reading of Cicero's Hortensius and certain Platonist books.\(^{76}\) Similarly, he worked on Augustine both through Faustus the Manichean and through Ambrose.\(^{77}\)

\(^{75}\) *Conf.*, 1.12.19: 5.8.14.


More significant for the present purposes, however, are Augustine's accounts of various conversions, and particularly his own. He repeatedly calls attention to the efficacy of certain remarks and events at a particular point in one of his friend's life, which are arranged by God. Monica was cured of her wine-bibbing by the remark of a servant.78 Alypius was first turned from his fascination with the circus by an observation which he chanced to hear in Augustine's class.79 The two imperial agents of whom Ponticianus tells were moved by a chance reading of the life of Antony.80 The recounting of these conversions brought Augustine to the point of decision.81 In a number of instances some scriptural text effectively moves a man's will to belief. The conversions of Antony and Victorinus were so effected.82 The dramatic narrative of Augustine's own conversion builds to the point at which he is presented with a text of St. Paul which is exactly suited to move him beyond his doubts.83 Alypius is similarly moved by the following verse.84 These narratives provide striking illustrations of God's effecting con-

78 Ibid., 9.8.18.
79 Ibid., 6.7.11.
80 Ibid., 8.6.15.
81 Ibid., 8.6.13-7.16.
82 Ibid., 8.2.4.
83 Ibid., 8.12.29.
84 Ibid., 8.12.30. The historicity of these events is not relevant to the present interpretation. The text of the Confessiones indicates Augustine's own interpretation of the process of his conversion. Moreover, this pattern is found in every other conversion he narrates.
version through a congruous vocation. Moreover, Augustine asserts repeatedly that God works through men so that what will be effective is heard at the proper time.  

The later books of the Confessiones emphasize the operation of Divine Wisdom and Love within man. God gives the desire by which man seeks to understand Scripture and know divine things, and he fulfills this desire by interior speaking. Every spiritual creature must continuously be inspired by Divine Love in order to adhere to God. The man who has received grace continues to feel the pull of fleshly concupiscence which charity must oppose and overcome. God must give what he commands. Augustine notes that the dispositions or loves of man effectively govern his free choices.

The inherited consequences of the sin of Adam are death and susceptibility to that necessity which arises out of habit. A man's own choice is the source of his impotence in doing good and the necessity which binds his will to evil. Augustine finds his inability to live without a woman an example of this necessity arising from habit.

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85 Ibid., 1.1.1, 2.3.7, 6.7.12, 7.6.8, 9.5.13, 9.8.18.

86 Ibid., 11.2.3, 4, 12.12.15, 13.1.1, 11.22.28.

87 Ibid., 11.11.12, 11.12.15, 11.16.23, 11.32.43, 12.3.3.

88 Ibid., 12.11.12, 12.15.21.

89 Ibid., 10.29.40, 10.38.63, 13.7.8.

90 Ibid., 13.9.10. See also, Ep., 54, 10.18.

91 Conf., 5.9.16, 8.10.22.

92 Ibid., 8.5.10, 12.
Conclusion

In this first ten years at Hippo, Augustine grew rapidly in his understanding of Christian faith and in his grasp of the implications of Paul's assertion of the efficacy of the grace of God and the limitation of the power of man's free choice. Augustine shifts away from his original theory of salvation in which the universal work of providence, the illumination of the human mind, and the gift of love which effects salvation are closely linked neither to the historical events of the life of Christ nor to the historical means of transmission and communication in the Christian community. No question of divine election arises since all men can be brought to salvation through their natural endowments and the illumination God offers all. Moreover, in this early period Augustine places no emphasis on the necessity of charity for the performing of salvific works. No polemic against human self-justification mars his confidence in the ability of human nature to desire the good and avoid sin. Augustine has found his breakthrough for the destruction of Manichean doctrine in the goodness of nature and the voluntariness of sin, but he has not yet discovered the limitations of his new position.

Under the influence of St. Paul, Augustine begins to appreciate some of the nuances of the Christian opposition to the Manicheans. He comes to realize that there is no salvation outside Jesus Christ, grasps the necessity of charity for performing good works, rejects that justice which man can build for himself, and thus takes a new stance toward the teaching role of the law. The means of salvation are the law which breaks the pride of man, the preaching of the gospel through which one turns

93 Ibid., 5.9.16, 8.10.22.
to Christ, and the gift of charity which inclines man to perform the good. These means of salvation are historically conditioned and contrast sharply with the universally available means which were earlier indicated.

Further, the limited availability of the means of salvation opens the way to the question of divine election in providing these to one man rather than another. Augustine does not immediately face this problem; rather he insists that every man receives the opportunity to believe and to take up the justice of Christ. Only those who refuse to respond are damned. Thus both Esau and Pharaoh are said to have received and refused some form of vocation.

After attempting various alternatives, such as God's making salvation available on the basis of his foreknowledge of how each individual would respond to the preaching, Augustine acknowledged a gratuitous divine election which not only makes the means of salvation available through preaching, but so motivates the elect that the gifts are accepted. He was immediately faced with the difficulty of justifying the reprobation implicit in God's withholding the grace by which man can and does believe. Since faith has been identified as a divine gift, Augustine moves to the universal sinfulness which is consequent upon the concupiscence inherited from Adam. The sin of Adam does not itself make all men sinful; rather it places each man in a situation in which he will prefer the lower to the higher good and thus become sinful unless the grace of God intervenes. Condemnation is justified through man's spontaneous, though inevitable, choice of evil.

To those whom God chooses, two different graces are given: faith and charity. At the beginning of salvation, a congruous vocation effects man's faith. This faith is worked by the manipulation of the elements
already in the world to elicit a consent which is within fallen man's power. God brings together those elements of choice and motivation which will result in consent to the preaching. Charity, on the other hand, involves a divine element which is not a part of man's own nature. Faith is a divine gift because man cannot guarantee or obtain for himself the conditions necessary for the operation of his belief. Charity, on the other hand, is completely beyond the power of man to elicit since it is the presence of the Holy Spirit.

In later years, Augustine will assert that his recognition in *Ad Simplicianum* that man's refusal cannot frustrate the divine intention to save, was the single significant change in his understanding of grace and free choice. Certainly this stands as a turning point, the principle from which later developments follow. Augustine's appreciation of the gratuitous election will develop as his explanations of its accomplishment become more elaborate. Before tracing this process of growth, there are more preliminaries to be noted, the developments belonging to the controversy with the Donatists.
CHAPTER TWO

THE DONATISTS AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

The Donatist controversy brought three significant advances and occasioned a fourth. Augustine found it necessary to explain why schismatics who share orthodox Christian faith, sacraments and moral ideals could not attain salvation outside the unity of the Church. In limiting the gift of the Spirit’s charity to the bond of Catholic communion, he asserted that salvation not only originates in the historical acts of Christ but is mediated exclusively by the preaching and sacraments of his Church. At the same time, however, he developed an understanding of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Church which recognized an immediate divine influence in the human ministry. The legitimation of the civil coercion of the Donatists into Catholic unity involved another affirmation of divine operation through human instrumentality. More importantly, with the emerging theory of inherited guilt, the justification of coercion signals a devaluation of man’s autonomous choice of good. The appreciation of God’s operation in the sacrament of baptism, the gift of charity and the coercion of persecution, and the denigration of moral action performed without the gift of the Spirit, all define an outlook which will place Augustine in full opposition to Pelagius.
1. The Holy Spirit in the Church

In response to the Donatist assertion that the Christian must separate himself from sinners, Augustine built his ecclesiology on the fraternal and social nature of the love which is given by the Holy Spirit. The Donatists professed the same faith, performed and received the same sacraments, strove for the same moral ideals as Catholic Christians; but their refusal of communion with Catholics violated fraternal love and broke the unity of the Body of Christ. Because the charity which the Holy Spirit gives is both love of God and love of neighbor, one cannot love God outside the unity of the communion which the Spirit forms in the Church.¹

The Holy Spirit was earlier characterized as the principle of unity in the Trinity: now he is recognized as the source of ecclesial unity² whose charity forms the communion of the Church.³ The nucleus of the visible Church is the congregation of the saints, each of whom has the gift of charity and is united to his fellows in mutual love.⁴ The charity of the saints joins into their communion many evil Catholics who passively participate in the communion without sharing its charity.⁵ The saints

¹ C. litt. Pet., 2.55.126, 2.77.172; C. Crescon., 2.12.15; Tract. in Joh. ep., 6.2.
² C. litt. Pet., 3.5.6; Tract. in Joh. ep., 7.6; in Joh. ev., 14.10; de Trin., 6.5.7.
³ De bapt., 3.16.21; C. litt. Pet., 3.5.6; Tract. in Joh. ep., 6.10; C. Crescon., 1.29.34, 2.16.19, 20; C. part. Don., 2.35.58.
⁵ C. ep. Parm., 3.2.10, 3.3.16, 3.5.27; de bapt., 4.7.10, 4.10.15, 4.12.18, 4.17.24, 4.18.25, 5.16.20, 21, 5.19.25-27, 5.21.29; Tract. in Joh. ep., 1.11, 3.4.
tolerate the evil of these brethren in the hope of effecting their correction and salvation. Contrary to the Donatist principle, such love does not make one a participant in another's sin. 6

The presence of the Spirit in the charity of the congregation of the saints establishes their union as the subject of the divine power which operates in the sacraments. Since Christ bestowed the power to forgive sins not upon evil men, but upon the saints who receive the Holy Spirit, 7 the efficacy of the sacramental ministry comes through the prayers of the saints. 8 They alone are commanded to baptize, though other men assume this office. 9 No matter who brings them forward, the saints actually present the candidates for baptism; and the saints spiritually generate Christ in the Church. 10 As his love of God and neighbor wins forgiveness for all his faults, the saint can be called a son of God who has no sin. 11 The unity of the saints within the communion of the Church forgives sins and makes the sacraments salvific.

Ordinarily one must be joined to this congregation by both visible communion and conversion of heart in order to be saved. 12 The schismatic

6 Augustine cites examples in proof of this contention: Christ with Judas, C. ep. Parm., 2.17.36; Cyprian with sinful bishops, de bapt., 2.6.7, 8, 4.9.12, 5.4.4; the apostles with Judas, C. litt. Pet., 2.23.53.

7 De bapt., 3.17.22, 3.18.23, 5.21.29, 6.3.5, 6.4.6, 6.14.23; C. Crescon., 2.13.16, 4.11.13.

8 C. ep. Parm., 2.8.16; de bapt., 3.17.22, 3.18.23.


10 Ep. 98, 5; de sanct. virg., 6.6; C. litt. Pet., 2.5.11, 3.9.10.

11 Tract. in Joh. ep., 5.2.3; see also, de bapt., 6.24.45; de unico bapt., 13.22.
cannot have charity, hence baptism does not forgive his sins, his faith is in vain, and none of his works are good. The pretender or evil man who is within the communion but not a part of the congregation of the saints likewise attains none of the salvific effects of the sacrament. If the schismatic is converted and returns to the communion, if the evil Catholic undergoes a change of heart, each is joined in love to the unity of the saints and his earlier baptism becomes salvific. The unity of charity would effect salvation even if through error or impossibility one has not actually received true baptism.

Under the influence of St. Paul, Augustine had earlier placed the love of God at the center of his understanding of Christian life. Now,

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12 In the case of necessity, one might receive baptism from a Donatist minister; but he would actually be united to the Church through his true conversion, de bapt., 1.2.3, 6.5.7, 7.52.100.

13 C. litt. Pet., 2.55.126, 2.77.172; Tract. in Joh. ep., 6.2; C. Crescon., 2.12.15.


15 De bapt., 1.9.12, 3.16.21; C. Crescon., 1.29.34; Tract. in Joh. ev., 6.21, 10.1; de unico bapt., 10.17.

16 De bapt., 1.9.12, 3.16.21, 4.17.24.

17 Ibid., 1.12.18, 19, 3.17.22, 4.3.4, 4.4.6, 6.31.60.

18 Ibid., 1.5.7, 1.12.18, 19, 1.13.21, 2.6.11, 3.18.23, 5.23.33, 6.5.7, 6.14.23; C. Crescon., 2.13.16, 2.16.19, 4.11.13, 4.61.75; de unico bapt., 15.26.

19 In Cyprian's allowing admission without rebaptism even when he considered heretical and schismatic baptism worthless, Augustine finds an affirmation of salvation by the unity of the Church alone, de bapt., 2.15.20, 3.2.2, 5.2.2; C. Crescon., 2.33.41. The salvation of the good thief was by conversion alone, de bapt., 4.22.29-25.32.
through his efforts to overcome the inadequacies of earlier responses to the Donatist theories, he joins fraternal love to this central divine charity and identifies the two as a single gift of the Holy Spirit. The communion of fraternal love is the locus of the divine power which operates in the sacraments. Fraternal unity manifests the presence of love for God, just as schismatic division indicates its absence. 20 By providing the context and experience in which one can understand the nature of God who is Love, fraternal love gives meaning to the propositions of the Creed. 21 Love also accomplishes the cleansing of heart in preparation for the vision of God which Augustine earlier recognized as an effect of the humility of the act of historical faith. 22 Without this love, neither faith nor obedience to the commandments can save; with it, no fault goes unforgiven. Love of God in the communion of the Church is the one thing necessary for salvation.

2. Divine operation in human ministry

The second issue central to the Donatist controversy is the role of the minister in the efficacy of the sacrament. This question is solved by establishing the independence of the operation of Christ and the Holy Spirit from the moral quality of the sacramental minister. 23 The presence

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20 Tract. in Joh. ep., 6.4; see above, n. 13.
21 Ibid., 5.7, 9.10; de Trin., 8.8.12.
22 Tract. in Joh. ep., 9.10.
23 C. ep. Parm., 2.11, 23, 2.15, 33; de bapt., 3.10, 13, 4.4, 5, 4.10, 13, 4.12, 18, 4.13, 19, 4.20, 27, 5.13, 15, 5.19, 27, 5.21, 29; C. litt., Pet., 2.6, 13, 2.108, 247, 3.8, 9, 3.49, 59; C. Gregson., 2.20, 25, 2.21, 26, 3.9, 9, 3.11, 12.
of the Spirit in the charity of the saints makes their congregation the proper ecclesial subject of the sanctifying power of the sacraments. These saints then participate in God's operation through their prayers rather than as proper agents. The divine power resides in the congregation of the saints rather than being properly communicated to it. Thus if the minister of the sacraments has charity, he himself participates in the spiritual efficacy of the sacrament; but the evil man in the Church has only the ministry of the sacraments, not their power. The celebration of a sacrament outside the Catholic communion has no salvific effect, though God himself effects a sort of consecration in which the schismatic or heretical minister has no part. The efficacy of the sacrament derives from the divine power, though the saints and their ministry participate in the operation.

Christ and the Spirit are the principal agents of the salvific effects of the Church's ministry. Christ alone baptizes with the Holy Spirit, is the source of faith and the origin of Christians. He

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24 See above, nn. 7-10.

25 C. ep. Parm., 2.8.16; de bapt. 3.17.22, 3.18.23.

26 C. litt. Pet., 2.5.11; de bapt., 5.21.29.

27 C. ep. Parm., 2.10.20, 21, 2.11.23, 24, 2.13.27; de bapt., 4.4.5, 4.10.15, 4.11.17, 5.12.14, 5.20.28, 5.21.29; C. litt. Pet., 2.30.68.

28 C. ep. Parm., 2.6.11, 2.13.29; de bapt., 4.10.15, 4.11.17.

29 C. ep. Parm., 2.6.11, 2.11.24; de bapt., 4.11.17, 4.20.27, 28, 6.25.47, 6.36.70.

intercedes for sinners as the pure priest whose mediation cannot fail. Whether the minister be Peter or Judas, Christ cures, illumines, vivifies, preaches and baptizes. The Holy Spirit operates in baptism and the preaching of the gospel. When man speaks outwardly, the Spirit communicates inwardly and elicits a response.

Some sacramental effects are independent of the dispositions of the recipient as well as those of the minister. When a man presents himself for baptism without true conversion or while clinging to schism, the divine power in the sacrament accomplishes a consecration analogous to a military tattoo which makes the sacrament itself unrepeatable. When the human will is not opposed to the divine operation, as in the case of infants, the sacrament is adequate for salvation: it frees from the sin or contagion inherited from Adam and from its condemn-

31 C. ligg. Pet., 1.7.8, 2.4.9, 2.5.11, 3.42.51; C. Crescon, 4.21.26.


33 C. ep. Parm., 2.5.10, 2.7.14, 2.8.15,16; C. ligg. Pet., 2.105.241.


35 C. ep. Parm., 2.10.20,21; 2.11.23,24.

36 Tract. in Joh. ep., 3.13, 4.1,6.

37 C. ep. Parm., 2.13.27-30; de bapt., 1.13.21, 3.14.19, 3.15.20, 4.15.22, 5.3.3, 5.5.5; C. Crescon., 1.31.36. For the tattoo analogy see, C. ep. Parm., 2.13.291; de bapt., 6.1.1; C. ligg. Pet., 2.108.247; C. Crescon., 1.30.35.

38 De bapt., 4.23.30, 4.24.31, 4.25.32.

39 Tract. in Joh. ep., 4.11; Ep. 98, 2,6; de Gen. ad ligg., 10.11-14,16.
tion. Even in an unrepentant adult, the divine power may actually accomplish the forgiveness of sins. In neither child nor adult, however, does the divine power change the willing itself by effecting a conversion. The child has only the sacrament of faith, not its assent; and any sins which might have been forgiven in an unrepentant adult immediately return unless he converts.

Augustine's theory of the divine efficacy of the sacraments builds upon an assertion of the divine operation accompanying human ministry. When the divine operation meets a converting human will, the salvific consequences follow; but the effects of the divine operation without the consent of the recipient remain obscure. The Catholic tradition affirms a baptismal consecration which cannot be lost or repeated, but Augustine cannot decide whether the divine power effects the forgiveness of sins from which man does not turn. The African tradition asserted that baptism was adequate to save infants; but Augustine has no clear idea what is done to accomplish this. Finally, he concentrates on the immediacy of the divine operation and neglects the significance of the Church's ministry.

40 Ep. 98, 10; de Gen. ad litt., 10.11,13-16.

41 De bapt., 1.12.19,20, 1.13.21, 3.13.18, 5.8.9, 5.21.29, 7.3.5; Tract. in Joh. ep., 5.6.

42 De bapt., 4.24.31; Ep. 98, 9.

43 See above, n. 41. The man who holds to his sin is not forgiven, de bapt., 3.17.22. God does not cleanse man without his willing it, Tract. in Joh. ep., 4.7.

44 The human minister provides the recipient with an occasion to humble himself, C. ep. Parm., 2.17.36; de bapt., 1.8.10, 4.22.29, 5.9.10,11; and perhaps with the example of a good life, C. Cresc., 3.6.6, 4.20.21.
3. The justification of coercion

The theory of the divine operation of conversion through the congruous vocation does not lie fallow during this period: it too appears in a social context to justify the persecution of schismatics. Augustine develops a rationale for the Catholic party's collusion with the governmental coercion of the Donatists to rejoin its communion. He had earlier affirmed that providence uses the ills which sinners do to their fellow man to admonish, correct and exercise them. God, he observed, works upon men by afflicting them; and fear has its proper role in the process of conversion. Now he establishes the civil power as a similar instrument of this divine operation.

The decisions of rulers are under the divine control; and God uses civil persecution to bring men to a point of decision about their situations. Persecution of the good is intended to excite them to the fuller commitment which suffering requires. Persecution of the evil moves them to reconsider and reverse the sinful choice to which they have grown accustomed. Coercion effectively counters the limitations which social pressure, ignorance, established custom, and its security place upon the exercise of man's free commitment. By the persecution of evil men God

45 C. ep. Fund., 38; C. Faust., 22.20,72; de nat. boni, 32; de serm. Dom., 24.79; de div. quaest., 27; Ad Simpl., 1.2.18, 2.1.1,4; de agone chr. 7.7,8.

46 Conf., 2.2.4, 8.11.25, 11.2.2.

47 De mor. ecc. cath., 28.56; de cath. rud., 5.9, 18.30.

48 C. ep. Parm., 1.9.15; C. litt. Pet., 2.86.191; Ep. 93, 5.18.

49 C. litt. Pet., 2.84.186.

50 Ep. 93, 1.3, 5.16,18.
moves them to a position of greater freedom and attracts them to Christ.\footnote{C. litt. Pet., 2.84.186; Ep. 93, 2.5.}
The Scriptures amply report God's depriving men of temporal goods in order to recall them to himself. Prominent among these is the affliction of Paul with blindness to effect his conversion.\footnote{Ep. 93, 2.4,5.} Augustine admits, however, that he was himself convinced of the wisdom of the use of civil power by his observation of its results. Many who have come over from schism now rejoice in the Catholic communion. Enlightened and truly free of fear, they openly condemn their former blindness.\footnote{Ibid., 1.2, 5.16.}

Augustine's explanation of God's use of coercion differs significantly from his earlier exposition of conversion through the congruous vocation. Each moves man to decision by the manipulation of his environment to suit the dispositions of his will. The congruous vocation attracts man's desire and wins his consent. Coercion, however, pressures him to reverse an earlier decision by threatening the loss of goods to which he is more fully committed. Like the law's threat of temporal deprivation and eternal punishment, coercion works a decision which is not motivated by the love of God. Although such motivation may effectively withhold man from evil, it does not make his loves and works good.\footnote{C. litt. Pet., 2.83.184.} It is at best preparatory to true conversion.

The experience of the Donatist controversy may have impressed upon Augustine the great difficulty of changing man's commitment and shown him...
how few were the men who respond to such motivation as had moved him. As he became more involved in the pastoral needs and conflicting motivations of church life, he placed stress on the divine operation which achieves man's salvation and consequently devaluated the individual's free self-disposition before God.

4. The doctrine of original sin

In the six years prior to the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine began to be concerned to discover the meaning of the text of Romans 5, in which Paul asserts that in Adam all were made sinners. In the charting of his development of a doctrine of original sin retains a somewhat tentative character, however, because of the difficulty of dating the materials involved. The statements in the homilies on John are proper to this period; but the discussions in De Genesi ad litteram and Ep. 98 ad Bonafatium may actually be the fruit of a clash with Pelagius' disciple Caelestius after 411. These chronological difficulties are noted in the discussion of each work.

In the early homilies on John's Gospel and First Epistle, Augustine contrasts the roles of Christ and Adam and the two births which belong to them. In Adam's birth men are made sinners; but by the baptism of Christ they are liberated. The birth from Adam transmits concupiscence and mortality, which had earlier been recognized as the


56 For the chronology of these Tractatus, see above, p. 11, n. 12.

57 Tract. in Joh. ev., 3.12, 4.10, 10.12; in Joh. ep., 4.11.
punishment for his sin; but it also transmits sin, iniquity and guilt. On one occasion, Augustine observes that the practice of infant baptism implies the transmission of sin. Nowhere in these homilies, however, does he attempt to explain or defend these assertions.

The matter arises again in book ten of De Genesi ad litteram when Augustine considers the creationist and the traducianist theories on the origin of the human soul. Its explanation of the situation of infants who die before reaching the age at which they could make a personal decision provides a means of judging the adequacy of each theory. The discussion has four principles. The major assertion is Paul's statement that all are sinners and that every soul other than that of Christ himself needs his grace to be liberated from sin. The Church's practice of

58 Tract. in Joh. ev., 3.12; in Joh. ep., 4.11.
59 Tract. in Joh. ev., 3.13, 4.10; in Joh. ep., 2.10, 3.11, 4.3,11, 8.7.
60 "Et quia Dominus noster Iesus Christus de Adam corpus accepit, non de Adam peccatum traxit; templum corporeum inde sumpsit, non iniquitatem quae de templo pellenda est;" Tract. in Joh. ev., 10.12, CCSL, XXXVI, 108.29-32. See also, in Joh. ev., 4.10; in Joh. ep., 2.10, 4.11.
61 "Cum ipsa concupiscencia nati sumus; et antequam nos debita nostra addamus, de illa damnatione nascimur. Nam si cum nullo peccato nascimur, quid est quod cum infantibus ad baptismum curritur, ut solvantur?" Tract. in Joh. ep., 4.11, PL, XXXV, 2011B.
63 De Gen. ad litt., 10.11,16,13.
baptizing living infants indicates that unless they receive this sacra-
ment, they will be alienated from eternal life. 64 Further, no one commits
a personal sin prior to birth. 65 Finally, God cannot be the author of
sin by sending an innocent soul into flesh in which it must sin. 66 These
principles guide the elaboration of explanations of original sin based
on the traducianist and creationist theories of the origin of the soul.

The traducianist view explains that both flesh and soul derive
from Adam through the process of carnal generation. God creates the soul
as he creates the body, from the parents rather than from nothing. The
carnal concupiscence transmitted from Adam affects both soul and flesh,
and makes all men sinners. Obviously the flesh cannot desire without
the soul; nor can the soul desire carnally without the flesh. Moreover,
in its fleshly existence, the soul cannot desist from desiring according
to the enticement of the flesh. The desire for evil, which Paul calls
sin, affects both body and soul and makes all men sinners. Baptism is
given to infants in order to free them from the condemnation consequent
upon this sin. 67

64 Ibid., 10.11,13-16.

65 Ibid., 6.9, 7.25, 10.15.

66 Ibid., 10.11.

67 Ibid., 10.12. This is a significant development beyond the earlier
theory in which concupiscence gains power in the soul by man's free con-
sent to the suggestion of the flesh. It follows from the transcending
of an earlier dualistic anthropology. Augustine's reference to Manichean
error in De Con. ad litt., 10.13 may indicate his own awareness of the
shift. The new understanding of the body-soul relation appears in, and
may derive from, the discussion of the unity of the divine and human in
Christ, de Trin., 1.10.20.
The alternate creationist explanation asserts that man's soul is created by God from nothing and sent into a body derived by generation from Adam. The mission of the soul is to subject the carnal concupiscence which comes to the flesh from Adam, and to merit eternal life and the resurrection in which the flesh will be fully healed. In being adapted to the sinful flesh which it animates, the soul must undergo an oblivion or deadening to spiritual things. As it gradually revives, it can turn to God by his assistance and begin the long struggle for victory over the flesh in which it was submerged. If, however, the soul leaves the body before it can revive and live spiritually, the deadening effect of the flesh continues to affect it and prevents its attaining eternal life. The sacrament of baptism does for the infant's soul what he cannot yet do for himself by responding to grace. The application of the sacrifice of Christ makes expiation for this contagion of the flesh and frees the soul for eternal life should it die before it can live well.  

The creationist explanation involves a difficulty in the just condemnation of unbaptized infants which the traducianist avoids. If both body and soul derive from Adam, the sin which affects the soul is a spoiling of its nature in Adam which is justly transmitted along with mortality and the other punishments for that sin. If, however, God creates the soul from nothing, places it in flesh which contaminates it, and then calls it forth in death before it can either receive baptism or make a personal decision, then God himself seems to be the author of its sin.

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68 De Gen. ad litt., 10.14, 16. Although this hypothesis of the mission of the soul into the flesh resembles that advanced in de lib. arb., 3.19.57, it too has been modified to express a closer relation of body and soul.

and condemnation. 70

Despite the inconclusiveness of the discussion, a number of points are clear. Augustine does not object to the condemnation of infants on the grounds that the sin in question, whether it be concupiscence or torpor, is not a sin of personal choice. Nor does he raise the question of justice in inheriting this sin from Adam. In neither explanation is the sacrament thought to remove the "sin" itself from the soul. Baptism liberates from condemnation and opens the way to eternal life; but concupiscence continues throughout life, and the soul gradually awakes from its oblivion. Augustine does not object to the limitations of free self-determination which ignorance, concupiscence and the condemnation of infants represent. Finally, in discussing Christ's freedom from this sinful inheritance, Augustine specifies that it is transmitted by generation through the male seed. 71

An explanation of infant baptism in Ep. 98 advances a variant of the traducianist explanation. 72 Baptism is efficacious not for the temporal health of the child, but in dealing with the spiritual effects which are inherited from Adam: guilt, debt, the bond of guilt and of fault. 73

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70 Ibid., 10.15,16. The assertion of the necessity of baptism clearly indicates Augustine's transcending of the perspective of de libero arbitrio.

71 De Gen. ad litt., 10.20; Tract. in Joh. ev., 4.10; see also, Ep. 98, 1.

72 Accepting Goldbacher's hypothesis for the identity of the Boniface this letter is addressed, J. Ch. Didier attempts to date the letter about 411 by relating its discussion of infant baptism to the raising of this question at Caelestius' arrival in Carthage. The Boniface in question became bishop of Cataca in 403; but no other date regarding the letter can be firmly established. See Goldbacher, CSPJ, LVIII, 30; and Didier, "Observations sur la date de la lettre 98 de saint Augustin," Mélanges de science religieuse, XXVII (1970), 115-117.

73 Ep. 98, 5,1,2,6.
If the infant dies before attaining the use of freedom, the sacrament liberates him from the condemnation which enters the world through Adam. The child carries the guilt of Adam's sin because at the time the sin was committed he was one with Adam and in Adam, thus contracting its guilt. Once he becomes a separate soul living in himself, he can partake of the sin of another only by his personal consent. The Holy Spirit, however, creates a community in grace whereby the child can be assisted by the good willing of others to which he cannot yet assent. This explanation of guilt through moral unity with one's generator was not advanced in De Genesi ad litteram, but appears in De peccatorum meritis et remissione.

In De libero arbitrio, Augustine established the justice of the transmission of the punishment of mortality with its consequent ignorance and weakness, but he insisted that guilt and condemnation are incurred only by personal choice. In the later discussion of universal sinfulness in connection with the assertion of gratuitous divine election, he taught that concupiscence works man's condemnation by eliciting his personal consent. Now Augustine appeals to Adamic transmission in the radically different context of an inherited sin and condemnation, but he does not

74 Ibid., 10.
75 Ibid., 1,4. This argument should also prove that children inherit the guilt and punishment of the personal sins of their parents, which Augustine considers only much later.
76 Ibid., 1,4. This had been asserted in the case of ecclesial communion in C. ep. Patti., 1.3.5, 2.17.36; de bapt., 2.6.7,8, 4.9.12, 5.4.4.
77 Ep. 98, 2.
78 De pecc. mer., 1.10.11, 3.7.14.
undertake its justification. This issue will be prominent in the Pelagian controversy.

Even if only the Tractatus in Johannis evangelium et epistulam can be dated before the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy, it is evident that Augustine has developed the major element of his later theory of inherited guilt. All men inherit a sin from Adam which will alienate them from eternal life even if no personal sin is added to it. Prior to the age of decision, a child's salvation may be worked without his consent. The developing awareness of restrictions on man's freedom is joined to an affirmation of the efficacy of God's operation which secures his salvation.

Conclusion

After the emergence of his understanding of the divine election which operates man's faith and the gift of charity which makes his works good, but before the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy in which these would be tested and brought to maturity, Augustine's appreciation of three of the factors to be involved in this quarrel developed significantly. He affirmed that access could be gained to the salvation of Christ only through the communion and sacraments of his Church. The charity which alone makes a man and his works good cannot be separated from the unity which the Spirit builds in the Body of Christ. Thus Augustine had already rejected the adequacy for salvation of assent to the gospel and the performance of the commandments.

An appreciation of the mission of the Holy Spirit in the ministry of the Church had also developed. The coordination of human activity and divine operation had been affirmed not only in the regeneration of
baptism and the forgiveness of sins, but also in the work of preaching and exhortation. Although the Spirit works through the action of a minister, the efficacy of the ministry comes immediately from the Spirit and cannot be frustrated by the inadequacy of man. Augustine tended to reduce the minister's action to an occasion for the operation of the Spirit. Again, he had already preferred the invisible operation of the life-giving Spirit to the ministry, teaching and exhortation of man.

Finally, the limitations of human free choice in the religious sphere attain fuller articulation. Augustine accepts the salvation of baptized children by the divine operation without their personal choice. Although he denies the condemnation of other infants by this divine will alone, he does not require a personal choice of evil subsequent to the sin of Adam in such cases. God does not overthrow an adult's resistance to faith by acting immediately on his will, but the opposition is undermined by external coercive means. Augustine has decided that eternal beatitude need not be a reward for man's own choice between the alternatives of good and evil.

Augustine's own development began in a rejection of Manicheism, which was in turn tempered by Pauline affirmations of the precedence of grace over man's own freedom and justice; this understanding was then deepened in the tracing of his own life's development under the grace of God. He passed into a public forum once again to establish the inadequacy of faith and commanded works outside the Church and the efficacy of the Spirit's work within its unity. To justify the coercion which his victory brought, he valued the good of man's salvation over his autonomous freedom in choosing it.

A clash was inevitable between this already dominant figure of
the African Church and the man who had been enraged by Augustine's prayer that God give what he commanded. The ensuing controversy was the longest of Augustine's battles and the least conclusive of his victories. That it seldom settled into the barren repetitiveness in which Augustine had demonstrated such endurance during the Manichean and Donatist controversies stands as a tribute to the intelligence of his adversaries and, perhaps, as an indicator of the ambiguity of the cause.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PELAGIANS AND HUMAN AUTONOMY

The preceding chapters have sketched Augustine's theological development prior to the arrival of Pelagius and Caelestitus in Africa about 410. Shortly thereafter controversy arose in Carthage over the efficacy of infant baptism. Caelestitus' views were promptly condemned; but the discussion continued and Augustine was drawn into it by Marcellinus, the imperial official who served the Catholic cause so well in judging the claims of the Donatists in 411. Through the subsequent question of whether a man could be without sin in the present life, the debate quickly spread to the related issue of the necessity of divine gifts of faith and charity for salvation. By this time Pelagius, who had gone on to Jerusalem, was involved; and councils in Africa and Palestine reached different judgments of his orthodoxy. To secure his own ground, Augustine then insisted on the acknowledgment of a divine election which provides the graces of faith and charity without prior merits or initiative of man and of the divine operation of man's responses to those graces.

Although the debate centered on the proper reconciliation of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, the participants disagreed on the foundations of Christian faith: the uniqueness of Christ as Savior and the function of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation. The Pelagians
asserted both the divine desire to save all men and the individual's responsibility for his own salvation or damnation. God's assistance is limited to those things which facilitate man's own action: the natural and Mosaic Law, the forgiveness of sins, and the promise of future glory. The Pelagian attempt to account for salvation or condemnation seemed to preclude a unique and essential role for Christ in the economy of salvation. He won the forgiveness of sins and serves as a guide and model for man's efforts; but the historical union with him through faith and sacrament which are not available to all men cannot be held necessary for salvation. Augustine, on the other hand, insisted on the centrality of Christ as the sole source and unique means of salvation, and consequently rejected all pretense of a divine will to save all men after the sin of Adam. Faith in the historical events of Christ's mission, the reception of the sacrament of this faith, and the Spirit's gift of charity in the unity of the Church are essential for salvation. God bears ultimate responsibility for man's salvation since his Spirit both provides the means of salvation and effects the faith and good works of the elect.

For the purposes of analysis, three stages can be distinguished in the Pelagian controversy. During the period from 410 to the councils of 416, Augustine refrained from attacking Pelagius by name and worked to win his agreement. When the judgment was appealed and the opposing parties were trying to win their cases in Rome, Augustine undertook a vigorous campaign which brought him into open conflict with Pelagius and later with the counter-attacking Julian of Eclanum. This issue was settled by 422, though Augustine was still struggling with Julian's books when he died in 430. The third stage of the controversy involved the doctrine of predestination. About 425, orthodox Christians in Africa and Provence
objected that the position Augustine had taken in the battle with Pelagius was itself outside the pale of Catholic teaching and practice.

The hypothesis of this study is that Augustine changed his doctrine of the way God works man's conversion when he began to press Pelagius about 418. The present chapter does not enter into the question, but sets the context for the development of Augustine's theory of divine election and operation by explaining his contemporary understanding of two related issues: original sin and the freedom of the will. In one sense the controversy concerns nothing else. Pelagius held as a first principle that a man cannot be punished or rewarded for something he either did not himself will and perform or for something he could not have avoided. Augustine's assertion of the gratuity and efficacy of the grace which accomplishes God's predestining purpose is built on his own understanding of human responsibility, and the justice of God's action is defended by an appeal to the condemnation of all men in Adam.

In order to clarify Augustine's suppositions, the material will be structured synthetically rather than chronologically, though developments will be noted when the sequence of positions is significant. Although Pelagius forced Augustine to further elaborate his theory of the operation of man's will, the controversy with Julian over the transmission of Adam's guilt through concupiscence yielded clarification rather than development. As background for the shift in Augustine's theory of conversion, the present exposition is limited to the first two stages of the controversy, 411-422. Final clarifications which Augustine advanced in his last, unfinished reply to Julian are noted; but new material from this work is deferred to its proper place in the chapter which deals with the third stage of the controversy.
1. The nature and transmission of original sin

Three levels of assertion can be discerned in Augustine's teaching on original sin. The theological foundation of the doctrine belongs to the essence of Christian faith: Jesus Christ is the sole source and means of salvation. Then he derives an understanding of the role of Adam as the source of condemnation and sin in all men. This layer also includes an assertion that, like spiritual re-birth in Christ, the transmission of condemnation from Adam is through generation rather than imitation. A second level of the teaching contains Augustine's explanation of the communication of sin and death through the presence and operation of carnal concupiscence. Finally, a third level is formed around the discussion of the problem of the origin of the soul which Augustine could not solve in a way he found compatible with both his explanation of the transmission of original sin and his belief in the divine justice. The doctrinal theories of the second level and philosophical discussions of the third are intended to explain the dogmatic affirmations of the first level. Augustine clearly distinguished the certainty of his first principles from that of subsequent explanations. He offered more than one theory of participation in the sin of Adam and refrained from judging the origin of the soul. The present exposition explores each of these layers in turn.

1. The present exposition is compatible with that of Julius Gross, Geschichte des Erbsündendogmas (Munich, 1960-), I, 257-376; as well as that of Athanase Sage, "La pêché original dans la pensée de saint Augustin, de 412 à 430," Revue des Études augustiniennes, XV (1969), 75-112. The interpretative principle employed here is significantly different, however. For a history of the exegesis of Augustine's doctrine, see Jacques de Blic, "Le péché original selon saint Augustin," Recherches de science religieuse, XVI (1926), 97-119; XVII (1927), 414-433, 512-531.
The foundation of Augustine's teaching and the source of its dogmatic character is a confession that Jesus Christ, in an historical act of redemption, is the sole source of salvation for mankind. Christ establishes his salvation in an historical way, and he communicates it through faith in the preaching of the account of this action and participation in his sacraments. Augustine's shift from a cosmological to an historical religious perspective was evident in his commentaries on St. Paul. His resolution of the issues of the Donatist controversy confirmed the supposition that salvation was available only through humanly communicated faith in Christ and reception of those sacraments proper to a particular period of the history of mankind.

Jesus Christ is the sole source of salvation; any assertion which allows eternal life without reference to Christ is to be rejected as contrary to the Christian faith and an emptying of the Cross. Consequently, Augustine excludes any form of eternal life outside the Kingdom of Christ. Though he does not deny a temporary limbo of the Fathers, he refuses to acknowledge any form of eternal life midway between the Kingdom and eternal death.

Confession of the historical Christ and his human activity as the origin of salvation entails, for Augustine, an assertion that Christ's grace is communicated only through such historical means as will join

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3 Two texts are important here. In de pecc. mer., 1.20.26, Augustine shows that without baptism one does not enter the Kingdom and without the eucharist one has no eternal life. Since only the baptized receive the eucharist, he limits eternal life to the Kingdom. In de pecc. mer., 3.3.6, the words of the judging Christ of Mt. 25 identify the Kingdom prepared for all time with eternal life. For the exclusion of a paradise of the unbaptized see, de anim. et ejus orig., 2.10.14, 3.11.17.
a man to these events. Faith in the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is judged absolutely necessary for the salvation of any man. 4 One cannot be saved simply by belief in the Creator, even if he has no way of hearing about Christ. 5 Since a concession that the Fathers of the Old Testament were saved by the power of human nature to do good or by the justice which comes from performing the commandments of the law would render the Cross of Christ unnecessary and meaningless for them, the grace of Christ must be recognized as working before his historical coming. 6 Augustine explains that faith in Christ was made accessible in every age to the predestined, principally through the various prophecies of his coming. 7 Belief in events which are future does not change the nature of faith itself, as the confession of the future judgment attests. 8

The sacraments of faith in Christ are not the same in every age. Circumcision joined men to Christ because it was a sign of his resurrection on the eighth day. 9 This has now been replaced by baptism, whose necessity Augustine establishes on the dual foundations of an act of belief and an incorporation into Christ. The charge to the apostles at

4 De pecc. orig., 24.28; de nat. et grat., 44.51.
5 De nat. et grat., 2.2.
6 De perf. just., 19.42; de pecc. orig., 27.32; de nupt. et concup., 2.11.24; Ep. 190, 2.6,8; C. epp. Pel., 1.7.12, 1.21.39; de civ. Dei, 10.25.
7 De pecc. mer., 2.29.47.
9 Ep. 157, 3.14; de anim. et ejus orig., 2.11.15; de nupt. et concup., 2.11.24.
the end of Mark's Gospel links baptism to the faith which is salvific. The martyr's confession is accepted by Augustine as saving even in the absence of baptism, but he prefers to argue that the thief crucified with Jesus may have been baptized before his execution or even by the water from the side of Christ. Children, of course, can escape the condemnation of unbelief only through the power of the sacrament and the confession of their sponsors. The influence of the Donatist controversy is evident in Augustine's argument that one must be joined to the Body and members of Christ to enter his Kingdom. Baptism has this function of joining man to Christ, and the necessity of the eucharist for eternal life derives from the communicant's participation in the Body of Christ.

Augustine's doctrine of original sin is the elaboration of his assertion that no one can be saved without faith in Jesus Christ. If faith is necessary for salvation, then some sin must justify the condemnation of those to whom the gospel is not preached and for whom the sacrament of faith is unavailable. Earlier in his episcopacy, Augustine defended the justice of the limited availability of the means of salvation through an assertion of universal personal sinfulness. At that time, however, he did not consider the case of infants who die with neither baptism nor

10 *De pecc. mer.*, 3.2.3, 3.3.6; *Ep.* 193, 2.4; *Ep.* 194, 10.46; *de anim. et ejus orig.*, 2.12.17; *C. epp. Pel.*, 1.22.40.


12 *De pecc. mer.*, 3.2.3; *Ep.* 193, 2.4; *Ep.* 194, 10.46; *de anim et ejus orig.*, 2.12.17; *C. Jul. Pel.*, 5.3.6, 6.10.29.

13 *De pecc. mer.*, 1.12.15, 3.4.7.

14 *Ibid.*, 3.4.8, 1.23.33; *C. epp. Pel.*, 1.22.40, 2.4.7.
personal sin. To account for the just condemnation of infants who are not joined to Christ as believers through the sacrament of baptism, Augustine now recognizes an inherited guilt which does not arise from their personal choice.  

The first principle of this argument is that no child can enter the Kingdom of Christ without baptism. For one made in the image of God, exile from the Kingdom, even without further torments, itself constitutes a great punishment, and cannot justly be imposed without the presence of sin. However, the infant who dies before attaining the age of discretion has committed no personal sin during his earthly existence; and Augustine steadfastly rejects any suggestion of the soul's sin in a separate state prior to its entrance into the flesh. Hence he must assert the presence of some sin and guilt prior to personal decision in all who need the salvation of Jesus Christ.

Augustine finds further indications of the presence of a pre-personal sin in infants by reflecting on the sacrifice which Christ offered for all men, the rite of baptism and the penal character of the life of infants. Though not all are actually saved by Christ's death, no one is saved in any other way. The absence of sin in infants would mean that

15 The case of unbaptized infants dominates the discussion of de Gen. ad litt., 10, and Ep. 98, as was seen above, pp. 48-52.

16 C. Jul. Pel., 3.3.9, 5.1.4.

17 De pecc. mer., 1.30.58, 3.3.6; C. Jul. Pel., 3.12.25, 5.11.44.

18 De pecc. mer., 1.23.33, 1.28.55; Ep. 186, 8.30; C. Jul. Pel., 3.3.9.

19 Ep. 164, 7.20; de pecc. orig., 31.36; de anim. et eius orig., 1.11.33, 1.19.34, 2.7.11; Ep. 202A, 8.17.
Christ did not die for them and would empty his Cross by opening another way to eternal life. The reality of an original sin is also indicated by the baptismal exorcism which liberates from the dominion of the devil. Augustine also argues from the fact that baptism is given for the forgiveness of sins. The Pelagians counter that this forgiveness could be conditional, removing sins if they are present, since the same ritual is used for both infants and adults. Augustine then appeals to Paul's explanation of baptism and argues that an infant enters meaningfully into the death of Christ only by dying to a sin which separates him from eternal life. The Pelagians cannot grant baptism for entrance into the Kingdom without acknowledging the sin to which one dies with Christ. Finally, the initial state of children indicates the presence of sin. They are subject to lethargy of mind and to mortality, both of which are punishments for the sin of Adam. The heavy yoke of the children of Adam with its pain and suffering of body and soul is placed upon the image of Cod. Some children have extraordinary burdens to bear: monstrous birth defects,
idiocy, blindness, deafness which hinders the hearing of the gospel, and even demonic possession. Augustine argues that these punishments would be unjust in one who neither had any sin nor could grow in justice and virtue through his suffering. Only Christ, moreover, suffered the penalties of sin innocently.

From his confession of Christ as the sole origin of salvation, and of faith and incorporation into him as the necessary means of attaining eternal life, Augustine has come to acknowledge the sinfulness of all Adam's children, even those who have no exercise of choice. To explain the presence of sin prior to any personal choice, Augustine has recourse to Paul's naming of Adam as the source of sin and condemnation. In his argumentation, as in Paul's, the role of the First Adam is clearly derived from that of the Second Adam.

Augustine delights in rhetorical parallels between Adam and Christ. The one moved from sin and death to life and grace. Their carnal generation and spiritual regeneration are contrasted: all who are from the body of Adam are sinners, but the members of Christ are just.

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27 C. Jul. Pel., 3.3.9. This argument accedes to primacy of place in C. Jul. op. imp., 1.3, 29, 31, 35, 49, etc.


nation comes from the one sin of Adam, but the grace of Christ forgives many sins. 32 The difference in their universal influence is carefully explained. All are bound by sin in Adam; and all the saved are in Christ: but not all who fall in Adam are raised in Christ. 33

As in Augustine's original assertion of the sin itself, the case of infants who can imitate neither Christ nor Adam is decisive in determining the mode of the communication of sin. Christ incorporates children without their imitation, and he illumines and justifies the saints before they begin to imitate him. He regenerates through an interior communication which does not require the consent of the child. 34 Noting the difference between the relationship of the Christian to Christ in whom he is born and to Paul whom he imitates, Augustine argues that Adam's sin is transmitted by generation rather than imitation. 35 Sin and condemnation can also be communicated without the recipient's consent. 36 Thus, Christ and Adam each have a proper generation and heredity: the one of life and the other of death. 37

31 Ep. 157, 3.11,12; Ep. 179, 6; Ep. 187, 9.30; de pecc. orig., 26.31.

32 De pecc. mer., 1.11.14, 1.13.16, 1.15.20; Ep. 157, 3.12,20.

33 De pecc. mer., 1.15.19, 1.28.56; de nat. et grat., 41.48; Ep. 157, 3.13; de nupt. et concup., 2.27.46.

34 De pecc. mer., 1.9.10, 1.10.11.


36 De pecc. mer., 3.2.2; C. Jul. Pel., 6.10.29.

Augustine also observes that Paul's rhetoric implies that generation is the mode of participation in sin and justice. If Paul thought sin was communicated only by imitation, he should have named Satan the one in whose likeness all sinned. Similarly, the head of the just should have been Abel. If Paul wanted human pairs to be his models, he should have taken Abel and Adam, or Christ and Judas. Paul's clear teaching is that as Christ communicates life by regeneration, so the generation of Adam transmits death and sin to all his race.

The second level of Augustine's teaching on original sin explains the mechanism of transmission of this sin and its guilt from Adam to all who are propagated from him. This explanation is in terms of the concupiscence of the flesh which Augustine judged that Adam incurred as a punishment for his sin, which is operating in and transmitted by the propagation of his children, and which is itself a sinful quality making them guilty. These components of his explanation will be considered in turn.

When man disobeyed the command of God, he received a fitting punishment in his own flesh: the loss of dominion over the desires and motions of his body. Augustine finds the disobedience of flesh to spirit most evident in the generative faculty. The opening of man's eyes to his nakedness is explained not by a modification of his sense of perception, but as the experience of lust in the flesh and the uncontrolled movement of the genitals. Adam and Eve fashioned coverings for those parts of their bodies in which they felt the punishment for their disobedience rather than...
than for the hands and mouths with which the act was perpetrated.\textsuperscript{40} As a punishment for the sin of disobedience, the flesh of man was changed into a flesh of sin, under the law of sin which seeks only the goods and pleasures of the flesh. Having thrown off the dominion of the spirit, the appetite of the flesh seeks its own goods independently.\textsuperscript{41}

As Augustine observed in his \textit{De Genesi ad litteram}, concupiscence is not simply in the body, for the body does not desire without the animating soul. The opposition which Paul expressed in terms of spirit and flesh actually occurs within the soul between desires according to the flesh and the motions proper to its higher, rational part.\textsuperscript{42} Carnal concupiscence is characterized by the independence of the appetites of the soul animating the body from its own rational aspirations.

Because of this sin, Adam's flesh becomes a flesh of sin and is transmitted to his children as a flesh of sin. Having lost dominion over their generative faculties, parents can transmit human nature to their children only through the operation of carnal concupiscence or lust. Augustine observes that man can neither excite nor still the movements of the generative power by his rational choice; the pious will to raise up children to the Kingdom cannot command the lust which controls generative action.\textsuperscript{43} Though the female may be capable of coitus without the

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{De pecc. mer.}, 2.22.36; \textit{C. epp. Pel.}, 1.16.32; \textit{de nupt. et concup.}, 2.5.14; \textit{de civ. Dei}, 13.13.15.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{De pecc. mer.}, 2.36.58; \textit{de nupt. et concup.}, 1.23.25; \textit{Ep.}, 143, 6.


\textsuperscript{43} \textit{De nupt. et concup.}, 1.6.7, 1.24.27; \textit{C. Jul. Pel.}, 3.26.59.
operation of concupiscence, the male is impotent. Thus Christians must generate according to their oldness in Adam through the power of lust, and transmit to their children the same disobedience which remains in them. Observing that the law of sin generates the flesh of sin, Augustine identifies the carnal concupiscence operative in generation as the agent of its own transmission to the child born of sexual union. The single exception which proves this rule is Christ. He alone was conceived without sexual union and its lust; and he alone was born not in sinful flesh but in its likeness, and without any sin.

The self-transmitting carnal concupiscence which governs sexual generation is identified not only as a punishment for sin, but as the sin itself. Those who receive this defect are subject to the mortality, ignorance and weakness which attend it, and bound by its guilt as well. Augustine explains that prior to any personal choice, the children of Adam are guilty by reason of the carnal concupiscence which they receive as a defect of their humanity. Baptism does not remove the concupiscence.

44 De nupt. et concup., 1.15.30; de civ. Del., 1.16, 14.16; C. ep. Pel., 1.15.31.

45 De pecc. mer., 2.9.11, 2.27.44; de pecc. orig., 40.45; de nupt. et concup., 1.18.20.

46 De pecc. mer., 2.23.37, 2.36.58, 3.12.21.

47 Ibid., 1.16.21, 1.28.55, 2.24.38; de pecc. orig., 37.42; de nupt. et concup., 1.24.27, 1.32.37; C. Jul. Pel., 2.4.8.

48 De pecc. mer., 1.29.57, 2.24.38, 2.36.58; Ep. 164, 7.19; Ep. 184A, 1.3; Ep. 187, 9.31; de nupt. et concup., 1.12.13, 1.24.27; C. Jul. Pel., 5.15.52, 6.19.62; Ench., 10.34, 14.46. Augustine credits Ambrose with this particular insight, de nupt. et concup., 2.5.15; C. Jul. Pel., 2.4.8. The case of the mother of Christ was obscure to him; and he prefers not to argue for her sinfulness, de nat. et grat., 36.42.
itself; but it does remove the guilt and liberate the Christian from the condemnation inherited from Adam. Each of these points requires fuller discussion.

Originally, Augustine seems to have assumed that concupiscence is itself evil and makes the unbaptized guilty. This assumption was integral to the exposition of original sin in De Genesi ad litteram. Later, under the pressure of objections from Julian of Eclanum he examined and defended this supposition. Anyone should admit that concupiscence is an evil since it originates from sin and causes sin if consent is given to it. Moreover, the appetite which does not oppose a higher faculty of reason in beasts is evil in man because of its rebelling against his spirit. Man's control over his bodily functions demonstrates that the anomaly of insubordination in the generative faculty is not natural. Concupiscence is properly sinful because the law of God prohibits lust; and a desire for evil is itself evil even without consent; and man does not fulfill justice as long as this evil remains in him. Finally,

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51 De nupt. et concup., 2.31.53; de civ. Dei, 14.24.

52 De perf. just., 5.11, 11.28; de nupt. et concup., 1.23.25, 1.27.30, 1.29.32.

53 C. Jul. Pel., 4.2.7, 10, 5.7.29, 6.16.50; C. Jul. op. imp., 1.106, 2.45, 122, 3.210, 4.61, 5.50.

54 De spir. et litt., 36.65; de nat. et grat., 62.72; Ep. 196, 2.6.
Augustine notes that Christian asceticism supposes that concupiscence is wrong: the Father gives continence to attack it; virgins and widows enter glorious combats against it; even marriage is a remedy for this disease. Augustine's judgment of the sinfulness of concupiscence draws upon his understanding of sin as a turning from the higher good and preferring the lower. Since concupiscence seeks the lower goods without subordination to the higher values of man's spirit, this desire is a disorder, a sin whose guilt must be forgiven in each man.

The other punishments for Adam's sin, ignorance and death, receive much less attention. The ignorance which is unbelief and folly with regard to divine things is sinful and a great evil whose guilt must be removed by baptism. This blindness of heart and inability to discern the good also cause further sin. Only bodily death appears to have been considered a punishment for sin without itself being sinful: no one sins just by dying.

By Augustine's reckoning, ignorance and concupiscence are sinful qualities whose presence makes man sinful even when no activity proceeds from them. Concupiscence is compared to timidity whose motions are felt only when the proper object is present to mind or sense. Similarly,

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57 De adult. coniug., 1.9.9; C. Jul. Pel., 5.3.8, 6.16.49, 6.17.52; Ench., 22.81.

58 De nat. et grat., 23.25.
concupiscence makes infants guilty although its presence in them is manifest only when they attain the age of discretion and their spirit begins to oppose its motions.

The concept of a sinful act or quality which does not arise from one's personal choice is difficult to grasp, but concupiscence is not without parallel in Augustine's writings. Although the good intention of charity is essential for moral action, the agent's intention is not equally integral to a sinful act or state. Though transgressions of a known command are more serious, acts committed in ignorance, either because one does not know what ought to be done or because one does not grasp the magnitude of their evil without the help of revelation, are nonetheless sins. Often one must even beg forgiveness for acts which were performed in the mistaken opinion that they would please God. Certain acts, such as stealing, lying or adultery, are evil in themselves and sinful even if performed for a good end. Finally, Augustine observes that the command to love God with one's whole heart is not fulfilled in this life, both because of the absence of the vision of God, and because of the presence of concupiscence in man's heart. Yet this lack of charity

59 C. Jul. Pol., 6.19.60,61. See also, de perf. just., 2.4; de nupt. et concup., 1.25.28.

60 C. Jul. Pol., 2.4.8.

61 De pecc. mer., 2.17.26; de spir. et litt., 35.63; de gest. Pol., 18.42; Ep. 194, 6.27; C. Jul. Pol., 5.3.8; de nat. et grat., 22.24; Quaest. in Hept., 1.49; Retract., 1.13.5, 1.15.3; C. Jul. op. imp., 1.106; de pecc. mer., 1.36.67; Quaest. in Hept., 3.20; Ench., 22.81.

62 De spir. et litt., 36.64.

63 De continent., 7.18.
is sinful. 64 Personal responsibility is no longer central to Augustine's notion of sin.

To understand the effect of baptism which remits the guilt of original sin but does not heal concupiscence and ignorance, one must grasp the relation of a sinful act to its guilt. When a person commits a sin, the willing and activity pass quickly; but the guilt endures until it is forgiven. This guilt may be located in the hidden laws of God which are written in the minds of the angels, rather than in the person himself. 65 Similarly, after baptism and the forgiveness of its guilt, concupiscence remains in man as an evil quality which does not make him guilty if no new consent is given to its motions. 66 Augustine makes a like observation and distinction in regard to the consent given concupiscence by a married couple who seek sexual pleasure rather than the generating of children in coitus. An act which would otherwise be grace becomes only venially sinful because of the concession which is made to Christian marriage. 67 Concupiscence is distinguished from its guilt as any other

64 _De spir. et litt._, 36.64; _de nat. et grat._, 38.45; _de perf. just._, 6.15, 8.19. Augustine offers no indication, however, of Anselm's identification of original sin with the absence of charity.

65 _De pecc. mer._, 2.28.46; _de nupt. et concup._, 1.26.29; _C. Jul._, _Pel._, 6.19, 60-62.

66 The consent of the Christian incurs the guilt which baptism has removed from his concupiscence. Among the unbaptized, concupiscence is sinful even without consent. _De pecc. mer._, 2.4.4, 2.27.44; _de pecc. orig._, 39.44; _de nupt. et concup._, 1.32.37; _C. epp. Pel._, 1.13.27; _C. Jul._, _Pel._, 2.4.8, 2.10.33; _Retract._, 1.15.2; _C. Jul. op. imp._, 2.71, 226, 3.183, 5.59.

67 _De nupt. et concup._, 1.14.16, 1.24.27. Note that intercourse between married persons for the sake of generation is not sinful, _C. Jul._, _Pel._, 4.8.49.
sinful act would be. 68

Using certain biblical materials, Augustine has elaborated an explanation of the transmission of a pre-personal sin to each of the children of Adam by means of propagation. Carnal concupiscence is not only the punishment for Adam's act of disobedience, but a defect which makes man disobedient to his higher aspirations and the command of God. The guilt of this sinful state is forgiven by the grace of Christ; but the evil remains and is the agent of its own transmission to further offspring, who then stand in need of the same regeneration which removed their parents' guilt.

Augustine justifies the inheritance of guilt in two related ways: by the presence of all men in Adam and by the derivation of the common nature from him. Augustine understands his reading of Rom., 5.12, "in whom all sinned," to imply that all men were one in Adam before they existed separately as individuals; and that they all sinned communally in the evil will of the one they all were. 69 Although this interpretation would imply that children might be held responsible for the sins of all their ancestors, in whom they previously existed, Augustine clearly distinguished such a presence and transmission from that by which all Adam's offspring

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69 De pecc. mer., 1.10.11, 3.7.14; Ep. 186, 6.21; Ep. 194, 6.27; de nupt. et concup., 2.5.15; C. ccpp., I. 4.4.7; C. Jul. ccpp. imp., 1.48, 2.83, 163, 164, 4.76, 104, 5.12, 13, 15, 6.9, 22. Christ is not so present, C. Jul. ccpp. imp., 4.104, 6.22.
are affected. 70 The second mode of justifying the transmission of guilt places Adam's children in him by reason of his generative power. When Adam sinned, he vitiated the common nature which was in him and which he transmitted to all his children. Hence men derive from Adam that sin which is associated with the defective nature. 71 This second method of justifying individual accountability for the common sin would both provide an explanation of the sin's transmission and exclude the necessary inheritance of subsequent sins, which do not affect the nature itself.

The explanation of the justice of original sin would be more straightforward could Augustine have assumed that the child is present in and derives from his parents according to his whole nature, both body and soul. The African tradition of traducianism of the soul was rejected by Augustine whose insight into the spirituality of God and the soul had allowed him to break free of Manicheism. 72 However, he could not accept

70 Under the influence of an interpretation of Ezek. 18.2,3 in C. Jul. Pel., 6.25.82, Augustine first considers the transmission of non-Adamic sin in Ench., 13.46,47. In C. Jul. op. imp. he devotes a good deal of attention to the justice of punishing a child for the sin he contracted in his parent, 3.12,43,49; but he clearly distinguishes the sin which Adam transmits to all his children through the injury to human nature, 3.33,65, from the guilt which God occasionally punishes in the sons of subsequent sinners. He decides that God does this but forbids man to do so because he judges according to things which man cannot know. For such irregular transmission, Augustine asserts that no systematic explanation can be developed, 3.66. A.-M. Dubrèlè's interpretation makes a stronger case than Augustine himself is ready to argue, "La pluralité des pêchés hereditairs dans la tradition augustinienne," Revue des études augustiniennes, III (1957), 113-136.

71 De pecc. mer., 2.36.58, 3.12.21; Ep. 143, 6; Ep. 186, 6.12; Ep. 194, 6.30; de nupt. et concup., 2.34.57; C. epp. Pel., 4.4.7; C. Jul. Pel., 3.26.63; de civ. Dei., 13.3,14, 14.20; de anim. et ejus orig., 2.34.57.

72 Augustine has only contempt for Tertullian's inability to grasp the spirituality of God and the soul, Ep. 190, 4.14; de anim. et ejus orig., 2.5.9. He does concede that affirring the corporeality of God and the soul does permit some people to distinguish them from pure nothing, de haeres., 86.
the alternative view that the soul is created by God from nothing and made guilty when sent into the body. The justification of inherited guilt leads to the third level of Augustine's teaching on original sin: the unresolved question of the origin of the soul.

Neither the assertion of the creation of the soul by God nor the confession of the sinlessness of Christ determines the question of the soul's origin. God is the creator of the body, though not without the matter which he derives from the parents; and even in the original six days of creation not everything was created from nothing. God might create the soul from the souls of the parents rather than from nothing, as he creates the new body from theirs. In any case, it is not transmitted by carnal semen which is mortal and can be wasted. If the souls are created from nothing by God, then Christ preserves his soul from sin by mingling it with flesh which is conceived without carnal concupiscence and thus does not bear the guilt of Adam. If, however, the souls are derived, Christ either created his own soul from nothing or cleansed the soul he derived in assuming it.

Theories of the transmission of guilt can be worked out for each hypothesis. If the soul as well as the flesh derives from Adam by propagation, then both were involved in his sin, and both were vitiated by its punishment. The soul propagated from Adam is afflicted with the evil and guilt which it contracted in him. If, on the other hand, souls

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74 Ep. 190, 4.15.
75 Ep. 164, 7.19.
are created from nothing and sent into the body to animate it, man would have sinned in Adam only according to the flesh and his soul would be made sinful by its mingling with flesh which bears the contagion transmitted from Adam. 77

Augustine ultimately refuses to embrace the preferred creationist hypothesis because he cannot accept its explanation for the condemnation of the souls of infants which leave their bodies without the opportunity to receive the sacrament of Christ. Since the soul commits no sin in a state prior to entry into the flesh, 78 it would be created anew and sent innocent to animate sinful flesh which makes it sinful: without the sacraments of Christ it would then pass out of the body through a death whose time and circumstances are controlled by divine providence and enter into eternal condemnation. 79 Such a soul would be either created evil by God, or forced into sin and condemnation by his sending it into the flesh, or condemned while innocent of sin. 80 Since none of these is acceptable, Augustine refuses to commit himself to the creationist view of the origin of the soul and leaves the question open. He admonishes those who are less cautious to beware lest they follow Pelagius and Caelestius, who

76 Ep. 190, 6.21; de anim. et ejus orig., 1.17.28; C. Jul. Pel., 5.4.17.

77 Ep. 164, 7.19; Ep. 166, 9.27; de anim. et ejus orig., 1.17.28, 2.13.18; C. Jul. Pel., 5.4.17.

78 Ep. 164, 7.20; Ep. 166, 9.27; de anim. et ejus orig., 1.12.15, 1.13.16, 1.19.34, 2.7.11; de pecc. orig., 31.36.

79 Ep. 166, 4.10, 6.16; Ep. 180, 2; de anim. et ejus orig., 1.11.13, 14, 2.5.21.

80 Ep. 190, 4.13, 6.21.
deny original sin and the regeneration of Christ because they refuse to believe that the soul is harmed in Adam. 81

In the Pelagian controversy Augustine's doctrine of original sin reaches maturity. Because the means of salvation are not universally available to either children or adults, many are condemned without a personal rejection of Christ. Hence all must be guilty of a pre-personal sin. The concupiscence which is transmitted as the punishment for the sin of Adam by the lust of carnal generation is itself sinful and makes each son of Adam guilty prior to his personal choice of evil. The justice of this transmission and the mode in which the soul is contaminated can be explained in different ways, between which Augustine cannot decide. The assertion of such a pre-personal guilt indicates a peculiar notion of human freedom and responsibility, to which attention is now directed.

2. The freedom and servitude of the will

A second issue dividing Augustine and Pelagius was their suppositions about the freedom and accountability of man. Pelagius contended that one could be held responsible only for choices, for willing one of two actually possible alternatives. A man in a situation in which he cannot choose good does not really sin; nor can one who cannot do evil merit a reward for his good will. Augustine's notion of freedom derives from the experience of willingness rather than from that of choice. One is free when he does what pleases him; and for this he is held responsible. One might be in a situation in which he can choose between the alternatives of good and evil; but he could also have a meaningful responsibility even

81 De pecc. mer., 2.36.59; Ep. 166, 8.25; Ep. 190, 6.22,23.
if he were incapable of choosing good; and finally, he would have a higher
and fuller freedom were he incapable of choosing evil. This notion of
freedom as adherence to good is intimately related both to Augustine's
identification of good with being and evil with a tendency to non-being,
a failure to function properly, and to his conception of divine charity
as delight in the Supreme Good. The present analysis proceeds in three
stages: the basic notion of willingness, the orientations and conditions
which affect the willing of man, and finally the four types of freedom
which these define.

Freedom is opposed to coercion, but not to the exclusion of al-
ternatives. God must be considered free in his willing of justice even
though he has no possibility of failing to will the good. 82 Closer to
hand, Augustine observes that the human incapacity to desire unhappiness
does not destroy the freedom in which each man necessarily wills his own
beatitude. 83 Two other forms of freedom without choice of alternatives
can be found: in beatitude man will have the voluntary necessity of not
sinning, and in his vitiated nature he is in voluntary servitude to sin. 84

The divine will is unchangeably fixed in its own goodness. The
created will enjoys no such stability in its orientation toward the Supreme
Good; it can fail to function properly and prefer the non-being from which
it was created. It is capable not only of being drawn toward the fullness

82 G. Jul. op. imp., 1.81,101, 3.120, 6.10,11; de nat. et grat., 49.57.

83 De nat. et grat., 46.54, 49.57; Ench., 8.25, 28.105; de civ. Dei, 5.10,
11.27; G. Jul. op. imp., 4.92,93, 5.53,55, 6.12.

84 De perf. just., 4.9; Ench., 28.105; G. Jul. op. imp., 1.102,103, 6.10;
de nat. et grat., 49.57.
of being, but also of falling in the direction of non-being or evil. The beatifying good of rational creatures is the divine goodness; turned to unchangeable good, they are fulfilled and happy. If, however, they fall from the quest for God and move toward non-being, they are miserable. Created being is not, however, equally capable of good and evil, success and failure. As man's good is not in himself but in God, so attaining and holding it are not by his own power alone. As Augustine has already demonstrated, the love by which the creature turns and adheres to the Supreme Good is the gift of the Holy Spirit. The failure of defecting from God and moving to the lower good is, however, intrinsic to the nature of the creature which was originally drawn from non-being. The eye needs light to see, but is itself adequate for darkness; and as one needs food to maintain life, he can kill himself by starvation alone. Sin requires no explanation beyond the capacity of imperfect being to fail in adhering to the good.

The will of the creature is dependent upon God for the gift of charity which empowers it to love good, and the enlightenment of mind

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85 C. Max. Arr., 2.12.2; de VIII quaest. ex V.T., 1; de civ. Dei, 12.6, 15.21; C. Jul. op. imp., 5.31, 38, 39, 42, 60.

86 C. Jul. Pel., 1.8.37, 1.9.43; Ep. 140, 23.56, 29.70, 31.74; C. Jul. Pel., 1.9.45; de civ. Dei, 11.9, 10, 12.6.


88 This has been established earlier: Augustine uses it to break the Pelagian assertion that teaching alone is necessary, de pecc. mer., 2.17.27; de spir. et litt., 3.5, 16.28, 28.49, 32.56, 33.59; de nat. et grat., 17.18, 56.67, 64.77, 70.84; de perf. just., 5.11, 10.21.

89 De gsr. Pel., 3.7; de grat. Chr., 19.20; Ench., 28, 106; de civ. Dei, 14.27, 15.21.
necessary to perceive the good which it ought to choose. Since the human will is further conditioned by man's corporeal nature, it chooses and acts in a certain dependence on other creatures. Augustine examines man's freedom existentially and understands the will in relation to the environment which conditions its performance, while Pelagius tends to analyze it in isolation from these factors. Augustine understands power not according to Pelagius' meaning of a capacity of human nature which cannot be lost, but as a dominion which a man has over his activity. Something is in one's power when it follows from his willing and is prevented by his refusal. When Pelagius argues that man has an inalienable freedom to do good or evil in the capacity of his nature, Augustine draws attention to the various ways in which man's activity is influenced and limited. Man has power of sight, but cannot see without light. The exercise of hearing and smell, moreover, can be forced by external factors: one smells and hears much that he cannot shut out. Similarly, a man cannot prevent the desires of the flesh by the purpose of his will; and he may be incapable of accomplishing the good he chooses or preventing the evil he rejects because he lacks dominion over his own body.° Pelagius does agree, however, to the susceptibility of man's will to orientations arising from the power of its own customs, which are difficult to oppose and reverse. The various forms of patterning and conditioning will be examined, beginning with the interior dispositions of the will and then considering its environment.

Augustine speaks of the intrinsic conditions of the will as

90 De nat. et grat., 47.55, 48.56, 50.58.

91 De grat., Chr., 39.43; C. Jul., Pel., 6.18.55.
orientations in a particular pattern of activity, which may be either permanent or subject to change. As God's will is committed to good, so man's is immutably fixed on his own happiness: even in an evil state, he cannot but will his own beatitude. Similarly, dispositions which are less stable do not abolish man's freedom but rather establish its exercise in a particular direction. Man is forced neither to justice nor to sin, but is drawn either by charity and delight in justice, or by lust and pleasure in sin. 92 Three orientations of man's willing can be distinguished by the good in which each delights: charity is a love of the Supreme Good and of the justice which God commands; pride seeks man's own power and autonomy; cupiditity is a delight in lower goods. Each of these dispositions will be studied in turn.

Charity is the gift of the Spirit of God by which man loves the Supreme Good. Unless the highest good is loved for itself, no other good is properly loved and no choice is morally good. In this love for God, one chooses and seeks creatures in the proper subordination of the lower to the higher and of all to the highest. 93 To hold back from a forbidden action because of the threat of punishment is actually to sin in preferring the evil; and the desire that the evil could be performed without incurring the punishment due it is a rejection of justice itself. 94 The gift of charity, however, generates a delight in justice which does not simply

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92 Ep. 145, 5; Ep. 157, 2.9; C. epp. Pel., 1.3.7; de civ. Dei, 14.4. See also, de perf. just., 4.9; Ench., 28.105.

93 De pecc. mer., 2.17.27; de spir. et lott., 14.26; Ep. 140, 2.4; Ep. 173, 6; C. Jul. Pel., 4.3.33; de civ. Dei, 5.12.

94 De spir. et lott., 8.13; de nat. et prat., 57.67; Ep. 153, 6.16; C. epp. Pel., 1.9.15, 2.9.21, 3.4.9; Ep. 145, 5.
give man the bare possibility of choosing good for its own sake, but acts as a gravitational force moving his will to choose and perform the good.95

When the creature is constituted in goodness by charity and helped to perform good works, his own willing and the exercise of his power operate well. Thus it is that he can turn to himself, pride himself on his share of the operation, and prize his own dominion over the gifts of grace. Pride arises when one trusts in himself, when he turns from the unchangeable good common to all rational creatures and makes himself both the end and the means of his beatitude. This preference of a private good is a sinful defection from the higher to a lower good.96

Pride was the first sin: it was the sin of the devil who then seduced man into it. Unless pride had preceded, disobedience to God's command would not have followed, and now man would not find obedience difficult and unpalatable.97 When the divine command is imposed, man's pride flares up; the very prohibition increases his desire for sin.98 If he accepts the divine command, pride works in other ways to subvert him. The Jews gloriéd in the merits which they supposed had won for them the divine favor and the giving of the law. Once the Pelagians concede a divine assistance for doing good, they claim that prior merits win it for a man. Each gives himself the first place in the process of salvation.99

95 De spir. et litt., 25.42; Ep. 188, 2.7; de grat. Chr., 19.20, 47.52.

96 De spir. et litt., 7.11; Ep. 140, 28.68; Ep. 155, 4.15; de civ. Dei, 12.1, 8.

97 De pecc. mer., 2.19.33; de nat. et grat., 29.33; de civ. Dei, 14.3, 11, 13.

98 De spir. et litt., 10.16; C. adver. lep. et proph., 2.7.28; de civ. Dei, 13.5.
Instead of asking for the gift by which the good might be done, pride
next breaks out to establish its own justice by a perfect legal obser-
vance. Even those who ask and receive grace are in danger of pride.
Man can become fascinated by his own dominion over the good activity which
grace has placed in his power and turn from its divine source to glory
in the good he finds in himself. Pride is the constant danger of those
who have undertaken the Christian life; and Augustine is always ready
to accuse the Pelagians of that spiritual pride in which man claims cre-
dit for beginning or completing the process of his salvation.
Charity opposes pride; it is the light to pride's darkness.
Yet charity does not exclude pride until it reaches its fullness in the
vision of the Source of all good. Paul had to be given a sting in the
flesh to protect him from glorying in his revelations, although he had
a great degree of charity. God constantly cares for his saints by
withholding certain graces so that they will be recognized as gifts of
God rather than man's own resources.

99 De spir. et litt., 8.13; Ep. 194, 3.6.

100 De spir. et litt., 8.13; Ep. 160, 22.54, 30.72; Ep. 186, 3.8, 9; C.
epp. Pel., 3.7.22.

101 De nat. et grat., 27.31, 29.33, 31.35, 32.36; Ep. 140, 37.84; de bono
vid., 16.20; Ep. 157, 4.29; Ep. 188, 3.9; de patient., 15.12; Ep. 211.
6. Even Paul was in such danger, de grat. Chr., 11.12; de civ. Pel., 9.20.

102 Ep. 140, 22.54.

103 De grat. Chr., 11.12; C. Jul. Pel., 4.3.28.

104 De pecc. mor., 2.17.27, 2.19.32, 33; de spir. et litt., 36.66; de pat.
et grat., 27.31; C. Jul. Pel., 4.3.28; Serm. 348, 1.
Cupidity is an orientation of will to the lower goods of the body, the things which concupiscence seeks independently of the dominion of the spirit. Although delight of the will in lower goods has a place in Augustine's teaching, he does not sharply distinguish this disposition of the spirit from the concupiscence which afflicts the animating soul and the flesh. In the earlier periods, Augustine spoke of custom as a tendency to evil which was generated by repeated consent to the suggestion of carnal pleasure. Such an orientation can be challenged by a choice to act in another way, but it is difficult to overcome. Then in the opening stages of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine shifts his attention to the role of concupiscence, its power to dominate consent, and its independence from the dissent of the will. When Pelagius argues that a habit of sinning can be overcome by the same free choice which established it, Augustine retorts that the concupiscence which drags man into sin comes from the body of death and can be overcome only by the grace of Christ. Finally, in the later stage of the controversy, when Augustine is opposing Julian of Eclanum, he acknowledges the existence and power of habits which arise from prior choices. Habits remain in the Christian after conversion and strengthen the power of concupiscence in opposing the pious will. The cupidity which Augustine names as the orientation of the will which is opposed to charity and which he identifies as the agent of its servitude in evil must be related both to the concupiscence of the flesh and to the habits of choice.

105 De grat. Chr., 39.43.

Concupiscence is an affection of the animating soul which is not displaced by the coming of charity in the higher part of the soul. From the very beginning of the Pelagian controversy, Paul's experience of the opposition between flesh and spirit, expressed in Rom., 7.14, is interpreted as a consequence of the effective opposition of the spirit's charity to the continuing carnal desires. Charity only gradually eradicates the concupiscence of the flesh and never fully overcomes it in this life.

Cupidity, however, is a disposition of the spirit, not of the animating soul. Augustine had earlier spoken of charity as the good root whence good works arise; but when he begins to insist on the divine operation of good willing, he identifies cupidity as the root of evil willing. God gives charity and its good fruits, but is not responsible for the cupidity which comes from man or his deceiver. The will of man is of itself neither a good nor an evil tree; rather it is capable of becoming either good or evil by the presence of charity or cupidity. The one makes it a good tree which produces good fruit and can bring forth no evil; the other makes man's will an evil tree which produces only evil willing and works. Augustine makes the same distinction

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107 See above, n. 42. F.-J. Thonnard's analysis reaches the same conclusion, "La notion de concupiscence en philosophie augustinienne," pp. 59-74.


109 De spir. et litt., 14.26; de nat. et præt., 55.65, 57.67; de nupt. de concup., 1.30.33; C. Jul. Pel., 2.3.5, 6.16.50, 6.23.70.

in defense of the goodness of a nature which can do only evil because it is dominated by the evil quality, cupidity.\textsuperscript{112} This evil root which can affect angels as well as men need not be identified with concupiscence which is in the animating soul rather than the spirit.\textsuperscript{113}

Augustine does not seem to have been much concerned to explain the generation of cupidity in the will, though there are indications in some of his remarks. He charges man with the responsibility for cupidity because of his turning from the highest good.\textsuperscript{114} One need not postulate an evil spirit who causes cupidity as the Holy Spirit gives charity. The various motions of the heart are adequate to explain the origin of a commitment to evil which can withstand great sufferings.\textsuperscript{115} The evil quality of each man's will is a consequence of his own choice. When he reaches the age of discretion he is not forced into evil, but goes by his own choice from one sin to another.\textsuperscript{116} One might note, however, that in the absence of the gift of charity, the power of concupiscence will

\textsuperscript{111}De grat. Chr., 18.19, 20.21, 21.22; de nupt. et concup., 2.26.43; de civ. Del., 14.11; Serm. 350, 1. Because of the usage in the Pelagian controversy, "cupidity" is employed rather than "libido" which Augustine uses in de civ. Del., 14.15,16, and which Gerald Bonner suggests as the better general term. Cupidity is not here limited to the sexual sphere. See, Bonner, "Libido and Concupiscencia in St. Augustine," in Studia Patristica, VI; Texte und Untersuchungen, 81 (1962), 303-314.

\textsuperscript{112}C. Jul. Pel., 4.3.30; C. adver. leg. et proph., 1.22.47; Ench., 4.15.

\textsuperscript{113}De anim. et eius orig., 1.25.28.

\textsuperscript{114}De grat. Chr., 19.20; C. Jul. Pel., 1.9.45; Quaest. in Hept., 2.18; C. epp. Pel., 1.3.6.

\textsuperscript{115}De patient., 17.14, 24.21.

\textsuperscript{116}C. epp. Pel., 1.3.7; C. Jul. op. imp., 4.103.
reign not only in the body, but in the cupidity of the spirit as well.\footnote{117}{Ench., 31.117. No direct indication of a transmission of cupidity from Adam has been uncovered. It might, however, be an assumption of the traducianist explanation of the origin of the soul and the transmission of original guilt.}

Augustine did not establish different terminologies for the concupiscence which is in the animating part of the soul and the cupidity which seems to be in the spirit. Consequently his statements on the opposition between charity and the various orientations to evil do not permit an exact differentiation according to these categories. A similar lack of precision persists in the distinction between the Holy Spirit and the gift of charity which makes the will good. Such precision would not have advanced his polemical intent which often exploits the ambiguity.

Unfortunately, the relation of cupidity to habit is anything but clear. If cupidity is indeed generated by the influence of inherited concupiscence on man's choices, it would be indistinguishable from habit. Cupidity would then be a general term for the various forms of spiritual aberration to which men are subject.\footnote{118}{De grat., 17.14; C. Jul. Pel., 6.18.55; de grat. Chr., 20.21; de civ. Dei, 14.15.} Although charity opposes these evil orientations, sin continues to spring from the root of cupidity in the just man,\footnote{119}{De grat. Chr., 18.19, 21.22; C. Jul. Pel., 4.3.30; de pecc. mer., 2.8.10; de perf. just., 18.39.} and the domination of long standing habits is only gradually overcome.\footnote{120}{C. Jul. Pel., 6.18.56; C. Jul. op. imp., 4.103.} Following the ebb and flow of the debate, Augustine contrasts habit to the inherited concupiscence of the flesh, but never considers it with cupidity. In any case, it is clear that he affirmed
a sinful orientation of man's will to the goods which are below it.

Of the three orientations which have been distinguished, Augustine defined charity most clearly. The love of God opposes both the love of one's own power and a delight in lower things. Charity orients man to the Supreme Good and comes down to him as a gift from God. Pride and cupidity are tendencies to goods at or below man's own level. These defects of the will from full being require no higher cause. In its fullness, charity excludes both pride and cupidity; but in the carnal state of the sons of Adam, it coexists with them.

Two extrinsic factors also influence man's willing of good and evil: knowing the good and the soul's commitment to the flesh. As was seen in the first section of this chapter, ignorance prevents man's doing the good and is thereby a cause of sin. Moreover, the blindness of heart which does not believe in God is sinful and leads to pride. One must believe in God to do what is commanded because he commands it, and to direct created goods to his worship. Thus even a Christian of lower ascetical attainments is to be preferred to a pagan whose heart is unfaithful to God. Finally, because love depends on knowledge, charity is not full without the vision of God. Giving one's life for his fellows is the greatest love which faith can achieve; but in the beatific vision, love will be still greater.

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121 *De fide et oper.*, 13.20; *de nupt. et concup.*, 1.3.4.

122 *De gest. Pel.*, 14.34; *de nupt. et concup.*, 1.4.5; *C. epp. Pel.*, 3.5.14; *de civ. Del.*, 15.20.

123 *De spir. et litt.*, 36.64; *de perf. just.*, 3.8, 6.14, 8.19; *C. epp. Pel.*, 3.7.21.
Because man is not only spirit, but soul and flesh as well, his willing is subject to the influence of corporeal desires and needs. The sons of Adam are punished by the loss of dominion over their animal desires. Thus the will is often unable to carry through its good purpose and powerless to prevent the motions which contradict it. Moreover, these desires constantly attract the will to choose lower goods for their own sake.\(^{124}\)

The incarnate spirit is also subject to coercion because of its commitment to the body. Man can be placed in a situation in which he can escape one evil only by consenting to perform another. In choosing to avoid the bodily harm, he actually consents to sin, although he would prefer to avoid both evils. Such coercion limits the voluntariness of willing, but does not eliminate it.\(^{125}\)

Augustine distinguished four stages of the freedom of man: the original state of Adam in which he could do good or evil, the fallen state in which man can do only evil, and the graced state in which freedom is the gift of charity, though a tendency to evil remains. The final state of the blessed is full freedom in good without any possibility of doing evil. The freedom which Adam might have merited by the proper use of his power not to sin is now a gratuitous gift of God.

Adam was originally created without defect of spirit or flesh. He was capable of understanding a divine command.\(^{126}\) His carnal desires

\(^{124}\) De pecc. mer., 1.39.70; de spir. et lilt., 36.65; de nat. et grat., 53.61,62, 62.72; de perf. just., 8.18, 21.44; C. Jul. Pol., 5.7.27. The generation of habit, if not cupidity, from consent to concupiscence has been discussed above.

\(^{125}\) De spir. et litt., 31.53; Ep. 145. 5; Quaest. in Hept., 4.24. Nor does it exclude the goodness of the conversion of a persecuted schismatic.

\(^{126}\) De pecc. mer., 1.36,67,68.
were subject to the dominion of his will, which was itself without weakness in carrying through the good he chose. He had the divine gift by which he could choose good, but he was also capable of choosing evil. Finally, the precept he was given could easily have been obeyed.

In his punishment for the sin of Adam, man lost charity and became subject to ignorance, weakness of will and concupiscence in the flesh. Since he does not have charity, he cannot choose good for its own sake, and does nothing that is morally good. Moreover, in the absence of delight in good, he lacks knowledge of the good and falls prey to the drawing of concupiscence. If he receives instruction in justice through the law and attempts to keep it, his situation deteriorates further. When concupiscence is blocked by fear of punishment without being cured by charity, its force increases just as the damming of a stream builds up the pressure of the water. Concupiscence finally breaks through and the sin is greater. Moreover, the law has made this sin into transgression as well. Finally, should he successfully play one evil desire off against another or deny all in fear of punishment, he is in danger of prideful glorying in self-righteousness. Cupidity reigns in the


128 de nat. et grat., 51.59; Ep. 194, 6.27; Ench., 28.105,106; de civ. Dei, 14.11.


130 de spir. et litt., 4.6; de perf. just., 6.14; de civ. Dei, 13.5.

131 de pecc. mer., 3.11.20; de spir. et litt., 4.6, 5.8, 14.25; de perf. just., 19.42; de grat. Chr., 8.9; de civ. Dei, 13.5.

132 de nupt. et concup., 1.3.4; C. epp. Pel., 3.4.11.
heart of such a man, and he is in bondage to sin. Although he is free
in the sin which delights him, he lacks the higher liberty in good.\textsuperscript{133}

The Christian who has heard the gospel and believed that Christ
offers him justice and charity asks these gifts of God. By the gratuitous
gift of God, he receives the forgiveness of sins and the gift of love.
The delight in justice begins to heal his will and restores his freedom
to choose the good for its own sake.\textsuperscript{134} Charity opposes and gradually
overcomes the power of concupiscence, cupidity and pride.\textsuperscript{135} The orient-
tations to evil, however, are not fully eliminated and continue to take
some toll of sinful consent. Though one holds back from grave sin and
even from sinful performance, still the just fail in lesser ways by var-
ious excesses and negligences, at least in thought and affection.\textsuperscript{136}

All must ask forgiveness as long as they are in the flesh;\textsuperscript{137} but the
more charity works in man's will, the more liberated from these restric-
tions he becomes and the greater grows his delight and true freedom in
the good.\textsuperscript{138} The Christian does not attain the original state of Adam,

\textsuperscript{133} Ep. 145, 2; C. opp. Pel., 1.2.5; de patient., 17.14; Ench., 9.30.

\textsuperscript{134} De pecc. mer., 2.17.26; de spir. et litt., 9.15, 19.34, 30.52; de nat.
et grat., 69.83; C. Jul. op. imp., 1.83,94,98,99,107, 2.223, 3.110,118,120.

\textsuperscript{135} De pecc. mer., 2.19.33, 2.23.37; de spir. et litt., 8.13; de perf. just.,
13.31; de grat. Chr., 19.20; C. Jul. Pel., 5.8.32.

\textsuperscript{136} De pecc. mer., 1.39.70; despir. et litt., 36.65; de nat. et grat.,
62.72; de perf. just., 8.18, 21.44; C. Jul. Pel., 5.7.27; Ench., 17.64.

\textsuperscript{137} De pecc. mer., 2.4.4, 2.16.24,25, 3.13.23; de spir. et litt., 36.65;
de nat. et grat., 35.41; de perf. just., 7.16, 9.20, 21.44; de gent. Pel.,
op. imp., 1.98,101.

\textsuperscript{138} Ep. 157, 2.8; Ench., 9.30.
however, since he remains subject to ignorance, fear and the opposition of concupiscence. 139

The final freedom belongs to the blessed. They are fully healed and have a necessity of living well; for as no man can will unhappiness, these cannot will iniquity. 140 The risen flesh is spiritual and subject to the dominion of spirit, and the vision of God is theirs.

Augustine's notion of freedom can be summarized in five propositions. Choice between good and evil alternatives is not of the essence of freedom, but characterizes a lower freedom which is instable in good. Second, voluntariness defines freedom, whether the object be a delighting good or evil or even a feared or threatened loss. Third, true freedom loves good without the possibility of failure, while a middle freedom chooses between good and evil, and the lowest freedom voluntary defects toward non-being. Fourth, unfailing freedom in good is the consequence of the presence of God's Spirit, not a natural property of any created being; servitude in evil follows inevitably from the exercise of choice in the absence of this grace. Finally, the cause of the absence of grace is the defect of the creature from the love of Supreme Good. Historically, the human race fell from freedom in the sin of Adam. Divine election rather than human willing and merits determines which individual recovers freedom and which remains in servitude.

139 In the final years of his life, Augustine explains that the freedom of the elect is greater than that of Adam, even among the limitations of this world. See below, pp. 157-159.

140 De perf. just., 4.9; Ench., 28.105; C. Jul. op. imp., 5.61.
CHAPTER FOUR

ELECTION AND EFFICACIOUS GRACE

Before moving into the exposition of the first part of the Pelagian controversy, it will be useful to recall the distinction of its three stages. In the opening phase of the debate, which lasted until the ecclesiastical judgments in 416, the principal point at issue between Augustine and Pelagius was the place of Jesus Christ in the economy of salvation. The specific issues involved were the necessity of the gift of the Holy Spirit for performing the works of the law, the necessity of faith in the gospel of Christ, and the role of the law in the process of salvation. This debate gave rise to the more general question of the priority of divine election or of human initiative in the salvation of the individual. Pelagius asserted that God desires the salvation of every man, but that he defers to man's freedom to reject this destiny. Since God cannot bear the responsibility of man's sin and condemnation, neither can primary responsibility for salvation be assigned to him. Augustine has already decided that man's dominion over his own destiny ended in the catastrophe of Adam's sin. Since God would be fully justified in condemning all men for that sin, Augustine never hesitates to attribute to him full responsibility for any man's salvation.

After the opening exchanges, the conflict over the necessity of
grace resolved into the questions of the nature and availability of grace. To uphold his position on human responsibility, Pelagius insisted that grace only facilitates what man can otherwise accomplish by the power of nature, and that any divine assistance must be given according to the prior merits of man's own good purpose and efforts. Augustine counter-attacked by asserting both that grace is given without any prior good merits and that man's subsequent faith and good works must be attributed to the efficacy of this grace rather than to the free choice of his will. This debate over the gratuity and efficacy of grace constitutes the second stage of the controversy and extends through 422.

In the last five years of his life, Augustine carried on a discussion with various Catholic interrogators over the divine operation which accomplishes God's predestining purpose by preserving the elect in the choice and performance of the good. The divine mercy not only precedes man to effect his conversion, but accompanies him to assure his perseverance and salvation.

The progress of this controversy will be explained in three chapters. The present chapter deals with the debate over the necessity of grace in the first stage of the debate and the transition to the issues of election and the efficacy of grace in the second stage. The following chapter concentrates on Augustine's analysis of God's operation of man's conversion and exposes a significant development of his explanation of God's efficacy in moving man's will to belief during the second period. The subsequent discussion of the grace of perseverance in the final stage will be treated in the sixth chapter.

In the first two sections of the present chapter, Augustine's opening arguments for the necessity of divine grace for man's faith and
good works will be exposed. The transition to the second level of the polemic, over the issue of divine election, is traced in the third section. This in turn opens a new battleground, the divine effecting of faith and good works. This progress is charted in the final section of the present chapter and fully explored in chapter five.

1. The necessity of divine grace for good works

The issue which dominated the controversy between Pelagius and Augustine prior to the synods of Carthage and Milevis in 416 was not Caelestius' views on original sin and infant baptism, but the question of whether anyone could be without sin in the present life. Marcellinus raised the question, and Augustine replied in De peccatorum meritis et remissione and De spiritu et littera. He affirmed the possibility but denied the fact, explaining that God does not use such a grace in working man's salvation. Pelagius himself advances the issue in his De natura by granting that no one is actually free of all sin, but insisting that it is possible, because the power to sin or not is a part of man's nature and cannot be lost through his choice. In De natura et gratia, Augustine argued both that nature can be deprived of the possibility of action and that the power of avoiding sin does not reside in nature but comes from the grace of Christ. In response to this, Caelestius asserted that God does not demand the impossible, and concluded that man can easily keep his commandments. In his Ep. 157 ad Hilarium, in De perfectione justitiae hominis, and in his commentary on the proceedings of Pelagius' trial at Diospolis in Palestine, De peccatis Pelagii, Augustine returns to the thesis that the grace by which man avoids sin is neither human nature, free choice, nor the teaching of the law, but the charity of the Holy Spirit.
Augustine's fullest explanation of the necessity and operation of the grace of God is in the two works written for Marcellinus at the outset of the debate. Without the Holy Spirit's gift of delight in the justice which the law commands, man does not choose the good for its own sake, and does not fulfill the law. The psychology of desire explains the efficacy of charity: man chooses the good which pleases him. Thus, to be actually chosen and performed, the commanded good must be attractive enough to override its impediments. God gives delight in the good; but during the present life, he does not give that fullness of charity which overcomes every contrary pleasure or pain. The grace of charity operates the choice and performance of the commanded good, but does not exclude all failure.

Pelagius' contention that human nature retains the possibility of sinlessness is met in De natura et gratia by a dogmatic assertion. If anyone can be without sin by the power of nature alone, then Christ has died in vain. But every Christian must confess that no man reaches either the perfection of justice or any degree therein without the help of Christ and the gift of his Spirit.

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1 Ep. 169, 4.13 establishes that de nat. et grat. was written in 415. Ep. 157 seems to be subsequent to this. De perf. just. can be placed before de gest. Pel., but cannot be located relative to de nat. et grat. and Ep. 157.


3 De pecc. mer., 2.17,26,27; de spir. et litt., 3.5, 16.28, 25.42, 29.51, 30.52.

4 De pecc. mer., 2.19.33; de spir. et litt., 35.63.

5 De nat. et grat., 2.2, 40.47, 60.70.
of the adequacy of nature are made in *De gestis Pelagii* and in the complaint Augustine addressed to Pope Innocent with four fellow bishops.  

Cælestius' teaching that God does not command what is beyond man's natural capacity to perform is discussed in *Ep. 157 ad Hilarium* and in *De perfectione justitiae hominis*. Augustine explains that all the commands and prohibitions of the law can be reduced to the mandate of love of God and neighbor and the exclusion of lust. Both charity and continence, however, are gifts of God. Man's preference of good over evil comes from the charity God inspires; and the same assistance makes him effective in doing good.

In the discussion of the necessity of grace, Augustine insists that it does not supplant or force man's own free choice, but heals his will and establishes his liberty. God works man's salvation not as that of a senseless stone or a mindless beast; man is helped only if he works himself. He cannot receive or retain the divine gifts except by his own consent. His understanding of the way choice follows the desire of the will excludes any coercion to good. Finally, grace heals the will, so that justice is freely loved and the law fulfilled.

Through the law is the knowledge of *sin*; through faith, the prayer for grace against sin; through grace, the healing of the soul from the disease

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6 *Ep. 177*, 4; *de gest. Pel.*, 3.7, 7.20, 9.21.

7 *De perf. just.*, 5.11; *Ep. 157*, 2.9.

8 *De perf. just.*, 19.40, 41; *Ep. 157*, 2.10, 4.29.

9 *De pecc. mer.*, 2.5.6; *de spir. et litt.*, 5.7; *de perf. just.*, 19.40; *Ep. 157*, 2.10.

of sin; through the healing of the soul, the freedom of choice; through free choice, love of justice; through the love of justice, the performance of the law.\textsuperscript{11}

Augustine immediately asks whence this faith comes, since the law and grace are both from God rather than man. The exposition now turns to this question.

2. The grace of faith

The necessity of faith for salvation has been evident to Augustine since his commentaries on Paul in 394, and his struggle with the question of infant baptism made this a pillar of his thought. In combatting the Pelagian assertion of the natural power to avoid sin and do good, Augustine emphasized the fiducial element in faith: it functions as a humble turning from one's own power to a prayer for the assistance of God's Spirit. As the act in which man abandons his pride and places his trust in God, faith is not simply a propaedeutic to but already the beginning of salvation. Since Augustine affirms in \textit{De peccatorum meritis et remissione} that conversion to good will is by the help of God, he must subsequently explain how God moves man to faith.\textsuperscript{12}

God prepares a man for faith by imposing on him a law which is beyond fallen man's abilities to fulfill. Through this command, God makes a man's weakness evident and shows him what he should seek and ask.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11}"neque enim lex inpletur nisi libero arbitrio, sed per legem cognitio peccati, per fidem inpetratio gratiae contra peccatum, per gratiam sanatio animae a utio peccati, per animae sanitatem libertas arbitrii, per liberum arbitrium iustitiae dilectio, per iustitiae dilectionem legis operatio." \textit{De spir. et ltt.}, 30.52, \textit{CSEL}, LX, 208.19-23.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{De pecc. mer.}, 2.5.5-6.7, 2.18.29-31.
In replying to the assertion of Caelestius that the law must be possible for man, Augustine points out the way in which the law breaks the pride of the man who presumes upon his ability to fulfill it: through it God humbles man and forces him to seek and pray for grace. 14

In De spiritu et littera, Augustine undertakes an analysis of the consent of belief which is his first full consideration of this issue since Ad Simplicianum. Having proven that moral living is not in man's power, he asks whether faith might be. A thing is in one's power if it follows from his willing and is prevented by his refusal. Obviously, faith is such a thing, since no one believes unwillingly or disbelieves unless he wills it. 15 The question is then posed: is the willing by which man believes itself a gift of God, or does it arise from his own free choice? If it is not a gift, does man have something in which he can glory as unreceived? If it is a gift, do non-believers have an excuse for their infidelity? The statements of divine operation of good willing and working in Phil., 2.13 properly apply to the charity which faith requests, not to the act of faith itself. If the act of faith is a gift of either nature or grace, why does God, who wants all to be saved, not grant it to all? 16 The problem here is that of divine election, but Augustine attempts to avoid it in explaining the act of faith.

The solution Augustine proposes employs the gifts of both nature

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14 De perf. just., 3.6, 5.11, 10.21, 19.42.

15 De spir. et litt., 31.53.

16 Ibid., 33.57.
and grace. In creation, God gives man free choice which can be turned to fidelity or infidelity; in grace God calls man to faith. The will which responds to this call by believing arises from the original gift of nature to accept the second gift of grace. Man has nothing unreceived. The infidel who spurns the divine mercy does not frustrate God's will to punish. Thus God wills man's salvation without either suppressing human freedom or allowing man to subvert the divine will.  

Augustine notes that faith is not attributed to God simply because he creates free choice, since this would make him responsible for sin as well. Notice that this willing is not attributed to God's gift only because it comes from the free choice which he naturally created in us; but also because God causes our willing and believing by sensible proddings. He works externally through the exhortations of the gospel and the commands of the law to draw man's attention to his weakness and move him to take refuge in justifying grace through faith; and he works interiorly where no man can control what comes into his mind. But to consent or refuse belongs to man's own will.

Although man cannot believe without the urging and vocation with which the divine mercy precedes his will, he is himself responsible for his acceptance or rejection of the call. As with all divine gifts, what is received and possessed is God's; but the receiving and possessing is

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17 Ibid., 33.58.

18 "...attendat et uideat non ideo tantum istam voluntatem divino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est, quod nobis naturaliter concretatum est, uerum etiam quod usorum suscionibus agit deus, ut uelimus et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per euangelicas exhortationes, ubi et mandata legis aliquid agunt, si ad hoc admonent hominem infirmitatis suae, ut ad gratiam iustificantem credendo confugiat, sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate quid ei ueniat in mentem, sed consentire vel dissentire proprie voluntatis est." Ibid., 34.60, CSEL, LX, 220.6-15.
itself man's own.\textsuperscript{19}

This explanation follows the theory of the congruous vocation which Augustine developed in \textit{Ad Simplicianum} and illustrated in the \textit{Confessiones}. Its intention, however, is significantly different; for Augustine is here attempting to affirm that the act of faith is a divine gift while avoiding an affirmation of both divine election and the efficacy of the divine operation which operates faith. He holds back from this fuller teaching without denying it.

But if anyone pushes the further question of why one man is so urged that he is persuaded and another is not, I have only two observations to make: "Oh the depth of the riches [of wisdom and knowledge of God]"; and "Is there injustice on God's part?" If he is dissatisfied with this let him seek someone more learned, but beware lest he find only someone less careful.\textsuperscript{20}

Augustine is evidently avoiding the question of the efficacy of divine grace. He proposed the explanation with, "Let us explain and see if this will satisfy the question...."\textsuperscript{21} He attempts to make the principal point

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{his ergo modis quando deus agit cum anima rationali, ut ei credat--neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio uel uocatio cui credat--, profecto et ipsum uelle credere deus operatur in homine et in omnibus misericordia eius praecuuent nos, consentire autem uocationi dei uel ab ea dissentire, sicut dixi, proprieu voluntatis est. quae res non solum non infirmat quod dictum est; quid enim habes quod non accepi? uerum etiam confirmat. accipere quippe et habere anima non potest dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi consentiendo ac per hoc quid habeat et quid accipiat dei est, accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est.} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 220.15-26.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{iam si ad illam profunditatem scrutandum quisquam nos coartet, cur illi ita suadeatur ut persuadeatur, illi autem non ita, duo sola occurrunt interim quae respondere mihi placet: o altitudo divitiarum! et: numquid iniquitas apud deum? cui respondio ita displicet quaeuerat doctiores, sed caueat, ne inveniat praesumptores.} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 220.26-221.4.

that faith is a gift of God while avoiding the further discussion and opposition to which an assertion of divine election and the efficacy of divine operation would lead.  

From this discussion and his contemporary works it is evident both that Augustine still affirms the efficacy of the divine action which works man's consent of faith and that he attributes this efficacy to the motives for belief which God presents in the vocation. In his comment on Psalm 77, Augustine assigns faith to the mercy of God which precedes and calls: God sought and revived the prodigal by a secret call and inspiration to return home. Similarly in De perfectione justitiae hominis he observes that man could not choose between life and death unless the divine vocation had placed the alternatives clearly before him, warned him to prefer life, and gave him the love of the good.

Augustine is avoiding yet another question in De spiritu et littera: why do some men never receive a vocation and perish without even the opportunity to be faithful? This issue could not long be forestalled: it forced it way into the early discussion and dragged the issue of divine efficacy along in its train.

22 Attempts to make this statement of man's freedom to accept or reject grace normative for Augustine's theology are misguided in ignoring his continuing affirmation that God has control over man's consent or dissent through the motives he presents. Jean Lebourlier called attention to the dissonance between this interpretation and the text of Augustine, "Grâce et liberté chez saint Augustin: Le grâce d'Adam dans le 'De Correptione et gratia,'" in Augustinus Magister (Paris, 1954), II, 789-793. Still, Maurice Huftier asserts that Augustine "often" speaks of the will as a media via while citing only this one text from De spir. et litter., "Libre arbitre, liberté, et péché chez saint Augustin," p. 222.

23 Enarr. in Ps. 77, 10, 24, which is dated in 415 by Ep. 169, 1.1.

24 De perf. just., 19.41.
3. Election without prior merits

The affirmation of divine election includes two parts which are ultimately inseparable: that God provides the means of salvation at his own discretion without regard for any prior merits of man, and that God himself works the salvation of those whom he has chosen. The first states that God effectively rejects a man by withholding the means necessary for his salvation; the second affirms that God not only provides the means to the elect, but effects their utilization. In the first part of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine asserted that man can neither be saved without faith in Christ and the gift of the Spirit nor merit their reception from God. The child who dies in a place where baptism is unavailable and the adult in whose hearing the gospel is never preached are condemned for the sin of Adam and for any personal sins which have been added to it.\(^{25}\) For whatever reason Christ descended into hell, it was not to preach the gospel and remove the excuse of the infidel\(^{26}\) who had never heard it, since he would be there still.\(^{26}\) Nor is this grace paid as a reward for the prior good works of man. Augustine notes that some reprobates are converted and some decent men never even have the chance.\(^{27}\) Since good works can only follow a preceding faith, this faith is not given for prior good merits.\(^{28}\) Although the cause of their rejection

\(^{25}\) De pecc. mer., 1.21.29, 1.22.31; de nat. et grat., 2.2, 4.4, 8.9, 9.10.

\(^{26}\) Ep. 164, 4.12,13.

\(^{27}\) De pecc. mer., 1.22.31.

\(^{28}\) De spir. et litt., 10.16; Enarr. in Ps. 67, 41, which is dated in 415 by Ep. 169, 1.1; de gest. Pel., 14.34,36.
is in men's pride, the only cause of their election is God's mercy. Still, the case of infants who die without any good or evil action provides his best argument.

The reaction of the Pelagians to this grace which could not be merited was predictably strong. Caelestius insisted that grace is given for man's prior merits, and that it is limited to teaching, lest by denying necessary aid God is responsible for man's sin. Pelagius refused to recognize man's total impotence in doing good and insinuated at Diospolis that grace is given to those who are suitable. Each is equally cautious about Paul's attribution of salvation to the mercy of God rather than the efforts of man in Rom., 9.16. Caelestius tries to temper the statement by quoting other passages of Scripture, and Pelagius explains that it either means that God helps man or is not Paul's assertion at all.

- After the condemnation of Pelagius at Carthage and Milevis in 416, and the appeals to Rome, Augustine became more aggressive. He was disturbed by discrepancies between Pelagius' own account of the proceeding

29 De pecc. mer., 2.17.26; de spir. et litt., 18.31, 24.40; Ep. 177, 7; Ep. 186, 6.16.

30 Cited in the proceedings of the trial, de gest. Pel., 14.30.

31 He is cited in de nat. et grat., 44.52-51.59.

32 De gest. Pel., 14.32.

33 De perf. just., 19.40.

at Diospolis and the official record which he finally obtained. These differences and statements which Pelagius had made in letters written after the trial made him suspect that Pelagius had been intentionally vague in order to deceive his judges and isolate the opposition of the African Church. Augustine was determined to force the issue and found his *homoousios* in the ninth chapter of Romans. The election of Jacob and rejection of Esau without prior differentiating merits and the attribution of salvation to the divine mercy rather than to the merits of man would be dogmas to which Pelagius must submit.

After he finished *De gestis Pelagii* in 417, Augustine received a copy of Pelagius' *Pro libero arbitrio*, which was written after the trial. He undertook a campaign of letter writing to expose Pelagius' error and defend the new condemnation at Carthage in the spring of 418. Before the council, he wrote to Paulinus of Nola and to Juliana; after it, he addressed *De gratia Christi* to Albina, Pinianus and Milenio, and a long letter to Sixtus in Rome. He pressed the two chosen issues: the giving of grace without prior human merits and the efficacy of the divine mercy in bringing man to salvation. These issues were fully discussed in *Ad Simplicianum*, but the context of the new analysis was significantly different. Augustine can defend the justice of divine reprobation through an appeal to the condemnation of all in Adam and need not rely on universal personal sinfulness; he now uses the salvation of infants to demonstrate the gratuitity of salvation in adults as well. Since Pelagius asserts that divine

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35 Augustine refers to a new book of Pelagius in Ep. 186, 8.27 and 10.34; and the wording of the Pelagian assertion in Ep. 186, 10.35 matches that of *de grat. Chr.*, 7.8, rather than a similar statement in *De gest. Pel.*, 30.54. In *de grat. Chr.* the source is identified as *Pro libero arbitrio*. 
grace gives only the possibility of doing good, Augustine no longer limits Rom., 9.16, "It is not man's will or exertion but God's mercy," to the operation of faith through a congruous vocation, but argues for a divine operation of man's good works through charity. The examination of this second point is deferred to the following section.

Augustine argues strongly for divine election in writing to Paulinus in mid-417. What might man do to separate himself out from sinners and earn the grace of God? Prior to grace no man can do any good works which would merit it; he has earned only the punishment of his evil deeds. Faith does indeed merit the bestowing of charity; but it is itself a gift and merits in the same way that charity earns its own increase. This is clear in children where subsequent gifts are the reward for prior gifts which were bestowed without their willing preceding, or receiving, or even following the gift. Paul argues that the divine election which preferred Jacob to Esau was fully gratuitous since neither of them had done anything good or evil. Nor was Esau, who also bore the sin of Adam, unjustly condemned. If the lump from which God works was itself neutral, one could charge injustice in his making some men into vessels of mercy and others into vessels of wrath; but since all are sinful, God does no injustice in condemning some while extending mercy to others equally deserving of damnation. The gratuity of salvation is more evident in children; but one must confess that no adult receives mercy

36 Ep. 186, 2.4-6.

37 Ibid., 3.7-10.

38 Ibid., 4.11,12.

according to a prior merit. No one is condemned without deserving it. The Council of Carthage defined the baptism of infants for the remission of the original sin which is the foundation of this argument.

The argument continues in Ep. 194 ad Sixtum at the end of 418. Since the Pelagians cannot assert any good works preceding the forgiveness of sins, they argue that faith is the human choice which merits the reward of grace. Augustine then proves that faith must be attributed not to man's choice, but to God's operation in him. Those who do not receive the gift of faith have no excuse for their infidelity, for the sin they have from Adam and their personal sins justify their condemnation.

A man proudly presumes upon his own good will in claiming that he lacks faith only because he had no opportunity to believe. It is the case of children, however, which makes the divine election patent. Divine providence, not fate, determines which infant receives baptism before death and which is condemned for want of it. These infants have no prior merits, nor do those of their parents provide any index of God's choices. Paul's reflection on the fates of Esau and Jacob is again expounded at length. Augustine completes his argument by excluding an appeal to divine

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40 Ibid., 6.16-21.

41 Henricus Denzinger and Adolff Schöningh, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 33 ed. (Rome, 1965), no. 223.

42 Ep. 194, 3.6-9.

43 Ibid., 6.22-30.

44 Ibid., 6.23.

45 Ibid., 7.31-33.

46 Ibid., 8.34-40.
foreknowledge of what each child would have done had he lived beyond infancy. Granting the possibility of such knowledge, it provides no explanation for the way God acts. Augustine makes the same appeal in a contemporary letter to Optatus and retraces the full argument as he moves to the discussion of the divine operation of man's faith in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*.  

4. Divine working of man's faith and good works

By establishing that God does not choose the men he helps on the basis of their own faith or good works, Augustine can overthrow the Pelagian assertion that grace is given to the man who renounces sin and earns God's favor; but he must also counter Pelagius' attribution of salvific willing and action to man's own choice. In *Pro libero arbitrio*, written after 416, Pelagius argues that God's grace only helps man's natural capacity: good will and performance must be man's own, for which he is solely responsible. Up to this point, Augustine has argued only that the divine mercy places faith in man's discretion by providing the necessary vocation and motivation. Nor has he insisted on the efficacy of the Holy Spirit in operating man's good willing and works. In his non-polemical commentary on Psalm 77 in 415, he had said that grace not only forgives man's sins but makes him cooperate with the operation of God's Spirit in doing good works. When, however, Caelestius tried to temper the


49 *Quando enim cum Spiritu Dei operante spiritus hominis cooperatur, tunc quod Deus iussit implicetur;...Multo enim hoc expressius dictum est, ad significantiam gratiam Dei, quae non solum operatur remissionem peccatorum,*
Pauline assertion that salvation depends on God's mercy rather than man's willing, Augustine was content to insist that man's will does not complete its work without divine help and then cut off further discussion which would exacerbate the objector. He even found an excuse for Pelagius' failure to respond clearly to this matter at Diospolis.

Once Pelagius had spoken after the trial, however, Augustine began to press this point of divine efficacy in no uncertain terms. Writing to Paulinus he insisted on the fuller meaning of Rom., 9.16: man's victory over concupiscence comes not from his will but from the help of God.

Addressing Juliana on the dangers of Pelagius' influence through his letter to Demetria, he made the same point.

"God operates in you both to will and to perform for good will," not, as they think, only by revealing knowledge that we may know what we should do, but also by inspiring charity; so that what we know by learning we may likewise do by loving.

A few months later, the Council of Carthage asserts the same doctrine:

Whoever says that the grace of God through Jesus Christ helps us to avoid sin only because it gives us a clear knowledge of the precepts and prohibitions; but denies that

sed etiam cooperantem sibi facit hominis spiritum in opere bonorum factorum;" Enarr. in Ps. 77, 8, CCSL, XXXIX, 1073.36-38, 41-44.

50 De perf. just., 19.40.


52 Ep. 186, 9.33.

53 "deus est enim, inquit apostolus, qui operatur in uobis et uelle et operari pro bona voluntate, non, sicut isti sentiunt, tantummodo scientiam revelando, ut nouriunus, quid facere debemus, sed etiam inspirando caritatem, ut ea, quae discendo nouimus, etiam diligendo faciamus." Ep. 183, 2.7, CCSL, LVII, 125.19-24.
through this grace we are given the desire and efficacy to do what we know should be done; let him be anathema.\textsuperscript{54}

This doctrine was directed against Pelagius' renewed assertion that God leaves choice and performance to man.\textsuperscript{55}

In \textit{De gratia Christi}, which was written before Augustine left Carthage after the Council, he mounts a fullscale attack on the Pelagian distinction between the divine help which gives man the power of willing and performing the good, and the exercise which comes from man himself under the inspiration of God's law, teaching and exhortation, and the example of Christ. Without distinguishing between the consent of belief and the subsequent performance of good works, Augustine insists that what Pelagius calls instruction must be recognized as an interior persuasion which moves man to action. The Father's instruction results not simply in knowledge or in a compliance by fear of punishment; rather he teaches by giving the charity which makes a man love and perform the good.\textsuperscript{56}

Christ himself says of this teaching that whoever hears and learns from his Father comes to him, and those who do not come were not taught. Augustine concludes that in drawing men to Christ by teaching through the Spirit's grace, the Father both imparts knowledge and works man's willing and performance.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54}"Item, quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum propter hoc tantum nos adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis revelatur et aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus, quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis praestari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus, an. s." Denzinger-Schönmetzer, no. 226.

\textsuperscript{55}The offending section of Pelagius' \textit{Pro libero arbitrio} is quoted in full in \textit{de grat. Chr.}, 4.5.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{De grat. Chr.}, 13.14.
It does not follow that whoever can come also comes, unless he wills and does this. Everyone who learns from the Father not only can come, but does come. There indeed are the perfection of capability, the desire of the will, and the achievement of action.\(^{58}\)

God's grace is not limited to establishing and strengthening man's capacity to believe and do good. Pelagius rejects a divine operation of man's willing on the grounds that it would make God responsible for sin as well as the virtuous choice. Augustine explains that to choose and act man must be oriented to good or evil through either charity or cupidity. The latter comes from man or his deceiver and it issues in sinful works. From God, man receives the charity which not only makes him good, but gives the interior increase of good fruit when God cultivates this good tree through the preacher's ministry.\(^{59}\)

In contemporary works, Augustine makes the same point about the role of interior grace in effective teaching. In *De civitate Dei*, he asserts that if God himself were to speak to a man by using creatures to affect his exterior and interior senses, but did not work upon and rule his mind by interior grace, then this preaching of the truth would accomplish no good at all.\(^{60}\) When Augustine preaches at Caesarea in September

\(^{57}\)Ibid., 14.15.

\(^{58}\)"Non est autem consequens, ut qui potest uenire, etiam ueniat, nisi id uoluerit atque fecerit. sed omnis qui didicit a patre non solum potest uenire, sed uenit. ubi iam et possibilitas prefectus et uoluntatis affectus et actionis effectus est." Ibid., CSEL, XLII, 138.17-21.

\(^{59}\)Ibid., 17.18-19.20. The role of these orientations was examined in chapter three, section two, above, pp. 84-89.

\(^{60}\)"Alioquin etiam si Deus ipse uetens creatura sibi subjicta in aliqua specie
In the hope of winning back one of the leaders of the Donatist party, he exhorts the people to pray that God would preach within Emeritus to make his sermon fruitful. In his commentaries on Psalm 118, Augustine devotes a good deal of attention to the divine teaching which effects good works by giving charity. Still later in his Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, Augustine observes that without the help of the Lord, men cannot hear and obey with the eyes and ears of their hearts.

In rejecting the Pelagian thesis that God empowers and exhorts man to good but is not otherwise involved in his exercise of this power, Augustine has already passed beyond his original understanding of charity as a delight by which man prefers and performs the good for its own sake. In countering Pelagius he affirms that God's operation causes man's choice and performance of good works. Again, however, his controversial purposes hold back a full exploration of his new position; and he remains within the limits of the definition of the Council of Carthage, that God gives man both the strength and the desire for good works. He demands only

humana sensus adloquatur humanos, sive istos corporis sive illos, quos istis simillisimos habemus in somnis, nec interiore gratia mentem regat atque agat, nihil prodest homini omnis praedicatio veritatis." de civ. Dei, 15.6, CCSL, XLVIII, 459.27-31.

61 Serm. ad Caes. ecc., 9. This exhortation is repeated in Serm. 152, 1, and Serm. 153, 1.1, both preached a month later.

62 Enarr. in Ps. 118, 5.4, 6.1, 17.3, 4, 9, 10, 19.4, 27.8. For the dating of this work in 419, see Charles Kannengießer, "Enarratio in psalmum CXVIII, Science de la révélation et progrès spirituel," Recherches augustiniennes, II (1962), 359-360.

63 Quaest. in Hept., 5.150.

64 Denzinger-Schönmetzer, no. 226, quoted above, n. 54.
that Pelagius affirm the necessity of God's help for man to actually exercise his capacity in good willing and action. He does not require an exclusion of man's power to impede the effects of the grace. In so refraining, Augustine leaves man a certain autonomy in good and the opportunity for merits which are not the fruit of grace alone. Such merits will not be excluded until the final stage of the controversy when he asserts the efficacy of the grace of perseverance in man's willing and working. In dealing with the consent of faith, however, Augustine immediately takes up the more radical position and excludes an autonomy by which conversion could merit the giving of charity. Merits which precede charity would undermine its gratuity, although subsequent merits which are the fruit of charity do not destroy the gratuity of its increase and eternal reward. Thus the divine working of the act of faith becomes essential to the defense of the gratuity of grace and divine election, while the corresponding operation of good willing and performance remains outside the battle until 425.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the controversy with the Pelagians, Augustine asserted the necessity of divine help for man to believe in Christ and to do good, but he avoided the discussion of the efficacy of these graces. The congruous vocation and the Holy Spirit's gift of delight in the commanded good were said to urge and incline to faith and good works, but to require a free consent which man can refuse. Pelagius and Caelestius

65 De grat. Chr., 47.52.

66 Ibid., 31.34; Ep. 186, 3.10.
reply that any help God gives is limited to teaching man what he should
do and exhorting him to accomplish it. Even such assistance, however,
must be earned by conversion and prayer. In order to establish the proper
nature of the gift of charity, Augustine must prove that the Spirit's
help is not limited to guiding and strengthening man's own good purposes;
and in order to safeguard the gratuity of this assistance, he must assert
the efficacy of the divine operation which accomplishes man's conversion.
When he can no longer avoid the issue of divine election, Augustine's de-
fense of the nature and necessity of charity inexorably leads him to de-
velop an explanation of God's working of conversion which excludes the
earning of charity by a meritorious acceptance of the congruous vocation.
The problematic for Augustine's analysis of conversion in the second stage
of the controversy with Pelagius is thus significantly different than
it had been for the discussion in Ad Simplicianum or in De spiritu et
littera. The exposition now turns to this new investigation of the way
God works his elect's initial act of faith.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE GRACE OF FAITH

The second stage of the Pelagian controversy moves beyond the debate over the necessity of faith in Jesus Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit to the questions of the adequacy of fallen man to begin the process of his salvation and the gratuity of the divine grace by which it is accomplished. In conceding that grace facilitates man's performance of good works, Pelagius insisted that the bestowing and withholding of such assistance must be according to man's merits. This leads Augustine to assert divine sovereignty over the will of man for the first time since the discussion in Ad Simplicianum in which he initially put forward this thesis. He argues that God provides or withholds his assistance which is necessary for salvation according to his own elective purpose without regard for prior or subsequent human merits. Further, he insists that the acceptance of these graces must be attributed to God's operation rather than to the autonomous free choice of man. The divine election and the efficacy of charity in moving man to perform good works have been considered in the preceding chapter. The tracing of Augustine's development now concentrates on the divine grace which operates the first act in the process of salvation, conversion and faith.

The hypothesis of this study is that after the Council of Carthage
in 418, Augustine developed a new theory of the way God causes man's initial act of faith. Up to this time, he had continued to rely on the explanation elaborated in Ad Simplicianum according to which divine knowledge of the dispositions of a man's will direct his providential control over the environment of choice so that the elect is called in a way which wins his consent. This theory provided a simple explanation for a divine control which does not interrupt the internal processes of man's free choice. The explanation of the working of faith contrasts sharply with the operation of good willing and performance through the gift of charity which changes the orientation of man's will and disposes him to respond to goods which he previously rejected. In giving faith, God brings man to a situation in which he makes his own decision; the gift of charity then gives a new orientation which empowers man to pursue the course he has chosen in converting to Christ.

In 418, however, Augustine begins to elaborate a significantly different doctrine of the initial act of faith. In working man's conversion, God operates not only through human ministry and the control of the environment of choice; he also works within man's will to move him to heed the preaching and believe in Christ. The interiority which has characterized the Spirit's gift of charity is attributed to the operation of conversion and faith.

The development of this new explanation of faith will be traced through three stages. In De gratia Christi, Augustine spoke of faith and charity as an interior divine teaching. In his Ep. 194 ad Sixtum, he assigned the operation of faith to the Holy Spirit. Then in replying to the two Pelagian letters in Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, he characterized the operation of conversion as the overcoming of man's
resistance to God. In the final section of this chapter, contemporary materials which reflect the new position are gathered.

1. The grace of effective teaching in De gratia Christi

As was seen in chapter four, the first book of De gratia Christi centers on Pelagius' assertion in Pro libero arbitrio that God gives and helps the possibility of good choice and action, but does not give the willing and operation which come from man himself. God's influence on man's choices is restricted to teaching, revelation, the example of Christ, and a motivation by the promise of future glory.¹ This contradicts Augustine's doctrine on the relation of the teaching of the law to the charity of the Spirit; but it reflects with some accuracy his explanation of the way God operates man's faith through preaching and his environment, though Augustine would emphasize the persuasive role of the divine action. Since an exclusion of human merit in the consent of faith has become essential to the defense of the gratuity of charity, Augustine no longer holds back from asserting that God bears full responsibility for man's consent of faith. More importantly, in elaborating his refutation of Pelagius, he assimilates the grace of faith to the interior gift of charity which changes man's dispositions and moves him to act according to new desires.

In De gratia Christi, Augustine insists on the efficacy of grace in producing man's willing and action, without clearly distinguishing the giving of faith and of charity. Various materials are recalled from the earlier analysis of charity to establish that God is not limited to operating through the exterior ministry of teaching. However, in proving

¹De grat., Chr., 4.5, 7.8, 10.11.
the efficacy of this operation in producing man's response, Augustine draws on scripture texts which have been associated with faith rather than charity. He cites the text of John 6 to show that God's urging achieves persuasion.

For not everyone who through the scriptures hears the Lord promising the Kingdom of Heaven has faith; nor are all who are exhorted to come to him who says, "Come to me all who are burdened," persuaded to come. The Lord himself showed who has faith and is persuaded to come to him when he said, "No one comes to me unless the Father who sent me draws him." Later he said of non-believers, "No one can come to me unless my Father gives this to him."2

Then he uses these texts to establish the efficacy of the interior teaching which gives the willing and performance of both faith and good works.

The Lord speaks of this manner of teaching when he says: "Everyone who hears from my Father and learns comes to me." If anyone does not come, it is not because he heard and learned that he should come but did not will to do it. Such a refusal cannot rightly be associated with God's teaching through grace. If as Truth says, "Everyone who learns comes," clearly whoever does not come has not learned. Obviously coming or not is by the choice of the will. But his will can be alone; and then man does not come. If he comes, his choice must have been helped; and so helped that he not only knows what is to be done, but does it. When God teaches through the grace of the Spirit rather than the letter of the law, whatever anyone has learned he not only sees in understanding, but seeks in willing and perfects in acting.3

2"non enim omnium est fides, qui audiunt per scripturas regnum caelorum dominum pollicentem, aut omnibus persuadetur quibuscumque suadetur, ut ueniant ad eum qui dicit: uenite ad me omnes qui laboratis; quorum autem sit fides et quibus persuadetur, ut ad eum ueniant, satis ipse demonstrauerit, ubi ait: nemo uenit ad me, nisi pater qui misit me traxerit eum, et paulo post, cum de non credentibus loquere tur, dixi, inquit, uohis, quia nemo potent uenire ad me, nisi fuerit ej datum a patre meo." Ibid., 10,11, CSEL, XLII, 134,21-135,2.
These statements of Christ about the teaching and drawing by which the Father gives men to come to him were first used for a coercion through fear and only more recently for a divine vocation which helps man believe.  

This passage is the only one in the controversy with Pelagius in which Augustine treats of the operation of faith and good works together under the rubric of divine teaching. The sudden shift in the interpretation of these texts of John's Gospel to establish the efficacy of charity is the point of transition in Augustine's explanation of the operation of faith. As the efficacy of the operation of faith is transferred to charity, so the interiority of charity is transferred to the grace of faith.

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3. De isto docendi modo etiam dominus ait: omnis, qui audiuít a patre meo et dicitur, uenit ad me. qui ergo non uenerat, non de illo recte dicitur 'audiuít quidem et dicit sibi esse ueniendum,' sed facere non uult quod dicit, prorsus non recte dicitur de isto docendi modo, quo per gratiam docet deus. si enim, sicut ueritas loquitur, omnis, qui dicitur, uenit, quisquis non uenit, profecto nec dicitur. quis autem non uideat et uenire quemquam et non uenire arbitrio voluntatis? sed hoc arbitrium potest esse solum, si non ueniit; non autem potest nisi adiutum esse, si ueniit, et sic adiutum, ut non solum quid faciendum sit sciat, sed quod scierit etiam faciat. ac per hoc, quando deus docet non per legis litteram, sed per spiritus gratiam, ita docet, ut quod quisque didicerit non tantum cognoscendo uideat, sed etiam uolendo appetat agendo-que perficiat." Ibid., 14.15, pp. 137.23-138.8.

4. Ep. 93, 5; C. litt. Pet., 2.84.186: de perf. just., 19.41; Serm. 131, 2.2; Ep. 186, 11.38. Phil. 2.13 has also been used to assert the operation of the consent of faith through the vocation as well as the operating of good will and works through charity. For the vocation see, de div. quaest., 68.5; Ad Simpl., 1.2.12; de spir. et litt., 34.60; de perf. just., 19.41. For the grace of charity see, Ep. 55, 10.19; de Gen. ad litt., 8.12; de pecc. mer., 2.18.30; de spir. et litt., 2.2, 25.42, 29.50; Ep. 140, 21; Ep. 157, 4.29; Ep. 186, 1.3, 3.7. In de spir. et litt., 33.57, Augustine distinguishes between the two uses.

5. Eugene TeSelle interprets this analysis as a collapsing of the sequential operations of faith and charity into a single process of conversion, Augustin the Theologian, p. 334. Because Augustine continues to distinguish these two graces in subsequent writings, the passage is here read as a point of transition to an interior grace of faith and an efficacious grace of good works. TeSelle's interpretation also uses a late dating of Tract.
Subsequently in *De gratia Christi*, Augustine replies to an assertion of Pelagius that man uses his freedom to run to God and place his will under the divine direction, thereby meriting God's direction and help. Augustine's response evidences the assimilation of the working of conversion to the giving of charity. For the first time he cites the episode in the book of Esther in which God himself converts the Assyrian king and changes his anger to gentleness without any prior move toward God on the king's part. God works within man by a hidden and marvelous power to operate both true revelation and good willing. Later he notes that contrary to the teaching of Caelestius that man's penance merits the forgiveness of sins, Christ moved Peter to penance and tears after his denial not by a glance, but by touching his heart through interior grace.

Augustine seems to be using the established doctrine of internal grace to defend and strengthen a new explanation of the operation of faith. This association with the work of the Holy Spirit makes the present problematically different from that of his earlier assertion of the operation of faith through the congruous vocation. In that analysis the adaptation of God's call to the peculiar dispositions of an individual

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6 *De grat. Chr.*, 22.23, 23.24.

7 *Ibid.*, 24.25. In the subsequent *Quaest. in Hept.*, 7.27, Augustine notes that God worked in the heart of Sisra and his army to astound and astonish them, and thus to hand them over to Israel.

8 Caelestius' teaching is reported in *de gest. Pel.*, 18.42. Augustine contradicts him in *Ep.*, 186, 9.33, but asserts the interior grace in *De grat. Chr.*, 45.49 and *Serm.*, 284, 6.
stood in sharp contrast to the effect of charity which changes these dispositions. The congruous vocation worked faith through divine knowledge of a man's pattern of choice and providential manipulation of the elements of the environment in which he was called to consent to the gospel.\(^9\)

This concern with the adaptation is reflected in the references to divine persuasion in *De spiritu et littera* and the inspiration of the Prodigal's thought of returning home.\(^10\) By contrast, the present doctrine of effective teaching interprets the divine working of faith through an analogy to the inspiration of charity which changes man's attitude and choices. It dwells on the activity of the Holy Spirit in moving man to good and the power of God to overcome man's reluctance and opposition to grace. Each of these will be developed in Augustine's subsequent arguments.

2. The work of the Holy Spirit in *Ep. 194 ad Sixtum*

Augustine wrote *De gratia Christi* in the spring of 418. He spent the summer after the Council of Carthage travelling on ecclesial business and returned to Hippo in the fall of that year to find several letters awaiting him. One of these was from the Roman priest Sixtus, who had been considered a Pelagian sympathizer. Augustine sent a brief letter to him immediately, *Ep. 191*, promising a fuller reply. This debt is paid in *Ep. 194*, which Augustine sent soon afterward, probably late in 418. It contains a full-scale attack on the Pelagian assertion that through his adhering to God in faith and praying for assistance man first merits the divine care and assistance. The analysis of the act of faith is set

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\(^9\) See above, pp. 28-29.

\(^10\) *De spir. et litt.*, 34.60; *Enarr. in Ps.* 77, 24; *Ep. 186*, 2.5.
in the middle of Augustine's proof of the gratuity and justice of divine election. 11

As in his letter to Paulinus, Augustine quickly resolves the question of the gratuity of grace into that of the generation of faith. Faith cannot be a reward for any prior merits, since before faith one has only sin. Nor can it be attributed to human choice, since God gives to each the measure of faith. 12 Augustine proceeds to establish the gratuity of divine election to grace by proving that the faith and prayer which seek and receive the forgiveness of sins are to be attributed to the work of God, not to man's choice and initiative.

Since prayer presupposes faith, Augustine begins by showing that God is responsible for man's belief. To believe, one must indeed hear the gospel through the minister of Christ's work; but he must also receive the gift of faith, which comes from the Father. Not every seed sprouts; nor does everyone who hears the preaching have faith, but only those to whom God gives the measure of faith. Two men each hear the same preaching and perhaps witness the same miracles, but one believes and the other does not. The distinction between them originates in the depths of divine wisdom and judgment, which is hidden but just. 13 Although the words which


12 Ep. 194, 3.9. This reference is to Rom. 12.3.

13 "...quia nec omnium est fides, qui audiant uerbum, sed quibus Deus partitur mensuram fidei, sicut nec omnia germinant, quae plantatur et rigantur, sed quibus Deus dat incrementum. cur autem ille credat, ille non credat, cum ambo idem audiant et, si miraculum in eorum conspectu fiat, ambo idem uident, altitudo est divitiae sapientiae et scientiae eius, cujus inscrutabilia sunt iudicia et apud quem non est iniquitas, dum, cujus uult, miseretur et, quem uult, obdurat; neque enim propterea sunt ista inuista, quia occulta." Ibid., 3.10, CSEL, LVII, 184,13-23.
Christ spoke were spirit and life, no one could believe unless it was given to him by the Father, that is, by the Son and Spirit as well, since the works of the Trinity are inseparable. Thus Christ's knowledge of who would believe in him was not a simple foreknowledge of man's decision, but of his own gift.  

Augustine's use of Scripture manifests no new development. The text of 1 Cor., 3.7, "So neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but only God who gives the growth," has been used for the various forms of ministry. God makes the sacraments effective, illumines the mind when man teaches, and gives the charity by which one keeps the Law.  

It is a familiar introduction to Augustine's own teaching and preaching, and is even used for the relation between the creator and cultivator of living things. The observation that not all have faith, 2 Thess., 3.2, is repeated from De gratia Christi. The text of Rom., 12.3, "God gives to each the measure of faith," has been used during the Pelagian controversy when Augustine speaks of the interior persuasion by which God moves to faith.  

14 "et ne quisquam existimaret credentes sic ad eius praesicientiam pertinere quo modo non credentes, id est ut non eis fides ipsa desuper daretur, sed tantum eorum uoluntas futura praenoscereetur, mox adiecit atque ait: Et dicebat: 'Propterea dixi uobis, quia nemo potest uenire ad me, nisi fuerit ei datum a patre meo.'" Ibid., 3.12, pp. 185,23-186,6.

15 C. litt. Pet., 1.5.6, 1.8.9, 3.5.6, 3.42.51, 3.50.62, 3.53.65, 3.54.66; C. Crescon., 2.30.38, 3.8.8; C. ep. Parm., 2.14.32; Tract. in Joh. ep., 3.13; Ep. 120, 2.14; Ep. 144, 1; de pecc. mer., 1.25.37; Ep. 147, 1.1, 11.27, 23.52; de pecc. mer., 1.9.10; de spir. et ligg., 25.42, 29.50; Ep. 185, 10.44; Ep. 188, 1.1; de grat. Chr., 13.14, 19.20.

16 De Gen. ad litt., 5.6, 8.8, 9.15,18.

17 De spir. et ligg., 35.61; de bono vid., 1.2; de perf. just., 19.41; de grat. Pet., 14.34; Ep. 185, 9.42; Ep. 186, 2.4, 3.10; de grat. Chr., 31.34.
to emphasize the divine action and exclude a simple foreknowledge of human
decision. The conclusion of Ephesians, "...charity with faith from the
Father and the Lord Jesus Christ," is used only here.

The final stage of this analysis presents a significant develop-
ment which carries beyond that of De gratia Christi. Augustine points
out that man has no merit prior to faith, or anything else in which he
can glory. According to Is., 11.2-3, he does not have wisdom, understand-
ing, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety or fear of the Lord unless he
has received the Spirit of each of these gifts. Nor could he have virtue,
charity or continence unless he received the Spirit of each, according
to 2 Tim., 1.7. Then Augustine concludes:

So he would not have faith unless he received
the Spirit of faith, of whom the same writer
says, "Having the same Spirit of faith, as it
is written: 'I believed and thus I spoke';
we too believe and so we speak."18

Augustine uses the text of Isaiah and 2 Timothy to give a new interpre-
tation to Paul's assertion in 2 Cor., 4.13 that the Psalmist shares Chris-
tian faith, a text which has been used before for its literal meaning.19

The present interpretation is clearly intended to move the assertion of
a divine working of faith into the orbit of the established doctrine of
the Spirit's effecting of good willing and works through the infusion of
charity.20

18"...ita non haberet fidem, nisi accipisset spiritum fidei, de quo idem
ipse dicit: Habentes autem cundum spiritum fidei, secundum quod scriptum
est: 'Credidi, propter quod et locutus sum,' et nos credimus, propter


20 The text of 2 Timothy was used for charity in de grat. Chr., 33.36.
This process of assimilation continues in the following section as Augustine proves that the prayer for forgiveness and grace is a divine operation in man. Prayer indicates that its object is received from God. Since, however, one might think that the praying earns its answer as a reward, Augustine proves that prayer itself is a gift of God. Paul's teaching clearly ascribes prayer to the Holy Spirit, who intercedes for man.

The Spirit is said to importune because he makes us do so and inspires in us the affect or importuning and clamoring. 21

The Spirit himself has no needs and thus does not himself pray; rather as the Spirit speaks in man by making him speak, so he makes man pray and beg for what he needs. Analysis of the Pauline usage establishes that this action is of God's Holy Spirit, not of the spirit of man. 22

The concluding paragraph of this section brings together the two assertions of the work of the Holy Spirit in man before the gift of charity is given. No one exercises any of the seven gifts or the virtues without the Spirit of each gift and virtue. In the same way, one neither believes properly without the Spirit of faith nor prays efficaciously without the Spirit of prayer. This, of course, does not mean that there are as many spirits as gifts, virtues and effects; rather the one Spirit divides his gifts as he chooses. Augustine has only one qualification:

But it must be admitted that he helps differently before his indwelling than he does once he is inhabiting. Even before he lives within man, he helps him to become faithful. Once he inhabits,

21 "sed ita dictum est 'interpellat,' quia interpellare nos efficit nobisque interpellandi et gemendi inspirat affectum,..." Ep. 194, 4.16, CSEL, LVII, 138.19-21.

22 Ibid., 4.17.
he assists those who are already faithful. 23

The consent by which one believes the gospel is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who subsequently operates the good willing of believers through the gift of charity.

The stages of man's conversion remain clearly distinguished: the law moves man to fear for his salvation; the gospel presents the occasion for turning to God for help to fulfill justice; when he prays, charity is bestowed through the gift of the Holy Spirit. Augustine now assigns the entire process to the work of the Holy Spirit: fear of God to the Spirit of fear, belief in the promise of Christ to the Spirit of faith, the plea for help to the Spirit of prayer, and finally love and good works to the Spirit of charity. 24 None of the external means through which God works man's conversion are effective without a corresponding interior operation of the Spirit.

In the assertion of efficacious teaching in De gratia Christi and his explanation of the work of the Holy Spirit in Ep. 194 ad Sixtum, Augustine shifts his doctrine of the divine operation of conversion toward the proper work of the Holy Spirit, who has always been identified as the source of delight in goodness, from the earliest exposition of the Creed, through the Donatist controversy, and the condemnation of Pelagius. The role of interior illuminator and teacher, which had been developed for the Son of God in Augustine's early works and which appeared as late

23 "Sed, quod fatendum est, aliter adiuvat nondum inhabitans aliter inhabitans; nam nondum inhabitans adiuvat, ut sint fideles, inhabitans adiuvat iam fideles." Ibid., 4.18, CSEL, LVII, 190.9-11. In Ossent. in Hept., 2.138, Augustine remarks that not all wisdom and knowledge comes from the Holy Spirit.

24 See also, Ep. 194, 6.30.
as *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, is assigned to the Holy Spirit. For the first time, Augustine speaks of an operation of the Spirit prior to and in preparation for the indwelling of divine love. The analysis of divine operation of man's conversion after the Council of Carthage in the spring of 418 uses different scriptural materials and different interpretative analogues than the earlier explanation of God's working of faith which structured the narrative of the *Confessiones* and continues to serve as the background for *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, *De spiritu et littera*, and even *Ep. 186 ad Paulinum* written midway through 417. It is here suggested that this shift be interpreted as a move to associate the efficacy and immediacy which characterize the infusion of charity with the inspiration of faith and the operation of man's consent of belief. Such a change indicates the development of a new doctrine of the divine operation of the initial act of faith in the spring and winter of 418.

3. The conversion of resisters in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*

Perhaps a year later, Augustine takes up the analysis of the act of faith again. Julian of Eclanum and eighteen other bishops who refused to accept Pope Zosimus' condemnation of Pelagius have written to his successor, Boniface, defending Pelagius and attacking Augustine's doctrine of election and grace. Boniface forwarded these letters to Augustine by his friend Alypius, bishop of Thagaste. Augustine addresses a reply to Boniface in the winter of 419-420, *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*.  

25 *De pecc. mer.*, 1.25.37. See also, *Ep. 140*, 37.85; *Ep. 147*, 17.44.

26 On the dating of this work, see Ch. Kannengiesser, "Enarratio in psalmum CXVIII," pp. 359-364.
The first book is directed against Julian's own letter, the following three against the common letter. The reply to Julian will be considered first.

As he did in De gestis Pelagii and Ep. 194 ad Sixtum, Augustine continues to shift the discussion of man's freedom and initiative in good works to the ground of the prior conversion to faith in Christ. The present discussion introduces a new existential consideration; man cannot begin the process of salvation because he is actually opposed to God, finding all his delight in evil. To convert him, God operates a change in the orientation of man's freedom.

The issue is joined over two sections of Julian's letter which assert the freedom of man's will and exclude any coercion to good or evil. In the first of these, Julian charges Augustine with teaching that in the fall of Adam man lost freedom of choice and is forced into evil by a carnal necessity. Augustine concedes that man has lost the freedom to choose good and live well, and explains that Christ restores this liberty to those who receive him.27 He quickly moves beyond the scope of Julian's charge to exclude any response that this freedom is merited through the reception of Christ. No one can receive Christ unless he is drawn by the Father and given to believe in him. When the receiving of Christ is given, the power to become sons of God is likewise freely given. The argument then returns to the original accusation. A good will is a faithful will; but no one can believe unless it is given to him; hence a just will is a free gift of God. Without faith and charity, man's choice is indeed limited to the evil which pleases him, but no one

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27 C. epp. Pel., 1.2.4-5.
is forced into evil by his flesh or anything else. If he has attained the age of discretion, his own willingness holds him in sin and casts him headlong from one sin to another. The devil plays upon man's gullibility and taste for iniquity to make him an even more willing sinner. Augustine argues that men must be drawn to Christ and given belief in him because the sinful will does not choose and desire to become a son of God. 28

The significance of man's opposition to faith is more evident in Augustine's reply to Julian's rejection of coercion to good or evil. Augustine takes exception to Julian's explanation that a man is incited to evil by the devil but must himself engage in good works to earn divine assistance. He urges a divine initiative and proves it by the conversion of those who resist God. Paul's conversion becomes a prototype for what God accomplishes daily in the enemies of the faith. Faith is given not only to those already prepared for belief, but to men who oppose and combat Christian faith. Christ commands his saints to pray, not for the rewarding of their persecutors' good will, but that God might change their evil will to good. Had he remarked that the Father leads men to him, one might argue that the assistance is given to those already willing to come, but he clearly asserts that the Father draws all those who come to him.

Christ did not say, "Unless the Father leads him," so that we might understand that his own will precedes in some way. Who is drawn if he has already willed? Yet no one comes unless he wills. He is drawn to will in marvelous ways by him who knows how to work within man's heart, not to make dissenting be-
lievers—which is impossible—but to change them into consenters. 29

God's operation does not presuppose willingness; he works within the dissenter's heart, and makes him choose to believe. 30

As might be expected, the interpretation of Paul's conversion dominates the analysis. Augustine has made various points about this act of divine power in his many sermons on the feast of Peter and Paul. But the parallel to the present reading is in his Ep. 185 ad Bonifatum de correctione Donatistarum, which was written after De gestis Pelagii in 417. In this he argues that the schismatics should not be allowed freedom to believe or not, to persist in schism or return to unity. Christ allowed Paul no such liberty to accept or reject his call. He restrained him by knocking him down and struck him blind to make him seek interior light. Yet this Paul who was forced to the gospel by corporal punishment worked harder in it than any of those who were called by word alone, and the one whom fear drove to charity had a perfect love which casts out fear. 31 The present interpretation of the divine operation in Paul's conversion stresses the marvelous working within the dissenter's heart, which is the legacy of De gratia Christi and Ep. 194 ad Sixtum. 32

29 'non enim ait 'duxerit,' ut illic aliquo modo intellegamus praecedere voluntatem. quis trahitur, si iam uolebat? et tamen nemo uenit, nisi uelit. trahitur ergo miris modis, ut uelit, ab illo, qui nouit intus in ipsis hominum cordibus operari, non ut homines, quod fieri non potest, nolentes credant, sed ut uolentes ex nolentibus fiat." Ibid., 1,19,37, CSEL, LX, 454,16-21.

30 Ibid., 1,18,36,37.

31 Ep. 185, 6.22. See also the contemporary Serm. 297, 7.10. A parallel use of this text before 410 in Ep. 93, 5, lays even greater stress on the exterior violence which Christ employed; and in Ad. Simiel., 1.2.22, it was the vision which affected the change.
Augustine drives his point home with three scriptural citations. He cites 2 Chron., 30.12 for the single heart given to the people of Judah to do their ruler's command. He applies Ezekiel's image of replacing the heart of stone with a heart of flesh to do the Lord's commands, a text which he has not used before. Finally, he draws out the implications of the conversion of the Assyrian king in Esther 15. The queen first prayed to God and then went to the king. Before she spoke a word, God converted the heart of the king, changed his anger to gentleness, and worked that willing by which he commanded everything the queen asked of him. This narrative, one will recall, was used in De gratia Christi to make a similar point. 33

Each of Julian's objections warns that God does not force man to do good against his will. In replying, Augustine moves the discussion to a consideration of the conversion of one who is opposed to God. Such a man does not make the first step toward God, nor does he believe against his will; rather God works within his heart to make him come willingly to Christ. The consideration of the existential state of the non-Christian is a new factor here. Augustine describes him as delighting in evil, even opposed to Christian faith. Such a man has not been terrified by the law and been made an apt subject for the preaching of the gospel. The conversion of Paul becomes the paradigm for the divine operation of faith.

In answering the objections of Julian's eighteen cohorts to his doctrine of divine election, Augustine must show that no human initiative

33 Ibid., 1.20.38.
precedes and merits the divine assistance. The Pelagians advance the text of Prov., 16.1, "It is man's to prepare his heart, but the response of the tongue is from the Lord," to support the theory that God bestows his assistance on those who already desire it. Augustine finds a different interpretation of this text of Proverbs and of the divine initiative. Stages in man's seeking for the good may be distinguished, but one may not affirm that man can ever desire true good without divine grace. The preparation of the heart is a cooperative enterprise of God and man, but God alone completes and perfects it.

Hence, God does many goods in man which the man himself does not do; but man does none which God does not make him perform.

The good desire which is the fruit of charity cannot begin from man alone since charity is totally from God in all its stages of perfection.

In objecting that God would be forcing the zeal for virtue on a man who is struggling against it, the Pelagians do not realize that man's good purpose and zeal are the effect of God's grace. The only preceding good purpose is that of the divine intention according to which only the elect are called. Although Augustine's exclusion of man's prior good purpose has been argued through the necessity of charity for any desiring of good, his conclusion is more general.

Thus I find nothing which God commands man in Holy Scripture in order to prove his free choice which is not also found either to be

34 Ibid., 2.9.19,20. See also, Quest. in Hept., 2.9.
35 "Quapropter multa deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit homo, nulla vero facit homo, quae non deus facit ut faciat homo." C. epp. Pel., 2.9.21, CSEL, LX, 482.22-24.
36 Ibid., 2.10.22.
given by his goodness or petitioned from him in order to demonstrate the assistance of grace. Nor does man begin to change from bad to good through the beginning of faith unless the unmerited and gratuitous mercy of God does this in him.\textsuperscript{37}

Augustine offers no further indication, however, which would justify an interpretation of the two stages of beginning and completion, preparation of the heart and response of the tongue, in terms of the working of faith and the infusion of charity.

Without attaining greater precision, Augustine speaks more explicitly of faith when he returns to this objection in the final book of his reply. The Pelagians propose the text of Is., 1.19-20, "If you are willing and hear me, you shall eat the good things of the earth; but if you refuse and do not hear, the sword will consume you," to show that the preceding will to hear God earns the following grace. The Catholic interpretation of this passage, however, recalls that according to Prov., 8.35, man's will to hear is prepared by God.\textsuperscript{38} Man's good purpose need not precede to forestall a forcing of the desire for virtue on a refusing man.

First a hearing of divine vocation is procured for the reluctant by the grace of God; and then in one no longer resisting, the zeal for virtue is enkindled.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37}"Quae cum ita sint, nihil in scripturis sanctis homini a domino video tibi in propter probandum liberum arbitrium, quod non inueniatur vel dari ab eis bonitate vel posci propter adiutum gratiae demonstradum nec omnino incipit homo ex malo in bonum per initium fidei commutari, nisi hoc in illo agat indebita et gratuita misericordia dei." \textit{Ibid.}, 2.10.23, \textit{CSEL}, LX, 485.1-6.

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}, 4.6.12.

God does not simply provide an opportunity for man to believe and then give charity to those who respond. But for the operation of divine grace which procures his hearing of it, the reluctant would refuse the gospel. His opposition is first overcome by the gift of this hearing; and then he is excited to virtue.

The scriptural citations with which Augustine buttresses his discussion confirm the accuracy of the present interpretation of this passage. He first quotes 1 Cor., 4.7 and John, 15.5 to show that man does nothing without God. Then he mixes three statements regarding the work of the Spirit in charity with two relating to the working of faith. An affirmation that God works in the heart of the king comes from Esdras; and a promise to give fear of the Lord and make his people good is cited from Jeremiah. Finally, Augustine quotes Ezekiel 36 to prove that God works man's walking in his justice, observing and performing his judgments for his Name's sake rather than for any prior merits of man. The evil man can do no good, can make no advance toward God which would merit his assistance. This text of Ezekiel has been used earlier in this work to prove that God works within men's hearts to convert those opposed to faith.

In his reply to the second Pelagian letter, Augustine is making the same point which he did in dealing with that of Julian. God does

40 "Ita namque illis tumor ipse aures cordis obstruxit, ut non audiant: quid enim habes quod non acceptisti? non audiant: sine me nihil potestis facere, non audiant: caritas ex deo est, non audiant: deus partitus est mensuram fidei, non audiant: spiritus ubi uult spirat et: qui spiritu dei aguntur, hi illii sunt dei, non audiant: nemo potest venire ad me nisi fuerit ei datum a patre neo." Ibid., 4.6.14, CSEL, LX, 534.19-26.

41 Ibid., 4.6.14, 15.

42 See above, n. 33.
not force man to faith or goodness; but his grace works in the elect to
change opposition and resistance into willingness and agreement. The
reply to these arguments appears to consolidate and advance Augustine's
understanding of the divine operation of faith as a changing of man's heart
which prepares him to receive charity.

4. Consolidation of the advance

Augustine confirmed and strengthened this new teaching in a number
of contemporary works. When he finally received Julian's four books Ad
Turbantium, which were an attack on the first book of his own De nuptia
et concupiscentia, he wrote six books of his own in reply, in 421 or 422.
Though the argument is principally concerned with original sin, the dis-
cussion of conversion reappears. Julian asserts that according to the
gospel man must ask, seek and knock for the help of God to be given to
him. Augustine replies that grace touches the heart of man so that he
seeks the beatifying good of God himself. The divine mercy precedes man
to move him toward God. Were it not God's own part to convert hearts
which are turned away and opposed to him, he would not have commanded his
saints to pray for their enemies. 43

Augustine's doctrine of divine election is the true object of Julian's
concern. Julian affirms that God wills all men to be saved and come to a
knowledge of truth. Only those are damned, he thinks, who refuse to ask
and seek what God wants to give them. In reply, Augustine resorts to the
case of infants who have no use of free choice either to seek salvation
or to resist God's decision to confer it on them. 44 Although no infant

either consents or refuses, some are saved and many thousands are con-
demned. Evidently, God does not will the salvation of all men but of
the many who are justified in Christ. None of these comes to Christ
unless it is given to him and he is drawn by the Father. As infants
are regenerated by the divine will which created them, a similar divine
operation saves adults:

Those who already exercise choice of will can-
not will this unless he by whom the will is
prepared wills and comes to their assistance. 45

The faith and salvation of an adult depends upon the divine election and
operation just as fully as does that of a child, whose dependence on the
divine mercy is undeniable. Augustine insists that the divine will moves
the elect to reverse his refusal and seek God.

The controversies with Pelagius and Julian echo distinctly in Augus-
tine's comprehensive statement of Christian doctrine, Enchiridion. In
exposing the assertion of Rom., 9.16 that salvation depends on God's mercy
rather than man's will or exertion, he insists, as in Ad Simplicianum,
that man's willing cannot impede the mercy of God. Instead of explaining
that God does not lack means of calling anyone he chooses, 46 Augustine
asserts that man's willing is prepared by God:

The whole effect is attributed to God, who
prepares man's good will to be helped and
helps it once prepared. Man's good will pre-
cedes many gifts of God, but not all of them.


45"...et qui jam utuntur voluntatis arbitrio, nisi eo volente ac sub-
veniente a quo praeparatur voluntas, velle non possunt." Ibid., 4.8.44,
PL, XLIV, 760D.

46 Ad Simpl., 1.2.14.
God will is itself among these gifts which it
does not precede.\textsuperscript{47}

God’s mercy precedes the dissenter to make him will and follows the con-
senter lest he fail. He observes again that Christians would not be in-
structed to pray for their enemies unless God himself works willing in
them and completes what he has made man desire.\textsuperscript{48} The parallel analysis
in the \textit{Enarratio in Ps. 118} attributes man’s asking and seeking grace
as well as the prayer for its increase to the work of the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{49}

Conclusion

The shift in Augustine’s explanation of the divine operation of
conversion and belief in Christ is unmistakable, and the development which
led to it is evident. To insure the condemnation of the Pelagian asser-
tion of the adequacy of man’s natural gifts, Augustine not only argued
for the necessity of grace, but forced the issue of its gratuity. This
in turn had to be argued in the dual questions of divine election which
provides the occasion for faith and divine operation of the act of faith
in which man actually turns from his own to God’s justice. Since Pelagius
insisted that God limits his assistance to teaching and urging, and that
man bears responsibility for choice and action, Augustine had to prove

\textsuperscript{47}Forro si nullus dicere Christianus audebit: Non miserentias dei sed
uolentis est hominis, ne apostolo apertissime contradicat, restat ut
properea recte dictum intellegatur: \textit{Non uolentias neque currentias sed
miserentias est dei, ut totum detur deo, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et
praeparat adiuuandam et adiuuat praeparatam. Praecedit enim bona uoluntas
hominis multa dei dona sed non omnia; quae autem non praecedit ipsa, in

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Enarr. in Ps. 118}, 14.2.
that God operates the consent of faith itself by an interior grace. If the Pelagians insist on speaking of teaching, then let divine instruction be recognized as imparting choice and action, not just their possibility. To counter the Pelagian emphasis on external gifts which do not affect man's interior freedom, Augustine assimilates the divine operation of faith to the gift of charity which itself changes man's heart and issues in good choice. He continues this argument by asserting that the fear, faith and prayer which precede and gain charity are the work of the same Spirit whose later inhabiting effects man's good living. Julian's objection to the coercion of dissenters clinched Augustine's case for the divine operation of man's conversion. From the beginning of faith to the fullness of salvation, no man chooses anything good unless his heart has first been prepared by God. God himself makes his enemies hear the call and consent to faith in Christ. At this point, the evidence for the primary hypothesis of this investigation has been presented.

Augustine's concern has been with the first element in salvation and the divine election and operation involved in coming to faith. What remains to be considered, of course, is the election to glory and its achievement through a divine operation which guarantees the faithful's perseverance in the good to which divine grace has brought him. Augustine has, of course, spoken of the divine grace which causes good willing and works; but he has not elaborated this doctrine, nor has he placed it in the service of a gratuitous predestination to eternal life. This development waits on the questions of the monks at Hadrumentum and the objections from Provence.
CHAPTER SIX

PREDESTINATION AND PERSEVERANCE

Augustine's letter to Sixtus expounding an efficacious grace of conversion to guarantee the gratuity of divine gifts touched off the final round of the controversy. A monk of Hadrumentum, Florus, read this letter in Uzalis and had a copy sent back to his monastery. Before he returned, his religious brethren had perceived the implications of Augustine's teaching of the gratuity and efficacy of grace. The doctrine of divine election seemed to imply that God would not judge and repay men according to their good and evil deeds. The assertion of efficacious grace appeared to exclude human free choice and meriting through good works.¹ The monks applied Augustine's explanation of God's operation of conversion to the subsequent performance of good works and concluded that this theory was incompatible with an ascetic life.

When Florus finally returned to Hadrumentum and took up the defense of Augustine's teaching, the upset turned into open controversy. Abbot

¹The conclusions which the monks reached are not explicit in Ep. 194. Since its thesis is the operation of the act of faith, however, the monks may have viewed the efficacy of the gift of charity as an implication of this, as Augustine argued in de grat. Chr. Augustine does assert that eternal life is a grace rather than a reward because grace works good merits, Ep. 194, 5,19; but the further elaboration shows that he considered the necessity of grace adequate to support his conclusions and did not pursue the assertion of its efficacy, 5.21.
Valentinus appealed to Augustine's friend Evodius, the Bishop of Uzalis, without receiving much help. Finally, he allowed three of the brethren to take the offending letter to Augustine in Hippo to verify his authorship and seek an explanation. Augustine set forth the context of the argument he advanced in the original letter and sent the monks back with two new letters addressed to their abbot, a sheaf of documents from the controversy with Pelagius, a new treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio, and the request that Florus visit him at Hippo. Florus arrived later with a letter from his abbot explaining the course of the disturbance. The second treatise addressed to the monks of Hadrumentum, De correptione et gratia, is associated with his visit.

In the first treatise, Augustine proves from Scripture that man does have a freedom of will which is exercised in the moral sphere. This freedom is not autonomy, however, since God works in both good and evil hearts to achieve his merciful and just purposes. By the Holy Spirit he makes evil wills good, moves them to desire good, and causes their performance of the good they will. Since the first movement toward good is a gift of God, these graces are given without any prior merit. Finally, God rewards the good which he has himself worked in man and punishes the evil which man has done.

In De correptione et gratia, Augustine must face the problems which arise out of his explanation of God's effecting of man's good works.

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4 Among Augustine's epistulac, 216.
If continued performance of good works is a gift of God, then failure would be a consequence of God's withholding the necessary grace, and man should not be held accountable for sin. In particular, since Adam did not remain in the good state in which he was created, he must not have received this grace of performance. Is God himself then responsible for the fall of the human race? Moreover, it appears strange that God might withhold a grace of perseverance from those on whom he has already bestowed faith and charity. Finally, if Augustine's theory is true, then no man should be rebuked for his sin; rather the corrector should simply pray that God give the grace necessary to prevent future falls. Augustine responds by explaining the difference between the original economy of free choice and merit in which Adam and the angels were established and the subsequent economy of gratuitous salvation which is accomplished in Christ. God justly withholds the means of salvation from many of Adam's sons, since all his offspring were condemned in his sin. The role of the rebuker of faults is compared to that of the preacher of the gospel whose efficacy comes from the interior work of grace.

Shortly after writing these treatises to the monks at Hadrumentum, Augustine replied to a certain Carthaginian, Vitalis, who challenged his doctrine of the divine operation of the initial act of faith.⁵ According to Vitalis' scheme, God provides the means necessary for salvation and man must use or reject them. God's withholding the gospel and baptism from some can be explained by his knowledge that they would have refused to believe even if given the opportunity.

This same rejection of divine election and efficacious grace was

⁵ Augustine replies in Ep. 217.
reported in Provence by letters which Augustine received from Prosper and Hilary. The doctrine of Ep. 194 ad Sixtum and that of De correptione et gratia had been vigorously disputed by influential Christians. A gratuitous predestination accomplished by the efficacious graces of conversion and perseverance was branded as a recent innovation incompatible with God's desire that all be saved and with the efforts of Christians to work out their salvation through good works. These critics acknowledged only a predestination according to God's foreknowledge of each man's own faith and perseverance. God offers the opportunity for salvation to all, and each is responsible for his success or failure. Like Vitalis, they resorted to a divine knowledge of what a man's response would have been to justify God's withholding baptism from infants and the preaching of the gospel from adults. When God provides the preaching and teaching through which a man comes to faith, he does not work this consent. Nor does God give any grace of perseverance which man cannot earn by his prayers or lose by his sins. Finally, even if Augustine's doctrine of gratuitous predestination could be proven true, preaching it would undermine all exhortation to virtue and lead to presumption or despair. To these problems Augustine addresses two treatises, De prae-destinatione sanctorum and De dono perseverantiae.

The material contained in these treatises and letters is presented under four headings. Attention is directed first to the evidence of the gratuity of grace. Then the continuing argument for the efficacy of the grace of conversion will be reviewed. In the third section, Augustine's assertion and explanation of God's causing of man's good works and per-

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6 Among Augustine's epistulae, 225, 226.
severance will be presented. Finally, his doctrine of predestination is explained.

1. The gratuity of grace and salvation

In the midst of his struggle with Pelagius, Augustine asserted the efficacy of God's operation of faith in order to defend the gratuity of his bestowing the charity which follows faith. In order to maintain the efficacy of grace, he must again establish the justice of God's withholding it from many. To insure that an individual bears full responsibility for his condemnation, Augustine's opponents in Provence assert that God wills the salvation of all and provides the necessary means to each. Unlike the Pelagians, they admit that all sinned in Adam and need the grace of Christ; but they still assert that the grace of Christ is offered to all so that whoever wills to come to faith and baptism is saved. Unbaptized infants are saved or damned because of the response they would have given in later life, and adults who never hear the gospel are condemned for the response God knows they would have made.

Augustine proves that God does not will all men to be saved. He rejects appeals to a divine knowledge and judgment of what a person would do in circumstances which never actually occur. Paul's statement in 2 Cor., 5.10 indicates that each one will be judged according to the things which he has himself done through his body, that is, in the time of his

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7 Ep. 225, 6; Ep. 226, 7.
9 Ep. 225, 5; Ep. 226, 4.
10 Ep. 225, 5, 6; Ep. 226, 3.
actual bodily existence. 11 The authority of Cyprian’s praise of the gift of removal from the temptations of this life by the mercy of an opportune death is also cited. 12 Moreover, an analysis of Christ’s reference to the belief of the citizens of Tyre and Sidon in a contrary-to-fact hypothesis shows that they were judged, not according to that faith which they never had, but according to their actual unbelief. 13 Finally, the very logic of the situation should convince. Suppose a man who has been faithful sins and dies the same day: he is certainly lost. Can one deny that he would have been saved had he died the previous day, before his fall? 14 Augustine presents the argument that if God judged according to what he knows would happen in various situations, the actual mission of Christ, the work of the Church, and the good faith and works of Christians would all be superfluous; God could have judged according to what would have happened if Christ’s gospel were to be preached. 15 In the entire discussion, Augustine strives to expose the incongruities to which the assertion of divine judgment according to unactualized possibilities must lead.

Augustine finds himself, however, in the embarrassing position of having to explain his own recourse to just this type of divine knowledge and decision in order to answer the objection that Christianity could not be the universal way of salvation because it was not available until

15 De dono persev., 9.22.
late in the history of mankind. In Ep. 102 ad Deogratias, sex quaestiones contra paganos expositae, he had said that Christ came at a time when God foreknew he would find believers, not at an earlier time when no one would have accepted him. He now explains that he omitted the clarification that God himself causes faith in Christ in order to avoid the further questions which have subsequently been discussed in the Pelagian controversy. Given the fact that Augustine had already affirmed a divine operation of faith in Ad Simplicianum before he wrote this treatise, and his other attempts to avoid the discussion of gratuitous election until the issue is forced in the second stage of the Pelagian controversy, the explanation he offers seems plausible. In any case, his rejection of judgment according to non-actual merits was explicit in the second stage of the controversy.

To disprove the assertion that God wills all men to be saved and is frustrated only by man's own rejection of his grace, Augustine cites various instances in which a specific divine action would have prevented a man's failure. Some men do not hear the gospel; the citizens of Tyre and Sidon did not see the miracles that would have brought their faith. God could save some man simply by taking them in death at an earlier moment. Any of the baptized infants who grow up and fall from the

16 Ep. 102, 14,15.
17 De praed. sanct., 9.17,18.
19 De corrupt. et grat., 7.12; de dono persev., 9.23, 11.25, 14.35.
20 De corrupt. et grat., 8.19; de dono persev., 9.22; C. Jul. op. imp., 1.119.
faith could have been saved through an early death had God been willing. Augustine insists that the case of infants is normative for understanding the salvation of adults, although his critics consider the fate of unbaptized children too obscure to serve as the basis for any theory. In the salvation of some children and condemnation of others by the giving and denying of baptism, God clearly manifests the mercy and judgment which are obscured by personal willing in the saving and condemning of adults. When a child dies even as his parents are rushing to secure his baptism, one must conclude that God himself does not will to save all.

An economy of merited salvation through a free choice to accept and use the proffered means, such as the monks proposed, was the one originally established by God for the angels and devils. This law also governed men until Adam and his whole race sinned and merited condemnation. God then replaced the system of merit and reward with an economy of gratuitous and efficacious grace in Christ. In the merit system, the power of free will was manifest, but in Christ God shows forth his mercy and judgment.

God created the angels in a state of beatitude in which they could remain or from which they could defect, and he gave them a freedom by which they could will one or the other. Those who chose good earned the reward of a beatitude which they cannot lose and a freedom which is stable.

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21 De grat. et lib. arb., 23.45; de dono persever., 13.32; C. Jul. op. imp., 1.130.

22 Ep. 226, 8.


and unfailing in good. The devils who sinned lost their beatitude and the freedom to choose good. Man was created in a similar state of beatitude, without the opposition of the flesh to the aspirations of his spirit, and was likewise given a grace which enables him to persevere in this good if he so chose. Adam, then, was endowed with that freedom to sin or not sin which the Pelagians claim for each of his sons: he was fully capable of avoiding a violation of justice. The grace which Adam received empowered him to will good, but the actual choice and performance were left to his own discretion. Had he chosen to remain in grace, he would have merited the same full freedom and beatitude which the angels earned. When he sinned and condemned himself and his whole race, Adam was fully responsible for his failure and its consequences. In the sin, the abused freedom to choose between good and evil and the right to the assistance necessary to do good were both lost.

God would have been fully justified in damning mankind just as he damned the devils. His decision was rather to abandon the economy of merits and rewards in which Adam failed and to establish a new economy of gratuitous and efficacious grace in Jesus Christ. The union of

25 Ibid., 9.27, 28, 12.33; de dono persev., 7.13; C. Jul. op. imp., 5.58.

26 De corrupt. et grat., 12.37; C. Jul. op. imp., 2.17.


28 De corrupt. et grat., 11.32; C. Jul. op. imp., 5.58.

29 C. Jul. op. imp., 1.44, 82; de corrupt. et grat., 11.32.

30 De corrupt. et grat., 10.28.

31 De praed. sanct., 15.31.
humanity to the Son of God in the constitution of Jesus and the further gifts bestowed on his humanity were free graces not preceded by human merits. Augustine indicates that any denial of the gratuity of the grace by which God became man in Christ inevitably leads to an adoptionist Christology and fails to guarantee the uniqueness of the Incarnation, since it would require Jesus' action to merit his identification with the Eternal Word, and would allow a repetition of his achievement. Christ was made both the source of the grace by which men are saved and the sign of its gratuity. Merits precede neither the birth of Christ nor the rebirth of the Christian, the grace by which he was sinless nor that which makes his members good. Since prior merits cannot be found in Christ, they must not be sought in the Christian. This economy of efficacious grace not only rescues man from the punishment due his sin but gives him the willing and performance of good works through which he is saved. God requires good works of both children and adults, but this good is effected by the grace which raises man up and accompanies him lest he fall again.

In assigning to Adam the freedom to do good or evil and merit a reward or punishment, Augustine recognizes the legitimate assertion that man must bear ultimate responsibility for his failure. The failure which

32 De correp. et grat., 11.30; de praed. sanct., 15.30.
33 C. Jul. op. imp., 1.138, 4.84.
34 De praed. sanct., 15.31; de dono persever., 24.67; C. Jul. op. imp., 1.140.
is played out in personal histories, however, occurred in the sin of Adam. Personal freedom and responsibility, and the power to earn an eternal reward were forfeited in Adam. The sons of Adam find themselves condemned, with no claim to that freedom and assistance which their father originally had. The only hope for salvation lies not in the initiative of free choice, but in the gratuitous and efficacious grace which first makes one good and then works the good willing and performance which God crowns with eternal life. All attempts to account for the salvation and condemnation of men through the free choice of each will are not only futile but misguided.

2. God’s working of the initial act of faith

Divine causing of man’s initial act of faith occupies the key position in Augustine’s defense of the gratuity of the sequence of graces which follow conversion and culminate in an eternal reward. If man can claim credit for converting to good, then all the graces which follow are his earned reward; but if grace precedes and effects his willing to believe, then it is free grace which follows and bears fruit in good works. Thus, unless one asserts that God works man’s conversion, he cannot defend the gratuity of any subsequent graces. 37

Augustine rejects Vitalis’ assertion that God gives faith by the teaching of the law and preaching of the gospel which man then accepts or rejects. He explains that God accommodates man’s assent to the preaching of the gospel by an inspiration hidden within his heart. 38

37 De praeed. sanct., 2.4,6, 21.43; de dono persev., 21.54.
38 Ep., 217, 2.5, 3.11, 6.23; de praeed., sanct., 7.12, 8.15; C. Jul. op. imp., 2.157,158, 3.114.
denies that man can give himself the thoughts necessary for belief, Augustine adds that God works within the heart to make the thinker believe. 39 The earlier doctrine of divine efficacy through a congruous vocation appears only in interpreting Christ's statement that the citizens of Tyre and Sidon would have believed had they seen the miracles he performed. Augustine explains that some men have natural gifts such that they would be moved to faith if they see signs or hear words which were suited to their minds. The men of Tyre and Sidon were apparently not subject to that hardness and blindness of heart which prevented the faith of those who actually witnessed the works and teaching of Christ. The men who might have believed through a fitting vocation were not called. What those who did hear needed was not a different set of miracles, but an interior grace which would soften their hardness and illumine their blindness of heart. This passage manifests Augustine's abandonment of the congruous vocation as an explanation for the divine operation of faith. 40

The explanations of the way God does cause man's conversion are summaries of those worked out after the Council of Carthage. The same emphasis on the reversing of the will of those who refuse and persecute the faith is evident. 41 The distinction between believers and non-believers is credited to the interior teaching of the Father: none of those to whom he speaks fail to come to Christ. His gift is never rejected because it removes the hardness of man's heart; thus if he decided to teach those

39 De praed. sanct., 2.5,6.

40 De dono persever., 14.34.

41 Ep. 217, 2.6, 6.24, 7.30; de praed. sanct., 2.4, 8.15; de dono persever., 23.67; C. Jul. op. imp., 2.157, 3.122.
who refuse, they too would come. Faith is also assigned to the work of the Holy Spirit who gives faith so that men will pray for his gift of love. The Spirit of faith and of charity prepares the will to believe and love the good. He gives the fulfillment of the command to believe just as he makes believers obey the command to do good. Finally, he rewards both faith and good works. Augustine's only innovation is the observation that the Spirit who brought about the Incarnation also makes men accept Christ as the Captain of their salvation.

The controversy over Ep. 194 ad Sextum does, however, move Augustine to emphasize the free choice of man which grace effects. In writing to Vitalis he asserts that the grace of conversion liberates a man's choice from Satan's grip so that he comes to Christ. In the treatises addressed to Provence he points out that belief is the choice of man's will, and that God's mercy or judgment operates in the assent or dissent of man. In his final reply to Julian, Augustine uses an analogy of the operation of divine creation in human generation to express the relation between

43 De grat. et lib. arb., 14.28; de dono persever., 23.64.
44 De praed. sanct., 3.7; Retract., 1.23.1.
45 De praed. sanct., 11.22.

46 "...ille quippe nos fecit credere in Christum, qui nobis fecit in quem credimus Christum; ille facit in hominibus principium fidei et perfectionem in Iesum, qui fecit hominem principum fidei et perfectorem Iesum." Ibid., 15.31, PL, XLIV, 983B.
47 Ep. 217, 1.3, 3.8,11, 5.16, 6.23.
48 De praed. sanct., 3.7, 5.10, 6.11; de dono persever., 13.33; Retract., 1.23.3.
God's grace and man's will. Each child is born both of man and created by God, so man's willing is his own, though it is caused by God. 49

Augustine's doctrine of the efficacious grace of conversion comes under vigorous attack by the opponents of gratuitous election and predestination. In the controversy, however, only those aspects of his doctrine are developed which parallel the work of the Holy Spirit effecting man's performance of the good works which follow faith. This final assertion of a divine working of perseverance in the faith which operates through love is the legacy of the successful affirmation of an efficacious interior grace of conversion. Augustine's elaboration and defense of this final thesis occupies the last sections of this exposition.

3. The divine operation of good works

The implications of Augustine's theory of the divine operation of man's will to believe were explicated by the monks of Hadrumentum by applying the doctrine of the letter to Sixtus to their own attempts to persevere and advance in the Christian life. As Augustine later observes, however, the whole doctrine is asserted in principle in his final discussion of divine sovereignty over the will of man in Ad Simplicianum. 50

The actual elaboration of a theory of a grace which is efficacious in performing good works waited upon the development and defense of his understanding of the efficacy of the Holy Spirit's action in causing man's faith, just as the doctrine of election to eternal life followed the

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49 "Et si operatur Deus in homine voluntatem bonam, id utique agit, ut oriatur ab illo bona voluntas, cujus est voluntas; sicut agit ut homo oriatur ab homine: non enim quia Deus creat hominem, idem non homo ex homine nascitur." C. Jul. op. imp., 5.42, PL, XLV, 1479B.

50 De correctione et gratia, 21.55.
successful defense of election to faith. Augustine did not think he could
defend a divine operation of conversion without also asserting his working
of perseverance; if man can accomplish the completion of his salvation
by willing to persevere in good, certainly he should be able to manage
the lesser feat of beginning it. 51 The efficacy of the grace of persever-
ing in good willing and performance is integral, moreover, to the asser-
tion of the gratuity of eternal life, the divine election to glory, and
the sovereignty of the divine will. Good works must themselves be gifts
of God if the eternal life in which they are crowned is to be a gift rather
than a merited reward, as Paul asserts in Rom., 6.23. 52 Nor can God's elec-
tion fail and his power be overcome by a human failure to persevere in good
and thus come to glory. 53 Finally, God is not dependent on man's inde-
pendent decision for the fulfillment of his promises, such as the pledge
that Abraham would have many sons following in his faith. 54

The affirmation of God's power to save his elect specifies the
more general thesis that consent and dissent are so in the creature's
power that the divine will is never obstructed nor the divine power over-
come. Augustine cites numerous scriptural examples to prove that God
accomplishes his own purposes by working man's voluntary action. 55 God
controls the hearts of evil men, either to move them to good or to punish

51 De dono persev., 21.54.

52 De grat. et lib. arb., 8.20, 9.21.


54 De praed., sanct., 10.19.

55 De correp., et grat., 14.43,45; de dono persev., 20.42; C. Jul. op.
imp., 1.93.
them in the performance of evil deeds which advance his own good purposes. Sinning itself belongs to the capacity of man; but the particular evil action the sinner performs is determined by God. The betrayal and crucifixion of Christ provide outstanding examples of God's good purpose being executed through the evil choices of men. Augustine also argues that God's will was not frustrated by the failure of the merit-reward economy in Adam or the increase of sin which the law occasioned. In each case, God intended to manifest the weakness of man's free will and prepare for the gratuitous and efficacious grace of Christ. Finally, because of divine sovereignty, he has felt constrained to reject the thesis of the universal salvific will of God and find another explanation of 1 Tim., 2.4.

In order to accomplish the salvation of his elect, God must not only provide the assistance which makes good willing and performance possible; he must also guarantee man's performance by effecting his willing. Augustine need only recall his earlier proof of the necessity of divine assistance for man to be able to remain in good, but must innovate to explain how God operates man's willing and performance of good works.

In De gratia et libero arbitrio, he sets forth the functioning of this


57 De corrept. et grat., 10.27; C. Jul. op. imp., 2.220. Augustine attempts to modify the meaning of "all men" to affirm that God wills the salvation of men from every nation, de corrept. et grat., 14.44. Finally, he explains that God is said to will the salvation of all because he makes Christians desire and work for the salvation of all men, ibid., 15.47.

58 Ep. 214, 2.7; Ep. 215, 4; de grat. et lib. arb., 4.7, 6.13, 7.16; de corrept. et grat., 1.2.
grace; in *De correptione et gratia*, he contrasts it with the assistance which was given to Adam and shows its necessity for his sons; in both *De correptione et gratia* and *De dono perseverantiae*, he answers the arguments which dispute the existence of such a grace.

Augustine differentiates two stages in man's willing of the good. One who has received charity may desire to do good but not have the strength of will to carry through its performance. He then needs to pray for an increase in charity which will heighten the ardor of his resolve and empower him so to will that he accomplishes the difficult good. Since however the power of acting would be futile unless man also willed to exercise it, in answering this prayer God not only gives a man the increased strength necessary to perform the good, but works his willing to do it. Augustine distinguishes the original giving of charity in which God alone works from the fulfillment in moral action, in which both God and man are operative.

He operates without us in order that we might will; and he cooperates with us when we will and so will that we perform. Without his operating that we will or cooperating when we do, we are impotent in the good works of piety.

This distinction between divine operation and cooperation does not describe two different forms of grace, nor does it assert the coordination of interdependent divine and human operations; rather it affirms the simultaneity

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59 *De grat. et lib. arb.*, 4.7,8, 15.31-17.33, 18.37.


of the divine activity with the human action which it effect.\footnote{Jean Chéné's attempt to distinguish two different forms of grace does not convey Augustine's own meaning, which is parallel to that of Enarr. in Ps. 77, 8, quoted above, p. 152, n. 49. See, Jean Chéné, "Grâce opérante et grâce coopérante selon saint Augustin," in Bibliothèque Augustinienne, XXIV, 774-775.} God not only gives the charity through which man is empowered to desire and to perform the good, he wills and works man's choice and performance. God gives and augments charity, and he produces its fruits.\footnote{De grat. et lib. arb., 16.32, 17.33.}

The assistance through which God works the elect's willing and performance of the commanded good differs significantly from the grace which was originally given to Adam. As a creature, Adam required the help of Omnipotent Good to will the good. Since he was established in an economy of merit and reward, the assistance he received gave him the possibility and tendency toward good willing and action; but exercise was left to his own discretion. The grace which comes through Christ is stronger; it gives man the possibility and the willing of good, and overcomes the opposition of carnal desires in its performance.\footnote{De corrupt. et grat., 11.31,32. Aimé Solignac points out that Adam was not in a neutral state, between good and evil, but in a dynamic orientation toward good which he could reverse. His assertion that Adam could will and desire good without the assistance of grace, which was necessary to perform it, does not, however, express Augustine's position. See, Aimé Solignac, "La condition de l'homme pécheur d'après S. Augustin," Nouvelle revue théologique, LXXVIII (1956), 359-387.} The assistance without which something is not done, adiutorium sine quo non, which was given to Adam, is compared to food which is necessary for, but does not guarantee man's health. The assistance by which something is accomplished, adiutorium quo, which is given to the elect, is compared to the beatitude which is both necessary and sufficient to accomplish.
man's happiness. Adam was capable of persevering in good if he so willed; but the elect receive a grace of perseverance by which their willing is accomplished. 65 The perseverance of the angels manifested the power of free will assisted by the original grace, but after the fall a greater grace prevents the failure of free will. It is evident in the endurance and triumph of the martyrs. 66

The grace given the elect stands midway between the grace which was originally bestowed on Adam and that which constitutes final beatitude. By the first grace it is possible for one not to sin; by the last it is impossible for him to sin. Augustine enjoys playing on the contrasts: possible not to sin, impossible to sin; possible not to die, impossible to die; possible not to desert the good, impossible to desert the good. 67 The grace given the elect is best described as a grace by which one does not sin, by which one consistently exercises the possibility of doing good and refuses evil. 68 Augustine's analysis of the grace of the elect is compatible with Paul's exhortation to continue the battle against concupiscence. Although the elect are not sinless, they avoid that sin which would separate them from eternal life. 69 But the Spirit who keeps his members good made the human will of Christ free of all sin. 70

65 De corrept. et grat., 12.34.

66 De dono persequ., 7.13,14; Serm. 286, 1.1.

67 "...posse non peccare;...non posse peccare....posse non mori;...non posse mori....bonum posse non deserere;...bonum non posse deserere." De corrept. et grat., 12.33, PL, XLIV, 936C.

68 Ibid., 11.32, 12.33.

69 Ibid., 12.34.
Unless their willing and performance were caused by God's grace, the elect would not actually persevere in good. The assistance which was adequate for Adam in Paradise would not be sufficient for his sons to overcome the opposition of concupiscence and such temptations as constantly press upon them in the present life. 71 No wonder then that those to whom this grace is not given fall into sin and perish. Augustine could provide no real explanation for the incongruity of God's withholding the efficacious grace of perseverance from those to whom he has already granted faith and charity to desire and perform good actions. 72 He could only assert that those who fail choose the evil for which they are condemned, and that the present economy is intended to display God's judgment as well as his mercy. 73 Such men were never among the elect and were not true disciples because they do not remain in the justice they possessed. 74 This assertion of the gratuity of the grace of perseverance throws off the last vestiges of the merit-reward system, the earning of the maintenance and increase of charity by its exercise in good willing and works. The divine operation of faith protected the gratuity of charity; now the operation of perseverance in charity entails a similar gratuity of eternal life. 75

70 Ibid., 11.30; de praed. sanct., 15.31; de dono persever., 24.67.

71 De corrept. et grat., 12.35,38.

72 Ibid., 8.17,18.

73 Ibid., 7.11: 10.27.

74 Ibid., 7.16, 9.20-22.

75 The gift of perseverance is withheld from some who have received and
Augustine's proof of the existence and functioning of the efficacious grace of perseverance parallels the contemporary proof of the divine operation of conversion. His major premise is drawn from Gal., 6.7: God is not mocked. Asking God to grant something and then thanking him for its accomplishment without at the same time confessing that the achievement is God's work rather than man's own makes a mockery of divine power. 76 The minor premise contends that perseverance in faith and victory over temptation have always been the object of Christian prayer and thanksgiving. 77 Christ, whose prayer could not fail, prayed for Peter's faith. 78 Paul's writings contain prayers that his brethren persevere in good. 79 According to Augustine's interpretation of Cyprian's exposition of the Lord's Prayer, every petition save that for forgiveness asks continuance in good. 80 Indeed, the prayer to be spared temptation admits no other interpretation, since one can fail only through tempting. 81 Any Christian who answers

exercised charity and who, according to Augustine's earlier explanation, would thereby have merited its continual increase. Moreover, eternal life is given only to those whose merits God has not only helped by charity but effected by perseverance. As the grace of faith causes the meriting of charity, so the grace of perseverance effects the merits for which eternal life is repaid. In this process, eternal life becomes a fully gratuitous grace which may be withheld for some who have faith even as the means of salvation are denied to many of Adam's children who die in his sin.

76 De dono persever., 2.3.

77 De grat. et lib. arb., 4.9; Ep. 217, 1.2, 2.5.

78 De corrept. et grat., 6.10, 8.17, 12.34,38.

79 Ibid., 6.10.

80 De dono persever., 2.4-5.9; de corrept. et grat., 6.10.

81 De dono persever., 7.15, 23.63.
"Amen" to the liturgical prayer for the conversion of infidels and perseverance of the faithful cannot dispute God's effecting of both. Finally, Augustine points out the incongruity of attributing to God the endurance of the martyrs and claiming perseverance for the man who dies in his own bed. In a somewhat less direct fashion, he argues that since God can give man perseverance through his indisputable control over the time of his death, his gift of perseverance to the end of a long and troubled life must also be recognized.

As the argument to prove the divine gift of perseverance is drawn principally from his current argument for the working of conversion, so Augustine's explanation of the relation between the grace of perseverance and the ministry of exhortation and rebuke parallels the discussion of the interaction of the grace of faith and the preaching ministry. Teaching that perseverance is a divine gift does not exclude exhorting Christians to continue in goodness. All the virtues are recognized as gifts of God, and yet no one hesitates to exhort to peace, charity, continence, conjugal chastity or wisdom. God himself gives man the obedient hearing of such an exhortation when he bestows the virtue. If Christians are taught that God gives the perseverance to which they are exhorted, then they will hope in his fidelity rather than despairing over their own weakness and will glory only in the Lord. Nor should the preacher hold

82 Ibid., 23.63.
83 Ibid., 2.2.
85 De dono persev., 14.37, 17.43, 44.
86 Ibid., 17.46, 20.51.
back from reproving those who sin and moving them to pray for God's help. As the corrector speaks outwardly, God works within to make the rebuke salutary for his elect. The divine operation provides the efficacy of the ministry of preaching, exhorting and rebuking. 87

Despite its close relation to the gift of charity, the divine grace which effects man's willing and performance of good bears a closer resemblance to the grace which achieves his conversion. The degree of charity which man can receive without the beatific vision empowers and inclines him to love and choose the good; but it does not guarantee performance, especially against the opposition of the world and the flesh. Augustine indicates that God might achieve his salvific purpose by manipulating the environment even of such a limited power to will good, and by taking the elect in death before he is overpowered; but he asserts that God overcomes the enemy of man's salvation rather than avoiding or forestalling the battle. Rather than strengthening a power which man might still fail to use, this unconquered grace achieves man's victory by causing the willing itself when salvation is in question. The gift of charity rebuilds man's shattered power, but the graces of conversion and perseverance give the willing and performance of which he is capable.

Like his doctrine of divine working of conversion, Augustine's teaching of the efficacious grace of perseverance builds on a theological foundation of divine sovereignty and supports a superstructure of the gratuity of grace and eternal life. Man's resistance cannot overcome the divine intention to join him to Christ in faith, nor can his weakness frustrate the divine decision to preserve him unto glory in that union.

87 De corrept. et grat., 5.7-6.9, 9.23,25, 14.43,45, 16.49.
Although failure always finds its origin in the creature, success is not from him who wills or runs but from God who has mercy.

4. The achievement of predestination

The principle of Augustine's doctrine of predestination was set forth in *Ad Simplicianum* when he reflected on Rom., 9.16. He realized that unless God's grace actually causes man's willing and performance, the efficacy of his mercy could be frustrated by man's refusal and the statement would be reversible; it is not of God's mercy but of man's willing and running. He concluded that ultimately God's grace was not subject to man's acceptance or rejection, but he still had to explain how God accomplishes his purposes. The first attempt to do this was the theory that God operates the elect's willing to believe by a vocation adapted to his dispositions. At the height of the Pelagian controversy the explanation was shifted from the providential adaptation of the minister's preaching to the interior teaching of the Father and the operation of the Holy Spirit. Finally, the limited concern with the defense of the gratuity of the graces of Christian living gave way to the broader perspective of election to eternal life. Augustine's original insight into the sovereignty of the divine will was translated into the assertion of divine operation of the elect's perseverance in the faith which operates through love and the gratuity of final beatitude.

Once he had established that human willing to come to faith and to persevere in its works is accomplished by the operation of the Holy Spirit, Augustine defined divine predestination as God's foreknowledge.

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88 *Ad Simpl.,* 1.2.13.
and preparation of the works which he himself performs. God's predestination is his knowledge and preparation of the gifts which he will give and those to whom he will give them; his grace follows as the actual giving and achievement. To reject predestination, therefore, one must either deny divine foreknowledge or assert that salvation is accomplished by the works of man rather than the gifts of God. Since the Church has always prayed for the conversion of infidels and the preservation of the faithful, Augustine claims to defend the Christian tradition in asserting the doctrine of predestination it implies.

For all the cogency of his argument for the predestination of the elect and the working of their salvation, Augustine does not meet the issue which his opponents are pressing, the reprobation of the non-elect which it implies. To these Catholics, predestination according to foreknowledge of God's own action seems to entail reprobation according to God's foreknowledge of his own inaction. While they confess the necessity of grace to rescue man from the sin of Adam, they cannot accept a withholding of assistance which makes damnation inevitable as the just and proper punishment for that sin. Rather than deny the necessity of an historical union with Christ and his Church, they are willing to rationalize the condemnation of adults who never hear the gospel on the grounds that they probably would not have believed anyway; and they can live with

89 De praeed. sanct., 10.19; De dono persev., 14.35, 19.50.

90 De correet, et grat., 12.36; de praeed, sanct., 19.38; de dono persev., 17.42, 18.47, 21.56.

91 De dono persev., 24.67.

92 Ep. 225, 5; Ep. 226, 3.
the obscurity of the fate of unbaptized children.\textsuperscript{93} A premeditated denial of perseverance to those who have responded to God's invitation to faith and are living a Christian life exceeds the bounds of credibility.\textsuperscript{94} Augustine had argued since \textit{De gratia Christi} that every conversion to Christ and every subsequent good action is the effect of God's operation and advances his elective purpose. Despite his current observation that Catholics who are not predestined to eternal life sin by their own choice without being coerced, both he and his opponents discern a divine decision to discontinue effective assistance as the ultimate source of the failure.\textsuperscript{95} Since he cannot understand the divine purpose which condemns those who have first been called and brought to life, Augustine does not explain the divine operation by which reprobate Christians had been converted and lived well before they lapsed.

Faced with the implications of this understanding of the operation of divine predestination, the Catholics of Provence argued that God desires the salvation of all, offers the gifts which each man needs to attain salvation, and predestines according to his foreknowledge of how each will use them.\textsuperscript{96} Taking his stand on the sovereignty of the divine will which cannot be frustrated by any creature, Augustine denies this universal salvific will, observes that the means of salvation are not available to

\textsuperscript{93} Ep. 226, 8.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 4,6.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{De correp. et grat.}, 7.11. In \textit{C. Jul. op. imp.}, 3.24,26, Augustine argues that divine and human justice may not be compared since God cannot be held responsible for a sin which his action would prevent, though man would be charged with an evil he could prevent.
\textsuperscript{96} Ep. 225, 4,6; Ep. 226, 7; Ep. 225, 3; Ep. 226, 4.
many infants and adults, and asserts that God works the conversion and perseverance of those whom he predestines to eternal life in Christ. He does not reject the implied predestination to sin and eternal damnation of those who are either never called or not given perseverance in Christ. Though he insists that God does not work man's sinning, Augustine assumes that the creature's failure is a consequence of the divine decision to withhold necessary assistance.

Conclusion

From the early commentaries on Paul's Epistles through the first two stages of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine focused his analysis on the initial moments in the process of salvation, the divine election which chooses a man for membership in the Church and the divine grace which works his conversion and incorporation into Christ. In his final five years, Augustine's attention was drawn to that predestination which chooses some men for eternal life, guides the process of their salvation through a long and troubled life, and finally brings them to the beatific vision.

Although its perspective was changed, the resources of Augustine's analysis remained much the same as they had been in 418. The functioning of a divine predestination to eternal life was proven in much the same way that he had earlier established an election to grace, through providential control over the availability of the means of salvation and the time of death. Further, the explanation of the interaction of the ministry of exhortation and correction with the grace of perseverance is modeled on the relation of the outer work of the preacher to the inner grace of the Spirit in conversion.
Augustine also seems to have modeled his explanation of the divine working of perseverance on his recently developed theory of the Spirit's operation which effects the consent of faith rather than his understanding of the healing of man's free will by the gift of charity. Although Augustine himself does not reflect on this difference, according to his explanation the grace of faith achieves consent without a prior reorientation of fallen man's evil and self-serving tendencies, but the subsequent gift of charity achieves good choice and performance by conferring and inspiring the appropriate love of God and neighbor. In giving faith, God achieves his purpose by manipulation of the environment and an interior grace which produce the choice itself; but in giving charity, he modifies a man's orientation and dispositions and thereby changes his pattern of choice. Augustine's explanation of the gift of perseverance seems to assimilate it to God's effecting of choice rather than to his gift of new aspirations and priorities.

Charity gradually heals man's will without achieving a stable and irreversible orientation toward good during his terrestrial life. Hence to effect perseverance in good willing and performance, God gives the further gift which produces such consistent preference of good as is necessary for a given individual's salvation. Just as the grace of faith works the assent to the gospel and prayer for assistance, the gift of perseverance effects a man's exercise of the power which charity heals and restores. All three are attributed to the interior activity of the Holy Spirit.

Augustine's assertion of predestination to eternal life grew out of his analysis of the election which chooses some men for faith. Similarly, his explanation of the grace of perseverance which accomplishes
this divine purpose is modeled on the understanding of the working of faith which he developed in 418. This concludes the presentation of evidence for the affirmation of a genetic connection between the two developments, which is the secondary hypothesis of this study.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is to marshal the evidence for two hypotheses: that in 418 Augustine changed his explanation of the operation through which God effects the initial act of faith, and that he subsequently developed a parallel theory of God's working of perseverance in good. The interpretation of Augustine's various statements on these issues has been secured by establishing the difference between the theological context and problematic of his explanation of the genesis of faith in *Ad Simplicianum* and his later elaboration of the divine action in *De gratia Christi* and *De correptione et gratia*.

Augustine was concerned to insure divine sovereignty over the will of man when he asserted in *Ad Simplicianum* that God controls man's acceptance or refusal of the gospel by the adaptation of his appeal to the preferences of a chosen individual. When God subsequently modifies the believer's dispositions through the gift of charity, he effectively orients him to the choice and performance of the good which is loved. Because of the dual gifts of a congruous vocation and the love of commanded good, no man can glory in his good works as though they were not received from God. All of this is fully illustrated in the *Confessiones*.

During the intervening years before 417, Augustine avoided the question of divine election and the grace through which divine sovereignty is exercised over the will of the elect. In *Ep. 102 ad Despratias, sex*
guæstiones contra paganos expositae, he explained that God chose the
time of the Incarnation according to divine foreknowledge of men's re-
responses to the mission of Christ; but he neglected to mention that these
responses are determined by divine operation. In De spiritu et littera,
he restricted the discussion of the genesis of faith to the cases of those
who actually hear the preaching of the gospel; and he emphasized their
own consent to or refusal of God's persuasion, mentioning the divine
determination of man's response only in a closing, guarded remark. In
De perfectione justitiae hominis and De gestis Pelagii, he refrained from
pressing the full meaning of the text of Rom., 9.16, which was his major
premise for the assertion of divine efficacy in Ad Simplicianum.

Although he did not deal directly with divine election, Augustine
gradually achieved a broader and deeper understanding of the interrela-
tion of divine operation and human freedom during the years of his polemic
against the Donatists and during the first period of controversy with
the Pelagians. The operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church became
a dominant theme of his theology. The Spirit is the cause of the commu-
nion of fraternal love within the Church and the source of the efficacy
of its ministry. Augustine's repeated refutations of various Donatist
writers advanced other themes to prominence. Only those who receive
baptism and incorporation into the Catholic communion can enter the King-
dom of Christ; all others are lost. Hence, in those Donatists whose
conversion his prayers and persuasion failed to effect, and in those
others who were coerced by the threats of civil law, Augustine could dis-
cern the operation of divine rejection and election. He testifies that
only the experience of seeing former schismatics rejoice in the safety
of Catholic communion had reconciled him to the use of force. In those
who continued to reject reunion, Augustine may well have perceived a re-
enactment of God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart.

Insistence on the necessity of incorporation into Christ also pro-
vided the major premise for Augustine's theory of original sin. In the
salvation of dying infants through baptism and the condemnation of the
unbaptized he witnessed the operation of divine election and reprobation.
Augustine's later writings often reveal a man nearly overwhelmed by this
perception of divine mercy and justice which repaid eternal life and death
to infants who themselves had chosen neither good nor evil. The experi-
ence held him back from the creationist theory of the origin of the soul
and provided his strongest argument for the gratuity of grace.

Augustine served twenty years as bishop of Hippo and chief spokes-
man for the Catholic party in North Africa before he returned to the anal-
ysis of the efficacy of divine grace in 418. This labor changed him in
ways which must not be ignored in interpreting these writings. Moreover,
he was still involved with the Donatists during this critical stage of
the struggle with Pelagius. His justification of the use of coercion,
Ep. 185 ad Bonifatum, de correctione Donatistarum, was written in 417,\(^1\)
and about 420 he refuted the arguments of Gaudentius of Thamugadi and
exhorted Count Dulcitius to proceed against him.\(^2\) In the fall of 418,
between the writing of De gratia Christi and Ep. 194 ad Sixtum, he attempted
to win back Emeritus of Caesarea, one of the spokesmen of the Donatist
coalition.\(^3\) Despite the absence of formal connections such as those which

\(^1\) See Goldbacher, CSPF, LVIII, 47.

\(^2\) C. Gaud.; Ep. 204. For dating see Goldbacher, CSPF, LVIII, 53.

\(^3\) Germ. ad Caes. etc.; de gest. cum Emerito.
link the struggle against the Manicheans to the questions of the Pelagian controversy, the issues of the Donatist controversy define the background of Augustine's proceedings against Pelagius and the first consideration of divine election and efficacy after the original explanation at the beginning of his episcopacy.

Not only do Augustine's prominent ideas and assumptions of 418 vary from those of 396, the problematic of the new analysis of divine election and efficacy is significantly different from that of *Ad Simplicianum*. In each case, he argues that God's operation not only makes faith possible, but causes man's consent. In *Ad Simplicianum*, Augustine had to exclude man's autonomous response to the preaching of the gospel as the foreknown basis for divine election. In *De gratia Christi* and *Ep. 194 ad Sixtum*, however, his explanation had to rule out any human meriting which would jeopardize the gratuity of the charity which follows the consent and prayer of faith. In the first case, he rejected a human autonomy which could frustrate the divine intention to save an individual; but in the second, he excluded meritorious cooperation as well. The act of faith was no longer analyzed as a free choice motivated by persuasion, but was modeled on the spontaneous response of love and attributed to the inspiration of the Spirit.

The explanation of conversion which Augustine developed between 418 and 420 drew heavily on the themes which became prominent only after the writing of *Ad Simplicianum*: the interiority and efficacy of the charity of the Holy Spirit, the power of divine coercion to subvert man's opposi-

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tion, the evidence of election and reprobation arising from his experience of the salvation and condemnation of children, and the inner action of the Spirit which accompanies and completes the ministry of man.

The subsequent assertion of God's causing of man's perseverance in good extends the original affirmation of divine sovereignty to the fulfillment of the process of salvation. The proof and explanation of the divine operation, however, are drawn from the new analysis of conversion rather than from that of Ad Simplicianum. Augustine calls attention to the salvation and condemnation of children, and asserts that God effects in adults the meritorious action which he rewards with eternal life. Recalling his recognition in De spiritu et littera that the degree of charity given during terrestrial life never prevents all sin, Augustine acknowledges another gift by which God preserves his elect from failure. Finally, this operation is not restricted to the providential control of the environment but attributed to the inner working of the Holy Spirit.

Throughout his discussion of the interrelation of free will and grace, Augustine's attention focused on man's willing and action rather than on questions of capacity and possibility. In Ad Simplicianum, he distinguished the motives which win consent from those which leave man unmoved. When Pelagius insisted on man's inalienable power to avoid sin, Augustine set forth the conditions and limitations of the exercise of this power. In the new analysis of conversion he showed what sort of grace would actually convert a man who is persecuting the Church. Finally, between Adam's possibility of doing good and the impossibility of sinning which the blessed enjoy, he located the predestined person's unfailing performance of good. Both the Spirit's grace of conversion and the gift of perseverance are designed not to enhance man's power and foster its
exercise but actually to produce willing and performance. Augustine is concerned not with man's own capacities and possibilities but with the performance which God effects and the achievement of eternal life.

Seen in the light of this analysis of the development of Augustine's theory of the divine working of faith and perseverance, his later works do not display an intransigent dogmatism. Instead, a continual growth of his understanding and appreciation of the work of the Holy Spirit which had become prominent during the Donatist controversy is reflected in the new doctrines of conversion and perseverance.

In distinguishing Augustine's later doctrine of efficacious interior grace from his earlier explanation of the exercise of divine sovereignty over human freedom by control of the environment of choice, the present study attempts to exclude most of the traditional means of mitigating the rigor of his final assertions. Augustine seems to have considered the recognition of God's predestination to sin and condemnation a corollary to his explanation of the gratuity of faith, charity and eternal life. Further inquiry must specify the significance which he attached to this implication. Did Augustine accept double predestination only as the inescapable consequence of his assertion of the gratuity and efficacy of grace? Or did he consider this manifestation of divine judgment integral to the higher and fuller good which is achieved in the Christic economy? If reprobation was only an implication which Augustine found no way of avoiding, then subsequent attempts to exclude it through more subtle analysis may remain more faithful to his original insight than dogmatic defenses of its necessity which ignore its derivation in his thought. If, however, it is integral to Augustine's explanation of the
Christic economy, his system may yet be ranked with Origen's as a brilliant, suggestive, but ultimately unsatisfactory exposition of Christian faith.

An investigation of the significance of divine reprobation could begin by examining Augustine's assertion of God's use of men's evil actions to accomplish the good of his saints and the providential ordering of world history for the development of the Church. It could extend to the development of his understanding of the original state of angels and men. In particular, the analysis could include the apparent discrepancy between the explanation that all the angels were given only the possibility of avoiding sin and meriting eternal life which Augustine sets forth in *De correptione et gratia*, and his earlier statement in *De civitate Dei* that those who persevered had been helped by a fuller grace.  

The present analysis also prepares for a developmental study of Augustine's understanding of the mission and work of the Holy Spirit. His characterization of the Spirit as the body of unity between the Father and the Son is brilliantly developed in the discussion of the building of the communion of the Church and of the perception of divine reality in the experience of fraternal love. Augustine later recognizes the operation of the Spirit not only in the gift of charity but in working Christian faith and perseverance, and in perfecting the humanity of Jesus Christ. A study of this development might also expose the continuity between the Donatist and Pelagian controversies.


6*De civ. Dei*, 12.9.
Finally, this developmental study has exposed the infrastructure of Augustine's doctrine of election and predestination, the principles which are its foundation and the theories which support it. Thus it helps establish a standard or base line for the investigation of subsequent attempts to deal with these questions which drew on his work. Many theologians escaped his conclusions only by obscurantism, while others accepted them with no clear perception of their presuppositions. Some, it may be hoped, recognized the limitations of his resources, expand the analysis, and develop a more comprehensive explanation of divine sovereignty and human freedom.
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